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By S. REED BRETT, M.A.

CHIEF HISTORY MASTER,
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CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

WILLIAM III AND ANNE: HOME AFFAIRS

	PAGE
1. POSITION OF WILLIAM III	I
2. FINANCIAL MEASURES	7
3. ACT OF SETTLEMENT	11
4. QUEEN ANNE, 1702-1714	14
5. UNION OF SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND, 1707	17
6. EFFECTS OF THE REVOLUTION	19

CHAPTER II

WAR OF ENGLISH SUCCESSION, 1689-1697

1. CAUSES OF THE WAR	22
2. WAR IN SCOTLAND	24
3. WAR IN IRELAND	27
4. WAR AT SEA	31
5. TREATY OF RYSWICK, 1697	33

CHAPTER III

WAR OF SPANISH SUCCESSION, 1702-1713

1. PROBLEM OF THE SUCCESSION	35
2. THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH	40
3. THE BLENHEIM CAMPAIGN, 1704	44
4. SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS, 1705-1709	47
5. PEACE, 1710-1713	52

AND

CHAPTER IV

GEORGE I AND GEORGE II: HOME AFFAIRS 1714-1760

1. PARTY POLITICS	57
2. WALPOLE'S RISE TO POWER	64

	PAGE
3. THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE, 1720	67
✓ 4. DEVELOPMENT OF CABINET GOVERNMENT	70
✓ 5. WALPOLE'S FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION	73
6. THE "FIFTEEN" AND THE "FORTY-FIVE" RE- BELLIONS.	78
7. CALENDAR REVISION, 1751	82

CHAPTER V

WAR OF AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION, 1740-1748

✓ 1. WAR OF CAPTAIN JENKINS' EAR, 1739.	84
✓ 2. CAUSES OF WAR OF AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION	86
3. BRITAIN AND THE WAR	93
4. TREATY OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, 1748	96

CHAPTER VI

SEVEN YEARS' WAR, 1756-1763

1. THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION	98
2. ✓ ENGLISH AND FRENCH IN NORTH AMERICA	100
✓ 3. OUTBREAK OF WAR	104
✓ 4. WILLIAM PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM	107
5. THE CAMPAIGNS, 1757-1760.	113
6. THE END OF THE WAR	120

CHAPTER VII

DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, 1760-1815

1. KING GEORGE III, 1760-1820	125
2. EARLY MINISTRIES OF GEORGE III, 1760-1783	128
3. ✓ WILLIAM PITT, THE YOUNGER	139
4. THE CLOSE OF GEORGE III'S REIGN, 1806-1820	146
5. SAMUEL JOHNSON, 1709-1784	149
6. THE WESLEYS	151

CHAPTER VIII

✓ WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE, 1775-1783

1. CAUSES OF THE WAR	159
2. EVENTS LEADING TO OUTBREAK	162
3. THE WAR	167
4. THE PEACE OF VERSAILLES, 1783	177

CHAPTER IX

IRELAND

	PAGE
1. CONDITIONS AFTER 1689	181
2. CONDITIONS IMPROVED, 1778-1782	184
3. EVENTS LEADING TO UNION	187
4. THE ACT OF UNION, 1800	190

CHAPTER X

INDIA

1. THE ENGLISH IN INDIA, 1600-1750	193
2. ROBERT CLIVE, 1751-1767	198
3. REGULATING ACT, 1773 ✓	206
4. WARREN HASTINGS, 1772-1784	209
5. PITT'S INDIA ACT, 1784	216
6. CORNWALLIS AND WELLESLEY ✓	217

CHAPTER XI

✓ THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

1. THE REVOLUTION SUMMARIZED	221
2. INVENTIONS IN MANUFACTURES	224
3. IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS.	229
4. INVENTIONS IN AGRICULTURE	233
5. RESULTS OF THE REVOLUTION	239

CHAPTER XII

✓ THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1792-1802

1. FRANCE AND THE REVOLUTION	245
2. ATTITUDE OF BRITAIN.	252
3. FIRST COALITION, 1793-1797	255
4. EGYPT AND THE SECOND COALITION	263
5. END OF THE WAR	266

CHAPTER XIII

THE NAPOLEONIC WAR, 1803-1815

	PAGE
1. TRAFALGAR CAMPAIGN	270
2. THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM	277
3. THE PENINSULAR WAR, 1808-1814	280
4. THE HUNDRED DAYS	292
5. THE PEACE	296

CHAPTER XIV

REVIEW OF PERIOD, 1688-1815

1. ENGLAND AND FRANCE	299
2. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT	301

SUMMARY OF COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT, 1688-1815	303
TIME CHARTS	306
INDEX	311

LIST OF MAPS

	PAGE
CAMPAIGNS OF WILLIAM III AND MARLBOROUGH	41
WILLIAM III IN IRELAND ; 1745 REBELLION	79
GROWTH OF PRUSSIA	89
SILESIAN WARS, 1740-1763	91
SEVEN YEARS' WAR IN AMERICA ; WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE	158
INDIA IN THE TIME OF CLIVE AND WARREN HASTINGS	199
DENSITY OF POPULATION IN ENGLAND, 1700 AND 1800	222-223
TRAFALGAR CAMPAIGN	271
PENINSULAR WAR, 1808-1814	281
WATERLOO CAMPAIGN	293

GENEALOGICAL TABLES

WILLIAM III AND THE HANOVERIANS (DESCENDANTS OF JAMES I)	2
SPANISH SUCCESSION (DESCENDANTS OF PHILIP III OF SPAIN)	36
HOUSE OF HANOVER (DESCENDANTS OF GEORGE I)	58
AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION (DESCENDANTS OF LEOPOLD I).	87

TIME CHARTS

1688-1721	(<i>end of book</i>)
1721-1763	" "
1760-1793	" "
1789-1815	" "

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PREFACE

THIS volume, like the others of the series of which it forms a part, is designed primarily as a text-book for candidates for the First School Examination. The particular form of the subject-matter is the direct outcome of the author's preparation of such candidates during a number of years. In this connection three features of the book call for notice.

First, though the general order is necessarily chronological, a topical treatment has also been adopted wherever this seemed advisable. Second, relatively only a few subjects have been dealt with somewhat lengthily rather than a larger number cursorily. Third, notes or chapter-summaries have purposely been omitted, because the aim of the writer is not to save pupils the trouble of thinking, but to put into their hands a book so arranged that they can use it for themselves: hence the subject-divisions within each chapter have been carefully selected and the headings collected in the contents-list. The concluding chapter, however, consists of a summary of the leading characteristics whose development the book has already traced in detail.

As far as the scope of the book allows, the social and religious as well as the political aspects of national life have received attention, and emphasis has been laid not merely upon facts but upon the meaning of facts by showing how particular events were related to one another and to the general features of the period. Military events have never been included for their own sake; their details are given only when essential to an understanding of contemporary policy.

Further aids to study are the Time Charts at the end

of the volume, and the maps. The latter—for the preparation of which the author is indebted, as in his *Europe Since the Renaissance*, to the enthusiastic co-operation of his colleague, Mr. D. R. Hill—are intended to illustrate boldly the main geographical features of the subject-matter, and every detail irrelevant to that purpose has been omitted. The necessity for the regular study of a good historical atlas along with the text-book can hardly be exaggerated.

The author hopes that these features will be conducive to an intelligent grasp of the subject and to successful examination-preparation—two objects which may be less widely separated than we are apt sometimes to suppose.

S. R. B.

NUNEATON,

January, 1933.

A glance over the period covered by this volume shows two main lines of events working themselves out : abroad there was a series of prolonged wars, while within England there was far-reaching constitutional development. In practice these two sets of events inevitably reacted upon each other, and the people who lived in the midst of them were not conscious of any separation between the two. But to distinguish between them in our own minds and to follow them one at a time is the surest means of grasping the real significance of the period. Throughout this book, therefore, we shall quite frankly do some violence to the actual sequence of events ; we shall deal with " Home Affairs " and with " Foreign Affairs " as separate topics except where the relationship between them was so intimate that to divide them would cause greater confusion than to deal with them together.

Some readers, particularly those who already have some knowledge of eighteenth-century history, may find help by beginning with the concluding chapter which summarizes the main features of the period 1688-1815 and which should enable students to understand how each separate subject fits into the story of the whole.

CHAPTER I


WILLIAM III AND ANNE: HOME AFFAIRS, 1688-1714

I. POSITION OF WILLIAM III

Bill of Rights.

JAMES II had succeeded his brother Charles II as King in February, 1685. By the middle of 1688 his despotic rule, and particularly his attempts to force Roman Catholicism upon the nation, had so alienated the mass of the people that a body of leading men invited William of Orange, the husband of James's daughter Mary and the Protestant Stadtholder of Holland, to come to England with an army. William landed in November, 1688, and James almost immediately fled. Hence when William III and Mary II became King and Queen, the political situation was in several respects unprecedented in the history of England. There had been no previous king during what even then could be considered as modern times who could not have made out some claim to the throne in his own right: even the first Tudor could have done that. Yet William III of Orange had no shadow of a right to the throne by any of the accepted rules of descent. Apart from James II himself, both the Princess Mary (who happened to be William's wife) and the Princess Anne had better claims than William. Moreover, though it is true that no section of the nation raised a finger in support of James II, it is equally true that the invitation to William had issued mainly from one party, the Whigs, who still were animated by the same political principle as when

WILLIAM III AND ANNE: HOME AFFAIRS



they were originally and tentatively founded by Shaftesbury in Charles II's reign at the break-up of the Cabal in 1678. That principle was that the King should rule not by his own personal authority but through Parliament. This did not mean that the King should be either a figure-head or a puppet: it meant that he should rule according to the accepted rules of the Constitution, that is, he was to be a Constitutional King.

This fact found appropriate expression in the Declaration of Rights, the terms of which were incorporated in the Bill of Rights which was passed by Parliament in 1689. William and Mary were thereby declared to be King and Queen, and after them the crown was to descend to their children or, if there were no descendants, to the Princess Anne; but henceforward Roman Catholics were to be excluded from the throne. Parliament was to meet frequently, to be freely elected and to give its consent before any taxation could be levied. Further, the dispensing power—that is, the King's power to ignore Acts of Parliament—"as it hath been exercised of late" and the keeping of a standing army in time of peace were declared to be illegal. This Act in effect re-asserted what were regarded as the rights of Englishmen and swept away the illegal innovations and accretions of the Stuart period. Its immediate effect was to impose limitations more definite than those endured by any previous monarch. Yet ample reason for such a step could be found in the recent history of the State; and it is greatly to the credit of William's good sense and honesty that he never attempted either to evade or to override his bargain.

~~Mutiny~~ Act, 1689.

One clause of the Bill of Rights was inoperative from the outset, namely, that forbidding a standing army in time of peace. The clause was the expression of the nation's distrust of army rule which the Cromwellian régime had so forcibly exemplified and which the later

Stuarts had tried to revive in a different form. Nevertheless, however deep might be the popular hatred of a standing army as a general principle, the foreign danger in which England stood in 1689 was too real to justify the complete disbandment of the Crown forces at that particular moment. An attempt was therefore made to provide for immediate national defence without endangering England's freedom from militarism as a permanent principle. The particular form which this attempt took was determined by the accident that in 1689, through jealousy of the Dutch troops, an English regiment mutinied. A Mutiny Act was therefore passed legalizing the army for one year and providing for punishments for military offences (hence the name of the Act). If the Act was not renewed at the end of twelve months, it lapsed automatically, so that the soldiers would become private citizens and the King would be left without an army. As a consequence, the King was compelled to call a Parliament every year in order to pass the Mutiny Act. This in fact took place, and in principle still takes place, though in 1879 the Mutiny Act was merged in a much more elaborate measure, the Army (Annual) Act. It is in keeping with the methods whereby the British Constitution has developed, that this necessity for the regular meeting of Parliament—fundamental to the security of political freedom—should have been provided for incidentally to some other measure and almost by accident.

Triennial Act, 1694.

Two other Acts near the beginning of William's reign also related to the regular meeting of Parliament. One of these—the provision of a Civil List as explained in the following section of this chapter—also did so incidentally, and the other—the Triennial Act—was expressly designed for that purpose. This latter Act stated that no Parliament was to last more than three years, the object being to prevent the repetition of such an anomaly as the

"Cavalier Parliament" of Charles II which, lasting from 1661 till 1679, was completely out of touch with the wishes of the people long before the end of its life. The effect of the Triennial Act, in conjunction with the Mutiny Act and the establishment of the Civil List, was that a general election was necessary at least every third year and that a Parliament must meet every year.—

Personal Liberty.

The liberty which the Bill of Rights assured to the subject in the realm of politics was extended also in other directions. In 1689 the Toleration Act granted freedom of worship to all persons who accepted a certain thirty-six of the Thirty-nine Articles of belief as set out in the Book of Common Prayer. Indeed, it would have been a strange anomaly if the Calvinist King had been compelled to enforce laws against English Puritans. The actual effect of the Act was to secure toleration for all non-conformists except Roman Catholics and Unitarians. Even here, however, the law was much less terrible in practice than it was in theory, and, though exceptional instances can be cited, Roman Catholic services were not interfered with by the government.

There was one respect in which dissenters still were under disabilities, for the Corporation and the Test Acts remained in force so that only members of the Church of England could take public office. A further notable advance towards true liberty was made in 1695. Until that year an annual Licensing Act had maintained a censorship of the Press; but in 1695 Parliament did not pass the Act, which thus happily lapsed.

Character of William III.

One of the factors exerting a determining influence upon politics was the health and character of the King himself. In manner William presented a sharp contrast to his immediate predecessors. The former Stuart mon-

6 WILLIAM III AND ANNE: HOME AFFAIRS

archs had, for the most part, been attractive in appearance and affable in demeanour towards their ministers and even towards such of the common folk as they met. William, on the contrary, was of slight physique and lacked the charm which is so often the natural expression of robust health. For, from his early days he had been a prey to chronic chest weakness which, for long periods together, meant that the drawing of every breath brought excruciating pain. Small wonder if such an affliction produced irritability and moroseness. But it is easy to understand also that the result was the personal unpopularity of William. Moreover, his physical condition made it impossible for William to reside in the heart of London; at periods he even had to return to his native Holland. Hence he tended to be out of touch with the intimate, personal details of politics—in which Charles II had excelled—and frequently to incur the suspicion of favouring the interests of Holland to the neglect of those of England. Indeed, a great deal of the unpopularity which William had to endure was traceable to the naturally common conviction that William had accepted the English throne merely in order to secure the resources of this country for the defence of Holland and for the overthrow of his traditional enemy, Louis XIV of France. This was the root explanation of the reluctance of England to support William over the question of the succession to the Spanish throne.

But if William seemed to contrast unfavourably with his immediate predecessors in appearance and manners, he had no need to fear comparison with them in his moral character or in his devotion to kingly duty. That William continued to live at all was due more to unflinching determination of will than to any other cause. This characteristic he carried into every other sphere of his life. Though the petty scheming of politicians often provoked bitterness on William's part and even brought him to the verge of relinquishing the crown and returning to his own beloved

land, he never neglected his duty as king of England or failed to carry out the policy which he believed to be in the true interests of the State.

Mary, the Queen, possessed a very different temperament from that of her husband. She had a friendly, kindly nature and was accustomed to yield to the will of her husband. Thus Mary was something of a compensation to the grimness of William, and at the same time her placidness tended to have a calming effect upon him. When, therefore, Mary contracted the then only-too-common smallpox and died in December, 1694, William suffered a catastrophe in more than one direction. Not only did he lose the affection of his wife; he lost also one of the few counterpoises to his own personal unpopularity. Moreover, not a few persons who disliked William as the supplanter of the rightful Stuart line, had nevertheless not opposed him because of the claim to the throne possessed by his wife. Her death removed even this slender thread of attachment, and the latter half of his reign was more bitter in character than the early half.

These personal details of William must be constantly in mind if we are to assess both himself and his reign justly.

2. FINANCIAL MEASURES

Civil List.

One of William's most pressing problems was that associated with finance. His accession was made the occasion for a change in the procedure of Parliamentary grants. Instead of allowing a total sum with which the King was to meet all his expenses, both private and public, Parliament divided the royal revenue into two parts. The first part, called the "Civil List", consisted of a vote of £700,000 per annum for life and was intended to cover his personal expenses and the cost of the Civil Service. But this sum was purposely insufficient for the upkeep of the army and navy and other governmental

services. In order to obtain the second part of his revenue, the King had to submit to Parliament an estimate of his expenditure for the coming year. This procedure ensured that the Commons should have effective control over the royal revenue and hence indirectly over the King's general policy. It also necessitated the meeting of Parliament every year, and thus reinforced the similar effect of the Mutiny Act referred to in the previous section.

Charles II and Goldsmiths.

The King's normal financial resources as outlined above were strained to the breaking-point by the wars which William found himself compelled to wage in Scotland and Ireland as well as in the Netherlands. The usual expedient of kings in such circumstances had been to borrow from moneyed men in the City—mostly the goldsmiths—on the security of the public taxes. Hence, if the whole or part of the loan were repaid when the new year's revenue began to come in, the King had at his disposal for the ensuing year only his usual income minus the amount repaid. Before that second year had expired, therefore, he would have to borrow more heavily than before. Consequently, every year the King would get more heavily in debt, and the inevitable end would be bankruptcy. Even if he paid only the interest on the loan, his position, except temporarily, was not improved but rather grew worse.

Charles II, whose constant quarrels with Parliament made him chronically impecunious in spite of subsidies from Louis XIV, was especially addicted to this procedure. During the first decade of his reign, Charles's debt to the goldsmiths steadily accumulated and was aggravated by the prevailing high rate of interest: even the King had to pay 8 per cent. on his loans. By 1672 Charles owed the huge sum of over £1,300,000, and in that year he declared his inability to repay the capital sum but undertook to maintain his payments of interest. This promise, however, was kept about as faithfully as most of that

monarch's: sometimes the interest was forthcoming, and sometimes not, and in 1683 it definitely ceased.

Bank of England, 1694.

The effect of all this upon the position of William III is not difficult to understand. The credit of royalty having been so completely undermined, the moneyed folk refused to respond to William's desire for a loan. Yet the normal channels of revenue certainly could not be made to produce enough to defray the temporary, extraordinary expenses of war. Hence some special inducement had to be offered to those who had money to lend the King. The actual plan adopted is attributed to William Paterson, the originator of the Darien Scheme mentioned later in the present chapter. The plan was simply that those persons who contributed towards the total sum of £1,200,000 lent to the Crown at 8 per cent. interest should be incorporated into the Company of the Bank of England and should be the only corporation allowed to issue bank-notes in and around London. These terms, included in an Act of Parliament of 1694, were immediately successful: within a few days the whole of the sum had been subscribed.

Results of the Bank.

The Bank thus established was to become the very bulwark of the financial security of Britain and the financial centre of the world. Before attaining that eminence, however, it had a chequered history. The later stages of its history will call for review in a subsequent chapter. Here we must be concerned with the immediate political results of the establishment of the Bank. One effect was soon evident: those who had thus lent money to William realized that if William were overthrown by James II or the Pretender, the latter would almost certainly revenge himself by seizing the treasure so conveniently deposited in the Bank's coffers. Hence, William was consistently supported by the moneyed men who, if only for financial

reasons, threw in their lot with the Whig party. Even a full generation later the same factor was still operative, for when in 1745 Bonnie Prince Charlie seemed within striking distance of London, there was a "run on the Bank" owing to the rush of depositors to secure their money before the Stuarts appropriated it. Thus it is safe to assert that the Bank of England, which originally was founded in order to meet a passing need, became the most potent source of strength to the throne not only under William III and Anne but also under their successors the Hanoverians.

Coinage Restored.

One other item of financial interest during the same period was the restoration of the coinage. During the Stuart period there had been a steady decline in the standard of the coinage. For this the Stuarts had not been personally responsible, and there is no evidence that they had issued debased coinage as some of the Tudors had done. The unreliability of the value of any particular coin was due to another cause, namely, that the absence of milled edges encouraged the practice of "clipping". So common did this become that numbers of men made their living by this fraudulent means. Further, much of the coinage in circulation was so old and worn that to counterfeit it was a simple operation. Hence, through the combination of these two practices—clipping and counterfeiting—the coinage at the beginning of William's reign was deplorably debased. The results were evident on every hand: trade was hampered by bargaining about how many of the particular coins offered should be paid for a particular article and by the rise of prices generally as some sort of protection against receiving less than the value for goods sold. Almost as serious was the hoarding of relatively good money—thus illustrating the famous "law" of Gresham who, in the reign of Elizabeth, declared that "bad money drives out good"

—so that not only was there a dearth of coins in circulation but the money that was available became progressively worse.

So urgent did the problem become that at last the Government decided on a scheme whereby the faulty coins were to be called in and new ones, of a standard fineness, were to be issued. The Declaration giving details of the procedure relative to re-coinage was issued in December, 1695, but the bulk of the work was carried through in 1696 and was supervised by Sir Isaac Newton. Inevitably, the issuing of good coins in place of defective ones involved the Treasury in a loss for each coin thus dealt with, the aggregate loss being £2,400,000. This charge was felt all the more heavily because it had to be borne at the same time as the cost of the war. Nevertheless, the economic benefit to the nation generally was so great and so immediate that instead of the re-coinage being felt as a burden it proved to be one means whereby the nation was enabled to face and to discharge its financial liabilities.

3. ACT OF SETTLEMENT

Reasons for Act.

As the reign of William proceeded, nearly all classes grew to feel that the welfare of the nation depended upon securing the continued exclusion of the "Pretenders" from the throne. We have seen already that the Whigs—who represented the majority of the nation—supported William for reasons of political principle, and that this attitude was reinforced by the commercial class who allied themselves with the Whigs as a matter of expediency if not of conviction. Gradually another factor had an increasing influence in the same direction: this relates primarily to foreign affairs and should become clearer as we proceed with the events related in the next two chapters. Suffice it to say that the close alliance between Louis XIV

of France and the exiled Stuarts caused grave uneasiness to patriotic Englishmen of nearly every type. Even most of the Roman Catholics did not wish to see their faith reintroduced by James II with the help of French soldiers. Rather than that they preferred a Protestant monarchy, especially as under it they were in practice unmolested in the exercise of their religion.

At last, near what proved to be the end of William's reign, an occurrence compelled the Government definitely to face the situation. In 1694 the Queen had died, and the King was left childless. The genealogical table shows that William's successor would be his late wife's sister, the Princess Anne. Anne had married Prince George of Denmark and had had a numerous family of children, but every one of them had died in infancy with one exception, a boy known as the Duke of Gloucester. Then, in 1700, when he was eleven years of age, the Duke of Gloucester himself died, so that after Anne there would be no descendant of James II and his first wife to succeed to the throne. William's health was then evidently fast failing—he actually died in 1702—and obviously none could predict how long the Princess Anne might survive him. One thing was plain: the death of Anne, whether it came early or late, would be the occasion for James II or the Pretender to reassert his claim to the throne. If that happened in the absence of any other individual with an undisputed claim, none could foresee the outcome: civil war, with one side helped by France, was almost a certainty. Hence the Government wisely decided to forestall that event by legislating immediately on the question of the succession. In 1701 the Act of Settlement was passed.

Clauses.

The arrangement made by that Act was based upon securing the succession of the nearest Protestant claimant to the throne. This proved to be Sophia, the daughter

of Elizabeth—daughter of James I of England—and of that Elector Palatine who had been so unfortunate in the Thirty Years' War. Accordingly, the Act provided that the crown should descend to the "most excellent Princess Sophia, and the heirs of her body, being Protestants".

The opportunity of the passage of an Act of Parliament relative to the Crown was seized upon in order to enact further regulations concerning the King's powers. Two clauses of the utmost importance were inserted. The first was that judges could not be dismissed by the personal will of the King so long as they "behaved themselves"—*quamdiu se bene gesserint*—that is, so long as they continued properly to discharge their duties as judges. Second, a royal pardon was not to be pleadable by a minister when impeached by the House of Commons. Thus were finally settled two of the great causes of the Civil War: by the first, the King could no longer do illegal acts and then rely upon a corrupt Bench to enforce his will upon unwilling subjects; and by the second, ministers were definitely responsible for every act of state.

In addition to these great safeguarding clauses, the Act also contained others which were included out of petty jealousy of William III, such as that England need not go to war to defend the foreign possessions of the Crown, that the King was not to leave England without Parliament's consent, and that persons of foreign birth were not to hold lands or be admitted to Parliament or to office under the Crown. These clauses were patently directed against William personally rather than for the maintenance of liberty as such. William, however, was quite content to endure these snubs so long as the Protestant succession was maintained in England, for only thus was there any assurance of a continued alliance between England and Holland against France. Fortunately, with the passing of the immediate cause of this antagonism to William, most of these minor clauses were either repealed or amended.

4. QUEEN ANNE, 1702-1714

Characteristics of Queen.

The death of William III took place suddenly in March, 1702. Though his frail body was not expected to last as long as it did, the manner of his death was strange. During February, while riding at Hampton Court, William's horse stumbled over a mole-hill, threw the King and broke his collar-bone. The injury in itself was not serious, or would not have been to a robust frame, but William's constitution could not withstand the shock. His death seemed to have occurred at the most critical juncture of the reign; for the great war against Louis of France over the succession to the Spanish throne was just beginning. Fortunately, as the next chapter will show, English generalship was in safe hands, but the monarch who was to control politics at home presented as sharp a contrast to William as can well be imagined.

Personally the Queen was rather a simple-minded, ordinary, uninteresting woman. Her husband, Prince George of Denmark, was a fitting consort; and Charles II's classic jest on his niece's husband aptly summarized his character: "I have tried him drunk, and I have tried him sober, and there is nothing in him!" The commonplace nature of the Queen's character was certain to produce reactions in English political life. Previous sovereigns, with rare exceptions, had been active partisans in politics. Some had been competent, some feeble; some honest, some given to duplicity; but, throughout Tudor and Stuart times, they had never been nonentities. Now, with such a monarch as Anne, the centre of political power was certain to shift to other quarters.

Political Parties.

One of the new political influences was that of the ladies of the Queen's Court. The exercise of political power by Court ladies was by no means an unheard-of

thing, but under Anne that power was wielded in an unusual way. Usually, the influence of ladies had been due to their charm over the King; but the ladies of Anne's Court owed their sway to self-assertiveness exercised over the placid mind of the Queen. Ascendancy thus gained was used in the interests of one or other of the political parties.

During the greater part of the reign, the Court favourite was Sarah Jennings, Duchess of Marlborough. Personally, the Queen favoured the Tories rather than the Whigs, if only because of the alliance of the Tories with the Church, for her religious conviction was clear and consistent: all her life she remained a faithful member of the Church of England. But so completely was she under the domination of the Duchess, whose husband's position as commander of the English and Allied armies on the Continent depended upon Whig support, that during the first half-dozen years of the reign the Whigs' tenure of office was assured; the Whig ministry that was in power from 1702 till 1710 being led by Godolphin. So intimate was the relationship between the Queen and the Duchess, that titles and ceremonies were privately dropped and to each other they were "Mrs. Freeman" and "Mrs. Morley."

But the Tories were not slow to learn their lesson. Their leaders were Robert Harley and Henry St. John. They found in another Court lady, Mrs. Abigail Masham, a means of poisoning the Queen's mind against the Marlboroughs. Under this influence even Queen Anne began to resent the domineering attitude of the Duchess, and gradually the latter's ascendancy began to diminish. Hence, when the nation grew weary of war—as the next chapters will show—the Whigs, bereft of the foundation of their power, were driven from office.

Dr. Sacheverell.

The immediate cause of their fall was bad political tactics over what in itself was a trifling issue. In the year

1710 a certain High Church clergyman, Dr. Sacheverell, preached a sermon before the Lord Mayor and Aldermen in St. Paul's Cathedral. The sermon was entitled "The Perils from False Brethren," and during the course of it he maintained the Tory principle of non-resistance to the Crown and asserted in violent, not to say vituperative, language that the Church was in peril since the Whig ministers were its enemies. The Whigs, feeling that the tide was beginning to turn against them, decided to try to stem the flow before too late. They therefore took the incredibly foolish decision to impeach Sacheverell for an attack on the Revolution Settlement. The only effect was to call attention to something which otherwise would quickly have died a natural death. The Tories played on the people's susceptibility to the cry of "The Church in Danger," and the Doctor, from being a somewhat verbose pomposity, was transformed into a popular hero. He was found guilty, but the light sentence—that he be prohibited from preaching for three years—was equivalent to an acquittal, and the public roar against the Whigs swelled yet louder. Thereupon the Queen took the step of dismissing the Whig Government. The Tories came into power, Harley, as Earl of Oxford, becoming Lord Treasurer, and St. John, as Viscount Bolingbroke, Secretary of State.

Pamphleteers.

One other political agency calls for at least brief notice: it was during the reign of Anne that pamphleteering became so potent a party weapon. On the Whig side were Addison, the editor of the *Spectator*—which, though mainly literary, was nevertheless of considerable political influence—and Defoe, the author of *Robinson Crusoe*, whose pamphlets were a continual source of bitterness to the Tories. But perhaps in Jonathan Swift, Dean of St. Patrick's, Dublin, the Tories had the most notable contemporary political writer of all. Swift was the author of *Gulliver's Travels*, and even this, to those who had eyes

to see, was a satire upon the politics of his time. His most famous effort was the *Conduct of the Allies*, in which he urged the reasons for ending the War of Spanish Succession. In the absence of newspapers and of political meetings, the pamphlets by these and other writers had a determining influence on the trend of public opinion.

5. UNION OF SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND, 1707.

Condition of Scotland.

One of the most notable achievements of the period 1688-1714 was the political union of Scotland and England. Since the year 1603 when James VI of Scotland became also James I of England, the same individual had been the monarch of both countries; but each country had nevertheless retained its own Parliament and its own Council, and each was politically independent of the other as if the two crowns had been worn by two heads instead of by one. Yet, though the two states were politically separate, there were at work forces of various kinds tending very strongly to bring them together.

Tendencies to Union.

First, English trade regulations, notably the Navigation Acts, severely handicapped the trade of Scotland which, under the terms of those Acts, was a foreign country. Scotland was a poverty-stricken land at best, generally undeveloped and subject to disorderly Highland raids upon the Lowlands, and if she was to continue to be impoverished commercially, there seemed no end in sight but starvation. Yet England could hardly be expected to modify her trade regulations in the interest of Scotland unless some concessions were received in return.

Second, in spite of the atrocious massacre of Glencoe—to be mentioned in the following chapter—Scotland became generally reconciled, from religious motives, to the government of William III. For in 1689 Presbyterianism was

recognized as the established religion of Scotland, and even those folk with Jacobite sympathies began to wonder whether they would receive equal security if the Roman Catholic Stuarts returned. Such wavering was not shared, of course, by the Highland clans, each of which was in any case a law unto itself and would have paid no more regard to one sort of king than to another.

Events preceding Union.

Matters were shown up in their true light by an incident that caused greatly embittered feelings between the two peoples. In the year 1698 a number of Scottish merchants tried to found a settlement on the Isthmus of Darien for the development of trade in the South Seas. The enterprise, however, was doomed to failure: bad management and the hostility of the Spanish Government—which naturally did not welcome trading rivals within what it regarded as its own preserve—combined to produce disaster. The Scots were angered because King William did not show sufficient energy on their behalf with the Spanish Government; William regarded the scheme as verging on the absurd and, in 1698, was in no position to make fresh enemies abroad. Friction thus created was rendered still more intense by the passage of the Act of Settlement in 1701; for the Scots resented the arrangement of the succession without any sort of reference to their wishes. Indeed, so embittered did their feelings become that in 1704 the Scottish Parliament passed the *Act of Security*, the substance of which was that when Queen Anne died Scotland would select a king for itself. Yet it was obvious to statesmen on both sides of the border that such an event would not really promote the interests of either party: the economic, religious and political well-being of both kingdoms depended not upon their separation but upon their union. Accordingly, in spite of the Act of Security, negotiations were set on foot, the outcome being the Act of Union of 1707.

Clauses.

The chief terms of the Act were that Scotland should retain her own legal system and the Presbyterian Church, should contribute $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom, and should be represented in the Parliament at Westminster by forty-five members in the Commons and by sixteen in the Lords, and that there should be complete free trade between the two countries. Thus at last the dream of so many English kings came true: on 1st May, 1707, there arose the "United Kingdom of Great Britain".

Effects of Union.

There can be little doubt that the terms were very advantageous to Scotland. Her relative poverty was accurately reflected in the very low quota she was to make towards the united revenue. It was Scotland, therefore, that would benefit by the establishment of mutual free trade; and the prodigious industrial and commercial development of Scotland since the beginning of the eighteenth century is certainly traceable in the main to the Union. On the other hand, Scotland has made her own contribution to the common interests of the new kingdom. One of the effects of the freedom of trade was that the Scots were no longer subject to the English Navigation Laws, and hence were able to trade with the English colonies. This fostered Scottish shipping, but it also encouraged the Scots themselves to join in colonial enterprise, and increasingly British colonies have reaped the benefit from the native wit and the initiative of Scotsmen; so that the extent and prosperity of the British Empire is due in no small measure to the Act of Union.

6. EFFECTS OF THE REVOLUTION

This is a convenient point, before we turn to the foreign relations of England under William III and Anne, at which

to summarize the main effects of the Revolution of 1688. Of these effects, three call for special emphasis.

Constitutional Monarchy.

First, and foremost in importance, the ejection of James II and the coming of William III was the logical and final settlement of the dispute—of which the Civil War (1642–1649) had really been but one stage—between Stuarts and Parliament. For the basis and the definition of William's power was the Bill of Rights which was in essence a bargain between King and People; and no king who ruled by virtue of a bargain, no matter what the terms of the bargain may be, can at the same time claim to rule by Divine Right. In short, the coming of William marked the definite establishment of constitutional monarchy as defined in the Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement. In the years that followed, the British Constitution underwent modifications in various respects, but the principle that the will of the people, as expressed through Parliament, should be supreme has remained unmoved.

Party System.

One further result of the 1688 Revolution, and allied with the supremacy of Parliament, was the development of the party system of Parliamentary government. Already we have seen that William's dependence upon the Whigs caused a sharper definition of party differences. Our subsequent study ¹ will show that the system thus emphasized under William III was, under George I and George II, to become the foundation of the whole fabric of British government. The special characteristics and principles of the respective parties will be reviewed at that point of the history.

Protestantism Secured.

Most of the other results of the Revolution follow from the two main ones already explained. One of them

¹ Chapter IV, sections 1 and 2.

perhaps, calls for particular mention, namely, that Protestantism was secured as the state religion of England, the Act of Settlement laying down definitely that the heirs of Sophia of Hanover should be eligible to succeed Queen Anne only if they were Protestants. The effect of this provision extended far beyond England itself. When William became King of England, Holland was almost of necessity assured of the alliance of this country against the attacks of the Roman Catholic Louis XIV of France. England might make paper provisions that she should not be dragged into war to defend the foreign possessions of the Crown, but the logic of events made those provisions impossible of execution. One of the outstanding effects of the Revolution, therefore, was the participation of England in a series of great foreign wars. Our business in the next chapter is to begin the study of those wars in detail.

CHAPTER II

WAR OF ENGLISH SUCCESSION, 1689-1697

I. CAUSES OF THE WAR

THE War of English Succession was the first of seven great wars in which England was involved against France during the period 1688-1815. To understand its root cause we need some knowledge of the position of France in Europe.

Menace of Louis XIV.

The reign of Louis XIV covered the extraordinarily long era of 1643-1715. Until 1661, however, the government of France was carried on by Cardinal Mazarin, for when Louis XIII died his son was only four and a half years of age. Even before the accession of Louis XIV, the way for the strength of France during his reign had been prepared by the great Cardinal Richelieu who had directed all his skilful energies towards unifying France within and humbling her traditional enemies the Hapsburgs of Austria without. Upon this foundation Mazarin had built: among other achievements, he had secured Lower Alsace for France by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) after the Thirty Years' War and so had strengthened the French position on the Rhine. When, therefore, Mazarin died in 1661 and Louis XIV became his own chief minister, France stood as the leading Power in Europe. This position of strength was even improved by Louis who gathered into his service a group of soldiers unrivalled in skill and daring: these included such men as Turenne and Condé his generals, Louvois his war-minister, Vauban his engineer of fortifications, and Tourville his admiral;

and though the first two were dead before our period opened, their tradition and methods lived on, and not unworthy successors were to be found in generals such as Luxembourg.

Louis XIV was therefore not without some prospect of success when he revived the long-cherished ambition of France to achieve for herself what she called "natural frontiers". This meant, in practice, that her eastern frontier should be pushed back to the Rhine. Louis' intention to carry this policy into effect was made unmistakably clear when, in 1681, he seized Upper Alsace including the key-fortress of Strassburg, thereby alarming the whole of Europe.

All this affected England because a Rhine frontier for France would mean that the coastline of the Spanish Netherlands—that is, roughly, the present Belgium—would be in the hands of Louis; and from early times a settled policy of England—founded on an accurate intuition—had been never to consent to that coast's being in the hands of a great Power that might become her enemy, for the shores of the Netherlands would form an ideal jumping-off ground for any would-be invader of England. Moreover, that that coast should be added to the adjacent coastline of France was even more menacing than its possession by a more distant country such as Spain. A further source of English interest in the machinations of Louis was to be found in the marriage in 1677 of the Princess Mary, daughter of James II, to William III of Orange, Stadtholder of Holland, who had already—notably in the Dutch War of 1672–1679—defended his Protestant land with great courage against the Roman Catholic Louis.

This menace of Louis XIV to western Europe generally and to England in particular was the root explanation of the War of English Succession. The immediate question at issue was, as the name implies, that of settling who should succeed to the English throne which, having been vacated by James II, was offered to and accepted by

William and Mary jointly. In England no party moved to support James, but outside England he found friends in several quarters. Most important of all, Louis XIV was seriously alarmed at the prospect ; for William's accession to the English throne would secure to Holland the permanent alliance of England against France. The obvious policy for Louis was to encourage the enemies of William to reinstate James II as king. Louis therefore granted to James a pension of £40,000 a year and the use of the palace at St.-Germain where he was treated as the rightful king of England.

Scotland and Ireland.

But William found enemies also nearer home. In Scotland, though the bulk of the people, being Protestants, were favourable to William, the Highlanders were enthusiastic Jacobites, as the supporters of James came to be called, from the Latin *Jacobus* meaning *James*. Moreover, the intense Roman Catholicism of Ireland meant that, in the latter country, William would have to fight for his crown. Actually, it was in Scotland and Ireland that resistance to William first manifested itself, and the years 1689-1691 were occupied in asserting his authority there. Only then was he free to return to what for him was the main purpose of his life, namely, the defence of Holland against Louis XIV.

2. WAR IN SCOTLAND

In Scotland events seemed at first to follow a course similar to that in England. A Convention, held at Edinburgh, offered the crown to William and Mary. The Episcopalianism imposed by Laud was swept away and Presbyterianism was re-established, though there was to be toleration for non-Presbyterians. Indeed, all might have gone well had not the situation been complicated by clan enmities. The recognized leader of the royal forces

in Scotland, under Charles II and James II, had been the famous John Graham of Claverhouse, Viscount Dundee. The latter had a personal feud with the Campbell clan, and therefore, apart from any question of either religious or political principle, Dundee took the side of the Jacobites. The Highlanders, always ready for a fight, especially against their traditional foes the Lowlanders, readily rose at the call of their leader.

Battle of Killiecrankie.

The action that followed was swift and decisive. The Highlanders, during several weeks in the spring of 1689, ravaged and plundered the Lowlands. Then the English general Mackay was sent against them with several loyal regiments. Dundee posted his clansmen at the strategic Pass of Killiecrankie, whence suddenly they swooped down upon the unlucky English regiments as they advanced. The English, unable to withstand the shock of a Highland charge, broke, fled and scattered, and there was every appearance that the cause of William and Presbyterianism had been shattered at a blow. But in the midst of the rout there happened the one thing necessary to reverse that result: Dundee himself was killed by a chance shot. The Highlanders had won a victory that was of no use to them: their main interest was in the fight, not in its cause; and when death removed the one man who was capable of following up the success to a conclusive issue and of holding together the various clans, the latter could do nothing but return to their native Highlands. This they soon did, and the rising in Scotland died out almost immediately.

Massacre of Glencoe.

It would be well if we could leave the story of William III and Scotland at that point. Unfortunately a further item has to be related. Though the Highland clansmen had mostly returned home, many of them were known to

be disaffected. Accordingly a proclamation offered a free pardon to all who, by the last day of 1691, should take an oath of allegiance before a magistrate. All the clans accepted the offer, with one notable exception: the aged MacIain MacDonald, head of the not very numerous MacDonalds of Glencoe. It would appear that they did in fact present themselves at Fort William for the purpose of taking the oath, but found there a military governor instead of a civil magistrate. Some delay therefore occurred before the order could be complied with, the result being that the stipulated date was passed before the oath could be taken.

This gave to the Lowlanders a chance for revenge upon their standing enemies. The Secretary for Scotland at the time was the Master of Stair, who, with the Earl of Argyll (chief of the Campbell clan), was the leader of the Lowlanders. Stair, seizing the opportunity provided by the delay of the MacDonalds, obtained from William an order "to extirpate that set of thieves". To execute this injunction, in February, 1692, a detachment of troops—mainly Campbells—was sent to Glencoe and was lodged among the cottagers of the district. The mission of the soldiers was ostensibly peaceable, and they were accordingly received in a friendly and even hospitable spirit. Then, at the end of a fortnight, after which any suspicions had been allayed, early in the morning of 13th February, the soldiery began in cold blood to murder their hosts without any respect for either age or sex. Though many of the MacDonalds effected their escape to the hills, many remained as bloody corpses among the blackened ruins of their former homes.

The primary responsibility for this horror must rest upon the Lowland leaders. William's part is less clear. It would seem that when he gave his consent to the massacre he was unaware that the MacDonalds had sworn allegiance subsequent to the prescribed date. To that extent blame does not rest upon him. Nevertheless, even that cannot,

in our eyes, justify such an atrocious punishment. Moreover, after the full facts became available, William made no attempt to punish the offenders, which was the very least he could have done if he had really disapproved of the deed. Certainly it was the massacre of Glencoe that was the main cause of the implacable hostility of the Highlanders to the Revolution Settlement and of their continued support of the Jacobite cause during the following half-century.

3. WAR IN IRELAND

Situation in 1688.

While the opposition to William's succession was being thus crushed in Scotland, a similar opposition was encountered in Ireland. There, however, the situation was different, for in Ireland the Roman Catholics formed the vast majority of the population and, during the reign of James II, the governmental control of the country had been in their hands. The Viceroy had been the Roman Catholic Earl of Tyrconnel, and office under the Crown—both civil and military office—was confined to men of his faith. Even the Revolution in England made very little practical difference in Ireland: the Protestants still remained only a small minority; the Roman Catholic régime was continued; and James II in 1689, supported by Louis XIV's officers and supplies, landed in Ireland, which was to be the base of his attack on William III. The whole country was almost at once enthusiastically in his control, and the position of the few Protestants was precarious in the extreme.

Londonderry and Enniskillen.

In practice the Protestant resistance centred in two northern towns, Londonderry and Enniskillen, both of which closed their gates to the Roman Catholic forces. The defence of those towns is worthy to rank among the great heroic sieges of history.

Londonderry stands on the Foyle near where that river runs into the Lough. The besiegers placed a great boom across the river so as to prevent supply-ships from re-victualling the town, and thus they were able to invest the city by land and sea. The siege began early in April, 1689. Throughout the first two months the besiegers tried, by a series of bombardments and attacks, to make a breach into the town. The defenders retorted with counter-attacks and with still further strengthening the defences. Then, in July, the Roman Catholic forces settled down to wait until starvation should place the city in their hands. This was a policy that seemed to have every prospect of success ; for the citizens of Londonderry were reduced to the sorest straits of famine. Though the food-supplies contained in the town were rationed throughout on the most severe lines, by July the people had no alternative to eating anything that was at all edible—leather, dogs, and vermin. The end of the month saw the end also of even such means of sustenance. What the end was to be, none could foresee ; yet still the city held out undaunted. Some weeks earlier, William had sent ships with food to relieve the distress of the citizens. These ships, however, dismayed by the harbour-boom, had remained inactive in the Lough. At last, on 30th July, when the position of Londonderry was so desperate that no catastrophe could make it worse, the ships hoisted full sail and made for the boom. The breathless suspense within Londonderry was intense beyond description, a suspense that was heightened by the fact that the force of the impact had driven the leading ship—the *Mountjoy*—on to the mud. Nevertheless she had burst the boom, and the tide rose in the very nick of time to carry her and her companion vessels into the city harbour. After a siege of one hundred and five days Londonderry was saved. The joy of its people, who had so richly deserved their reward, knew no bounds. But the significance of the relief was greater even than the safety of the inhabit-

ants: the Roman Catholics, in spite of the relative vastness of their resources—both Irish and French—had been defeated, and the crisis of William's difficulties in Ireland was over.

Three days later, the people of Enniskillen, enheartened by the success of their sister-town, sallied out and met the Jacobite troops at *Newtown Butler* and were similarly successful.

Battle of the Boyne.

But though the most critical days were over, the preponderance of Roman Catholics in Ireland meant that much would have to take place before William's supremacy was acknowledged throughout the land. In June, 1690, William went to Ireland in person. He landed at Carrickfergus, and then went via Belfast southwards towards James's army, which he encountered on the River Boyne. Though William's troops were drawn from various sources, and consisted not only of English but also of Dutch, Swedes, Danes and Huguenots, they were hardened fighting men united by a common hatred of Louis XIV. Against these James could oppose the Irish and the troops loaned him from France. In the face of these William had to ford the river. The Irish soon fled in disorder, leaving to the French the impossible task of alone stemming William's advance. The result was a great victory for William. James shamefully joined in the rout, and fled to France.

Treaty of Limerick, 1691.

William then returned to England and left Ginckel, his Dutch second-in-command, to complete the subjugation of the country. Very thoroughly the work was carried out. The last Roman Catholic town of any consequence to capitulate was *Limerick*, in October, 1691. Meanwhile the Earl of Marlborough had conquered Cork and Kinsale. Further resistance was evidently useless,

and the Jacobites therefore agreed to the Treaty of Limerick. By its terms all Irish soldiers who wished to do so were to be allowed to go to France for service under Louis XIV; there was to be an amnesty for all who laid down their arms; and Roman Catholics were to be granted religious and political liberty similar to that which they had possessed under Charles II.

Penal Laws.

On this basis there was a real prospect of a peaceful settlement, and, had its terms been loyally carried out, most of the troubles that England has subsequently met in Ireland would have been avoided. Though the conditions of peace were violated in a manner different from that of the Massacre of Glencoe in Scotland, the effect was certainly not less dishonourable or less disastrous. The English Parliament immediately enacted that every member of the Irish Parliament and every Irish officeholder should take an oath not only of allegiance but also of Protestant belief. The effect was that for the first time in history the Irish Parliament consisted of Protestants only. Such a Parliament became little better than a tool whereby the small Protestant minority fixed an oppressive yoke upon the Roman Catholic mass of the population. Roman Catholics were forbidden to become teachers, to possess firearms or to own a horse worth more than five pounds. As time passed, even these laws were elaborated with greater severity: thus, in 1697 it was enacted that Roman Catholic priests were to leave Ireland and that Roman Catholics were not to marry. These provisions were flagrant violations of the Treaty of Limerick and were more pernicious even than most religious persecutions, in that they were the persecution of the majority by the minority. Their fruits were to be seen a century later in the series of events leading to the Act of Union of 1800, and, later still, in the Home Rule movement of the nineteenth century.

4. WAR AT SEA

Battle of Beachy Head, 1690.

Actually, the success of the Irish campaign was due as much to the French neglect of the sea as to William's efficiency on land. Louis XIV had in Tourville the finest admiral of his day, and he had a fleet superior to anything the English could put on the sea. Had these advantages been used to the full, William's crossing to Ireland would certainly have been seriously hampered and perhaps would have been prevented altogether. The first notable action at sea took place on 30th June, 1690—that is, the day before the Battle of the Boyne—when off Beachy Head, Tourville fell in with the Anglo-Dutch fleet commanded by Lord Torrington. Torrington was under definite orders to engage the enemy and, though the French were greatly superior in numbers, a fierce action took place. The Dutch plunged rashly into the fray and were extricated from annihilation only by the tactics of Torrington. The result was a decisive victory for the French, who thus gained complete command of the Channel, and William's campaign was saved from complete collapse only through Tourville's failure to follow up the victory by cutting off communications between England and Ireland and the Continent.

Battle of La Hogue, 1692.

For nearly two years the naval campaign remained almost in abeyance. Then, in the early part of 1692, Louis XIV, persuaded by the entreaties of James, decided to send an expedition to England so as to divert the energies of William from the Netherlands. A large number of vessels was collected in order to carry over to England a picked army of some 30,000 men who were to be transported while Tourville held the Channel. James II prepared a manifesto which was, in effect, a declaration of his policy if he were restored to the throne; but as this

did not indicate that he was willing to act as a constitutional monarch it did his cause more harm than good.

The really hopeful sign for the Jacobites was that duplicity and even treachery were rife among statesmen in England. Indeed there were very few even of William's most prominent supporters who had not entered at some time into treasonable correspondence with James. The truth was that William's position as King was regarded as anything but assured, and there was a common anxiety both to hunt with the hounds and to run with the hare. As we shall see, Marlborough was perhaps the most glaring example of such intriguers; but the extent to which the practice was carried is indicated by the fact that Lord Russell, the commander of the English fleet, was in touch with James at the very moment when the critical naval events of 1692 were shaping themselves. Indeed it was this, perhaps more than any other one factor, which encouraged James and the French to proceed with their expedition, though, as the event was to show, Russell's wavering did not make him less energetic or wholehearted when the time for action arrived.

Between the middle of April and the middle of May, 1692, unfavourable winds prevented the French expedition. Meanwhile the English and Dutch fleets had joined under the command of Russell, so that numerically the French were considerably inferior. In spite of this disadvantage Tourville defended himself both gallantly and skilfully, but his fleet was compelled finally to scatter. Many of his ships escaped southward between the Channel Islands and the mainland. Those unable to do so took refuge at La Hogue, where James was waiting to cross to England, and where a dozen of them were burnt by Sir George Rooke.

The length at which the Battle of La Hogue has been described is justified by its consequence, namely, that henceforward the English had unchallenged command of the Channel so that, not only in the War of English Suc-

cession but also throughout the subsequent War of Spanish Succession, William and Marlborough were free to come and go, and to transport men and supplies, between England and the Continent at will. The action at La Hogue was therefore highly critical in the wars between England and Louis XIV.

5. TREATY OF RYSWICK, 1697

War in the Netherlands.

From the middle of 1692 the war consisted solely of military actions in the Netherlands. As an aspect of English history these are of relatively minor importance and we may dismiss them with only a brief notice.

The struggle resolved itself mainly into a war of sieges in which the superior resources of the French allowed them step by step to advance into the Netherlands. Thus in 1691 they forced the surrender of Mons and in 1692 of Namur. Meanwhile William was far from idle. Not even his best friends could claim that he was a master of strategy: indeed it was a rare event for William to win a battle. But what he lacked in generalship—in the ordinary sense of the word—was more than compensated for by his undaunted, persevering courage which never recognized defeat; so that repeatedly, after losing an action he managed to extricate his army intact. That, briefly, was the story of *Steinkirk* in 1692 and *Neerwinden* in 1693. William's outstanding success came two years later when he succeeded in recovering Namur in spite of its strong French garrison and a relieving French force.

Reasons for Peace.

By this time both sides had become convinced that a decisive victory was impossible, a lesson that was being forced home by the exhaustion that was slowly extending among all the belligerents. Thus, though the war continued to drag on indefinitely, there was a general and a

growing desire for peace. On the French side there was a further inducement to that end. Already the apparently impending death of King Charles II of Spain convinced Louis XIV that—for reasons to be explained in the next chapter—a struggle over the succession to the Spanish throne could not be long delayed. If France was to be fit to take full advantage of that struggle, peace must be made early in order that she might have time to recuperate her resources, both military and economic. Accordingly, in 1697 terms were agreed upon and the Treaty of Ryswick was signed.

Clauses.

Louis undertook to relinquish all his conquests since 1678—that is, since the Treaty of Nimewegen—except Strassburg, to allow the Dutch to garrison a number of fortresses in the Netherlands—the famous “Barrier Fortresses”—and to recognize William III as King of England. Such were the clauses of the Treaty of Ryswick which marks the end of the first stage of the long struggle between England and France. For the moment William had gained his objectives. But the future was to show that the main cause of the conflict was still unsettled, namely, the dominating power of Louis XIV in Europe. France had not been thoroughly beaten: she had agreed to the cessation of hostilities merely in order to conserve her energies for the yet greater struggle to come. The importance that Louis placed upon the impending dispute over the Spanish Succession is indicated by the terms he was willing to make at Ryswick. Or, regarded from another point of view, it may be that the generosity of those terms was itself a proof that Louis had no intention of keeping them when to do so was no longer convenient.

CHAPTER III


WAR OF SPANISH SUCCESSION, 1702-1713

I. PROBLEM OF THE SUCCESSION

The Heirs.

THE question of the succession to the throne of Spain was one which had been looming ahead, in the minds of European statesmen, for a long time. Charles II, who had ascended that throne in 1665, was known to be feeble in both body and mind; and, having no children, he was the last male descendant of the Spanish Hapsburgs. Actually, much more than the throne of Spain was involved. for the King of Spain was the ruler also of the Spanish Netherlands, territories in Italy—including Milan, Naples, Sicily and Sardinia—as well as the West Indies and the whole of South America except Brazil. These together constituted a prize that was certain to be much sought after.

Nor was it easy to determine exactly who the fortunate candidate should be, for the accepted rules of inheritance were in this instance extraordinarily complicated by a series of intermarriages in three of which there had been a renunciation, by a female descendant, of all rights to the Spanish throne. These, however, being no concern of British History, may be left aside. In effect, claims could be put forward by three families, namely, the French, the Bavarian, and the Austrian. Of these, none had a claim so definitely superior to that of the others as to be accepted without dispute even by an impartial observer. It was therefore not to be expected that any one of the three would be accepted by his rivals. Further, the rest of



Europe—particularly William III of England and the Netherlands—would certainly not be content to see the whole Empire of Spain added either to the adjoining territory of Louis XIV, for that would fix beyond a doubt the dominance of France over Europe, or to the domains of Austria, for that would virtually revive the Empire of Charles V.

Partition Treaties.

In these circumstances, only one solution to the problem was possible, namely, that the Spanish possessions should be divided and that the division should be agreed upon before the expected death of Charles II precipitated a quarrel. Accordingly, in 1698 Louis XIV and William III agreed upon a Partition Treaty by which the Dauphin of France was to receive Naples and Sicily, the Archduke Charles of Austria was to have Milan, while the bulk of the Spanish possessions, namely, Spain itself, the Spanish Netherlands and the Spanish possessions across the seas, were to go to Joseph Ferdinand, Electoral Prince of Bavaria. Unfortunately for this scheme, Joseph Ferdinand, who was a baby, died of smallpox in the following year.

Hence the problem had to be tackled afresh. The difficulties were now more acute than ever for considerable accessions of territory by both of the remaining great Powers seemed inevitable. However, in 1700 a Second Partition Treaty was signed. This gave Spain, the Netherlands, Sardinia and the oversea possessions of Spain to the Archduke Charles who, being the second son of the Emperor Leopold I, was not likely to succeed his father. The Duke of Lorraine was to receive Milan in exchange for his own Duchy; and Lorraine, Naples and Sicily were to go to the Dauphin. Though France did not thus receive large accessions of territory, she was compensated by the strategic advantages accruing to her by the possession of Naples in the Mediterranean and of Lorraine on her eastern frontier.

Will of Charles II, 1700.

The one person not consulted in the above arrangements was Charles II ; indeed, both he and the Spanish people were completely ignored in the transaction. When the Treaty and its provisions became known, Charles was madly furious and retaliated by making a will which upset all that had been agreed. Apart from the insult of settling the fate of Spain without reference to her king or her people, the Spaniards were particularly incensed by the threat to divide their dominions. Charles II's will therefore provided that his whole inheritance should pass to Philip of Anjou, who, as the younger son of the Dauphin, was unlikely to become king of France. The one condition imposed by the will was that Philip should renounce, for himself and his successors, all claims to the French throne.

At last, in November, 1700, within a month of signing the will, Charles II died. The next move was with Louis XIV : should he adhere to the terms of the Partition Treaty or should he, at the risk of the opposition of Europe, accept the will of Charles II ? We have to remember that the Emperor had not accepted the Treaty because of the strategic position it gave to France, that France would gain nothing tangible by the will, and that Spain was whole-heartedly in favour of the succession of Philip. Moreover, neither England nor Holland was sufficiently interested in William's Treaty to make war in its support, especially as Philip was not to unite France and Spain. By April, 1701, both England and Holland, recognizing the inevitable, had acknowledged Philip of Anjou as Philip V of Spain. In such circumstances, Louis can hardly be blamed for supporting his grandson.

Immediate Causes of Outbreak.

At that point, therefore, everything seemed to have been settled amicably, and the prospects of war seemed to have receded almost out of sight. Almost certainly, Philip's

accession would mean that Louis XIV would control the policy of Spain as well as of France and could count upon the resources of the Spanish Empire in the event of any war in which France was engaged ; but Europe was prepared to wait until a particular issue arose before challenging that position. William III alone seems to have appreciated the danger in which England especially stood. His most energetic and anxious protests against allowing Louis to gain such a vast accession of power, none the less real because intangible, fell on deaf ears.

Then it was that Louis XIV, rendered over-confident by the apparent ease of his success, himself played into William's hands by deliberately taking steps that were certain to arouse the hostility of Europe as a whole and of England in particular. He overran the Spanish Netherlands, seizing, as he did so, the Barrier Fortresses which, by the Treaty of Ryswick, had been placed in the hands of the Dutch. He secured for French merchants the sole rights of trade with Spanish possessions, thus threatening the interests of both English and Dutch. He even refused to recognize Philip's renunciation of a right of succession to the French throne. Finally, by a crowning act of folly, when James II died in September, 1701, Louis recognized his son as James III of England. This was both a further violation of the Treaty of Ryswick and an insult to England, for the Act of Settlement of June of the same year had excluded the Pretenders from the throne. At last Whigs and Tories united in demanding war against France, and William, having for the first time an enthusiastic nation behind him, set to work to form a European alliance against Europe's common enemy. Before the end of 1701 he had organized the Grand Alliance, its chief members being England, Holland, the Empire, Prussia and Hanover. On Louis' side were Bavaria and Savoy.

2 THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH


Early Career.

The Alliance was hardly formed when, in March, 1702, William III died. On his death-bed William appointed the Earl of Marlborough as Captain-General of the forces of the Grand Alliance: it was indeed fortunate for the members of the Alliance that at that critical moment such a man was available to direct operations. Marlborough had already had a varied career. He had been born in Devonshire in 1650, his father being Sir Winston Churchill. As soon as he left school he was made a page to the Duke of York (James II), a fact which was to prove of great value in his later career. While still a youth he saw military service in various parts of the world, including that with the French against the Dutch from 1672 onwards. Steadily he rose in royal favour, especially after the accession of James II, and was one of the commanders of the army against the Duke of Monmouth. Nevertheless, when James's days as King were evidently numbered, Churchill entered secretly into correspondence with William of Orange whom he did not hesitate to join as soon as James's flight showed definitely which was the winning side.

William III, quick to appreciate military genius, gave high command to his new follower, and created him Earl of Marlborough. Unfortunately for his moral reputation, Marlborough seems to have seen no more reason for giving unfaltering allegiance to his new master than to his former one. William's position as King appeared so uncertain that Marlborough, along with a number of other leading Englishmen, continued to correspond with James. Nor did his treachery stop at mere correspondence: on at least one occasion he betrayed William's plan of campaign to the French, and on another he plotted with the Princess Anne to put her on the English throne in place of William. Small wonder that he was banished from Court and was not allowed to return until the end of William's reign.

CAMPAIGNS OF WILLIAM III & MARLBOROUGH.

SPANISH NETHERLANDS SHADED.



Character.

In his personal relations Marlborough was evidently completely untrustworthy, and honour was a word that had no place—or at least no meaning—in his vocabulary. The facts of his life show that he was dominated by boundless greed, so that no action was too mean for him if, by stooping to it, he could either save or gain money. This lack of moral scruple was the more remarkable because it was combined with a handsome figure and with a shrewd, cool judgment that never deserted him. His personal manner was marked by such a winning charm that his persuasiveness was almost irresistible. This trait was to prove invaluable in the years during which he had to hold together the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV.

In spite of the treachery of his personal relationships, there were two respects in which Marlborough proved thoroughly trustworthy. First, while in supreme command of the forces of the Grand Alliance he bent all his energies without reserve to achieving the thorough defeat of Louis XIV. Second, his chief lieutenant was Prince Eugene, the leader of the Imperial armies: with him Marlborough worked in complete accord and co-operated unswervingly.

About his amazing military ability there never has been, and cannot be, any question. In every branch of military practice he displayed consummate genius. No situation, however desperate, was beyond his successful resourcefulness; and if sometimes he was unable to gain the fullest possible advantage over the enemy, this was due not to limitations of his own faculties but to lack of understanding and support by the English Parliament or the Dutch Estates. Of very few generals can it be said, as it can of Marlborough, that he never lost either a battle or a campaign. Certainly England has never produced a greater general, and equally certainly he is fit to rank among the greatest generals of the world.

Marlborough's Objects.

Such was the man whom William chose—in spite of his former treachery—to lead the armies of the Grand Alliance against those of Louis XIV; and examination of the latter's position at the opening of the war shows that Marlborough would need all his personal abilities and charm if he was to succeed. The French were already in possession of the Spanish Netherlands and even of the Barrier Fortresses; they had the Elector of Bavaria as their ally and therefore could use his territory from which to drive into the heart of their Continental opponents; and the Spanish alliance meant that the French need not fear invasion from the south, but also that they were in command of the resources of the whole Spanish Empire. There were, however, two weaknesses in the French position. First, the generation that had produced the marshals who had built up Louis' army had passed before this last great war of Louis had begun, and the campaigns were to show that the new commanders were unfit to continue the reputation to which they had succeeded. Second, though the importance of the navy as a determining factor in warfare was not yet appreciated, the mastery of the sea maintained by the English and the Dutch allowed a development of their oversea trade and an interference with that of the French and of the Spaniards, so that, as the war proceeded, the resources of the English and the Dutch grew while those of Louis declined.

The disposition of the forces of Louis and his allies is itself sufficient to suggest the main objects that Marlborough set himself to achieve. The supreme purpose was to eject the French from the Spanish Netherlands, and Marlborough himself took command of the operations directed to that end. The map shows that the main physical features of the country are three parallel river-valleys, namely, the Rhine-Moselle, the Meuse, and the Scheldt. In a succession of campaigns, the French were

cleared from each of these in turn until the Allies themselves invaded French soil.

Meanwhile there were three other centres of warfare : first, the French, taking advantage of their alliance with Bavaria, made a thrust against Vienna ; second, in Spain where an attempt, brilliant but finally unsuccessful, was made to expel King Philip V ; and third, a number of operations took place on the sea. With all these we have now to deal in something approaching chronological order.

3. THE BLENHEIM CAMPAIGN, 1704

Marlborough began operations in the Netherlands in 1702, and during that year and the following one he succeeded in driving the French out of the two easternmost of the three parallel river-valleys, namely, the Rhine and the Meuse, and in capturing certain fortresses within that area. It was in recognition of the achievements early in this campaign that in 1702 the Queen raised Marlborough to the rank of Duke.

The French and Vienna.

The French, thus losing much of their initial advantage in the Netherlands, looked round for a way of checking the Allied success. The scheme they evolved was no less than one to seize Vienna and thereby to detach Austria from the Alliance. The result would be that the forces under Louis' command could concentrate against the English and the Dutch. For this purpose, in 1703 the French army in north Italy and a French army from the Rhine were both directed towards Bavaria where they were to join with Bavarian troops, the threefold force being then concentrated against Austria. Actually the details of the plan miscarried badly, and operations had to be postponed until the next year's campaign. Yet the attempt had shown clearly the immediate danger in which Vienna stood, and if in 1704 a similar plan of co-operation was

carried through with success, nothing would be able to save Vienna. Marlborough therefore determined that at all costs such a project must be frustrated. The problem was, how? The obvious stroke was for Marlborough himself to lead a great army for the relief of the city; but to do so would leave the Netherlands unprotected. Marlborough's strategic sense might show him that the threatened danger in the east was so serious that no risk could be too great in order to avert it; but the English and Dutch governments could hardly be expected to allow the Netherlands to remain defenceless before a certain French invasion. In short, Marlborough was unable to persuade the politicians to allow him to move towards central Europe. But Marlborough was so convinced of the urgency of defending Vienna that he decided upon a ruse intended to deceive both the enemy and his own political superiors. His disobedience to the latter could be placated only by complete success; and Marlborough was taking in his hands the fate both of the Alliance and of his own career.

Marlborough's March.

Allowing friend and foe alike to believe that he intended to invade France along the line of the Moselle, his real intention he kept a profound secret. He left in the Netherlands a force only just large enough to withstand a possible French counter-attack while he himself moved up the Rhine. To the bewilderment of the French, who were watching his movements, he passed the junction of the Moselle with the Rhine and continued to move up the latter river as far as Mainz. Thence he struck across to the Neckar which he followed for a short distance, and then made a swift march direct to the Danube which he struck near Ulm. His first business was to control a passage of the river. This was secured by storming the town of Donauwörth, the capture of which put the bridge in the hands of the Allies. By this time the real object of the

campaign was obvious, and the French army of the Upper Rhine—which Prince Eugene had been watching—moved eastwards to co-operate with the Elector of Bavaria and with the French army threatening Vienna. Simultaneously Eugene also moved rapidly eastwards and got into touch with Marlborough who was thus in command of a large force which was at least as numerous as the combined forces of the enemy. The two armies met on 13th August, 1704, at Blenheim, where one of the most fateful battles of modern history took place.

Effects of Blenheim.

The details of the tactics employed in the battle are beside our purpose. The early attacks of the English left wing, under Lord Cutts, though delivered with the utmost coolness and courage, were repulsed. Marlborough then directed the full weight of his attack upon the French centre, with the result that the French lines were divided into two and beaten piecemeal. Some eleven thousand French troops were made prisoners, and over one hundred guns were captured.

The immediate effects were unmistakable: Vienna was saved and, with it, the Emperor's adhesion to the Alliance; Bavaria's co-operation with France was shattered; Marlborough's flouting of his political superiors was justified by the event, and his own prestige, among friends and enemies alike, leaped to the highest possible point; and, at the same time, the French reputation for invincibility was destroyed at a blow. These last two effects reacted upon the *morale* of all the combatants and contributed appreciably to the success of Marlborough in the subsequent battles of the war. To understand the real significance of Blenheim, one needs to consider what would have resulted from a French victory: Marlborough would have been discredited and probably dismissed from office for disobedience; Vienna would have fallen and Austria been forced to make terms; Holland, defenceless, would have

been overrun by Louis who at a stroke would have realized his ambition of a Rhine frontier for France and hence of French supremacy in Europe; and France would have been able, with Spanish help, to control the sea also and hence to prevent the development of the British Empire overseas. The Battle of Blenheim was thus not only the turning-point of the War of Spanish Succession but also one of the "Decisive Battles of the World".

Gibraltar, 1704.

Almost at the same time as the fighting on the Danube, another event, scarcely less crucial, took place in the Mediterranean. Sir George Rooke, who since 1702 had been in command of the English fleet in the Mediterranean, was cruising off Spain when he decided to try to storm the Rock of Gibraltar. Chance and the negligence of the Spanish garrison combined to aid the enterprise. The day was a Saint's Day and the troops were away at Mass, so that all that the English had to do was to clamber up the precipitous rock and take possession; since then Gibraltar has remained a base for the English fleet in the Mediterranean, its importance being increased manifold with the opening of the Suez Canal in the middle of the nineteenth century.

4. SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS, 1705-1709

Immediately after his victory at Blenheim Marlborough returned to the main field of operations, namely, the Netherlands, where he continued the process of pushing the French back to their own territory. The greater part of this work consisted of steady manœuvring and marching, with occasional skirmishes. At two critical points in the struggle decisive actions were fought on a grand scale: at Ramillies in 1706 and at Oudenarde in 1708. The remaining battle of the war—Malplaquet, 1709—was fought on French territory, which fact indicates that Marlborough had succeeded in clearing the Netherlands of the enemy.

But before Ramillies had been fought another theatre of war was attracting attention.

War in Spain, 1705-1707.

The primary object of the Allies had been the exclusion of Philip of Anjou from the throne of Spain and the transfer of that throne to the Archduke Charles of Austria. It was natural, therefore, that action to that end should be taken in Spain itself, and in 1705 the Earl of Peterborough sailed from England with some five thousand men and landed at Barcelona. Peterborough was a remarkable person with a varied experience of warfare, on both sea and land, and also of politics. He had been one of the men who had been instrumental in bringing William III from the Netherlands, and throughout William's reign there had been close friendship and confidence between the King and the courtier. But never did Peterborough's energetic resourcefulness show itself to such advantage as during the campaign in Spain: by a combination of genuine military skill with daring and bluff, he carried through an amazing series of operations. Though Barcelona was regarded as impregnable, the fortress was seized by Peterborough who thereby controlled the north-eastern provinces of Catalonia and Valencia. Almost more astonishing still, his little band, supported by the English fleet, managed in the following year to defy the French who were counter-attacking with twenty thousand men and were forced to raise the siege.

During 1706 also another Allied army, under Lord Galway, moved eastwards from Portugal towards Madrid. This expedition was so far successful that Madrid was captured, Philip having fled from his capital. But difficulties then arose of co-operation between Peterborough and Galway. Moreover, the Spaniards were warm supporters of Philip and, as the Allied troops were too few to keep down a really national rising, the foreign occupation of Madrid could be temporary only. Peterborough was

recalled from Spain, and Galway, isolated, had to withdraw from Madrid to Valencia.

Notwithstanding Peterborough's and Galway's exploits during the earlier campaigns, in 1707 the war in Spain came to an inglorious end without having achieved any permanent success. For, in April of that year, at *Almanza* a French army, led by the Duke of Berwick—a son of James II of England and a most capable commander—defeated Galway whose English troops, deserted by the Portuguese contingents, were overcome by weight of numbers. Allied attempts, later in the war, to recover Spain were all fruitless, so that from 1707 Spain remained in the hands of the Spaniards themselves and of the French, though Gibraltar continued permanently an English fortress.

Ramillies, 1706.

While the fate of Spain was thus being fought out, equally decisive events were taking place in the Netherlands whither, as we saw, Marlborough returned after his victory at Blenheim in 1704. The next outstanding event in the north was at Ramillies where, in 1706, a battle was brought on by a struggle between the French, led by Marshal Villeroi, and the Allies for the possession of Namur. Marlborough won as the result of a feint attack, by the conspicuous British red-coats, against the French left while the main weight of his attack was delivered by Allied troops against the French right. The French, completely surprised, found their lines shattered and were thoroughly routed. This victory was followed up so energetically by Marlborough that he succeeded also in pushing the French out of Brussels, Ghent, Antwerp and Ostend, so that only very little of the Netherlands remained in French hands and France herself seemed in danger of invasion.

The result of this threat was that in 1706 Louis XIV suggested terms of peace. He offered to recognize the Archduke Charles as King of Spain if Philip of Anjou were

given Naples, Sicily and Milan as a Kingdom. Unfortunately for all concerned, England and the Emperor, certain that victory was within their grasp, refused these terms which a wiser statesman would have accepted at least as a basis of negotiations and which proved to be far better than those the Allies finally secured. From that moment the fortunes of the Allies began to decline.

In 1707 there was a threatened complication from a different direction ; for Charles XII, who was the King of Sweden and an amazing military genius, seemed on the brink of invading Germany as the ally of Louis XIV, and all Marlborough's diplomatic skill was needed to check that intervention. The immediate effect was that the smaller German princes, who formerly had co-operated with the Emperor, recalled their armies ready for home defence if the need arose.

Oudenarde, 1708.

The one notable subsequent success of the Allies was gained by Marlborough and Eugene at Oudenarde. In 1708 the French, enheartened by their victories in Spain, decided to take advantage of the possibility of further divisions among their enemies. They therefore invaded the Netherlands once more and entered Ghent and Bruges. Marlborough's reply was to bring on an engagement at Oudenarde where he thoroughly routed the French and followed up his victory with such effect that he captured Lille, which was one of the great French barrier fortresses, thus definitely opening the way for the Allies into France.

Also in 1708 the island of *Minorca* was captured by the English fleet under Admiral Leake. This, with Gibraltar, gave to England the key to the Mediterranean where her naval power was henceforward supreme.

Peace Negotiations, 1709.

Oudenarde and Minorca together seemed to place France at the mercy of the Allies, and once more Louis XIV

offered to make peace (1709). His suggested terms were a modification of those of the previous year. He was willing to agree that Philip should have only Naples and Sicily and that the Dutch should garrison a line of barrier fortresses against France. Even these terms were rejected by the Allies. The Spanish people were enthusiastically favourable to Philip as against the Archduke Charles, and the Allies therefore demanded that Louis should send French forces to expel his grandson Philip from Spain. Louis treated this insult with the decided refusal that it deserved. He appealed to his countrymen to support him against an enemy that would have imposed such humiliating conditions. Though France seemed to be prostrate with exhaustion after her prolonged efforts, her people made a wonderful response to Louis' appeal. Indeed, widespread distress and hunger themselves drove many men into the army where alone there seemed to be some assurance of clothes and food. Altogether an army of one hundred thousand men was raised and was placed under the command of Marshal Villars.

Malplaquet, 1709.

After the Battle of Oudenarde and the fall of Lille Marlborough had turned to Tournai and, after a stubborn siege, had captured that also. He next directed his attack on the fortress of Mons. By this time the new French armies were ready, and in September, 1709, Villars moved for the relief of Mons. He took up a strong position among the woods at Malplaquet, south-west of Mons. There Marlborough and Eugene had to attack. The French offered a gallantly stubborn resistance so that the Allies, notwithstanding superiority of numbers, had the greatest difficulty in breaking through the defence. Towards the close of the day the French line was pierced and the French troops were withdrawn from the field. To achieve this somewhat barren result, the Allies had lost twenty thousand men, whereas the French had lost

not many more than half that number. The wave of Allied successes had spent itself, and the French, though unable themselves to carry off a victory, had at least prevented their enemies from pursuing the invasion of France.

5. PEACE, 1710-1713

Party Politics.

This situation coincided in time with that anti-war feeling in England whose growth we watched in a previous chapter.¹ The Tories had urged that the Whig ministry ought to have agreed to peace on the basis of the terms offered by Louis XIV in 1706 or, failing that, the still more advantageous ones of 1709. Subsequent events proved that the Tories were right; but, irrespective of this, the fact was that the immediate object of the Tories was party advantage rather than national welfare. They realized that while the war was successful it would be generally popular, and therefore that the Whigs, who had made and were supporting the war, would continue in power. Moreover, there seemed no prospect of the war's being anything but successful while Marlborough remained in command. Hence, the first step towards a Tory ministry seemed to be the removal of Marlborough from his command, so that the war might be less successful and therefore less popular. The Tories, therefore, before Malplaquet, had begun their anti-war propaganda. They tried to undermine Marlborough's position both at Court, by creating friction between Queen Anne and the Duchess, and in the country, by urging that Marlborough and the Whigs had refused Louis' reasonable offers merely because they feared lest the end of the war would cause their fall from power. This propaganda had the desired effect, and the Battle of Malplaquet was all that was needed to complete the process: the Tories could point to the losses involved and could

¹ Chapter I, section 4.

claim that these losses would never have occurred if their policy had been adopted. The conviction spread that the tide of victory had turned and that unless peace were concluded quickly the chances of favourable terms would decline. Hence the election of 1710—the immediate occasion for which was the Sacheverell trial—resulted in the return of a Tory majority to Parliament.

Emperor Charles VI, 1711.

Apart from the party-political influences towards peace, an event on the Continent made the further continuance of the war ridiculous. The Emperor Leopold I had died in 1705 and had been succeeded by his elder son as Joseph I. In 1711 Joseph died childless and was consequently succeeded by his brother the Archduke Charles, who thus became the Emperor Charles VI. This was the man whom the Allies were fighting to place upon the throne of Spain, the assumption having been that, as the younger son of Leopold, he would never become Emperor. To give him Spain in addition to his family possessions, to which was added the Imperial title, would be to revive the Empire of Charles V and to defeat the very object which, in principle, the Allies had set out to achieve.

Further, throughout the war the Spanish people had supported Philip V with most tenacious loyalty, so that even if the Allies had persisted in their desire to eject him in favour of Charles, it was difficult to see how that object could be achieved. Naturally, Charles did not share this view, neither did the other Allies who were eager to grab every possible advantage from the downfall of their arch-enemy Louis XIV.

Fall of Marlborough, 1711.

Accordingly, St. John, the new Tory Secretary of State, opened negotiations secretly with Louis and agreed to provisional terms which were afterwards, for the most part, incorporated in the Treaty of Utrecht. The publica-

tion of these terms in November, 1711, was the signal for outcries of protest. The Allies complained that the separate negotiations were a betrayal of the common cause, and the Whigs claimed that the victories which had been won so gloriously and bought so dearly were being thrown away. The House of Lords, where the Whigs had a narrow majority, carried a motion against the proposed peace terms. St. John's reply was emphatic: Marlborough was dismissed from his command, and the Queen consented to create twelve new peers so as to give the Tories a permanent, though small, majority in the Lords. Marlborough's successor was the Duke of Ormonde who was given strict, though secret, orders to act on the defensive only and to avoid all conflict with the enemy if he could possibly do so—perhaps the most disgraceful incident in the life of any English government.

Marlborough was accused of appropriating to his own use public moneys voted for the prosecution of the war, and so widespread was the belief in his culpability that he was publicly insulted in the London streets, the appearance of his coach being sufficient to raise the cry of "Stop thief!" The Duke's avarice was beyond question, but the subsequent inquiry failed to prove that he had enriched himself to a degree beyond what was sanctioned by the practices of that day. Nevertheless, so great was the antipathy towards him that for some three years Marlborough had to withdraw from England and seek shelter abroad. Such was the unhappy ending to the career of the most brilliant soldier that England ever produced. Yet, apart from the personal aspect of the case, it was a healthy sign that even the greatest public services could not be relied upon to excuse morally questionable methods of carrying them out. Not a few similar instances are to be found in English history: those of Chancellor Lord Bacon before Marlborough and of Clive after him readily occur to mind. Marlborough's death took place in England in 1722.

Clauses of the Treaty.

The supremacy of the Tories meant that there was nothing to hinder negotiations for a peace. Throughout 1712 negotiations proceeded, and finally on 3rd March, 1713, the Treaty of Utrecht was signed. By its provisions, Philip V was allowed to retain Spain and Spanish America, but only on condition that he renounced all claim to the French throne. Sicily passed to the Duke of Savoy. The Dutch were given certain "Border Fortresses" as a guarantee against future French aggressions. The gains of England were the most substantial: from France she secured Acadia—henceforward known as Nova Scotia—settlements round Hudson Bay, and Newfoundland where, however, the French retained certain rights of fishery; from Spain she secured Gibraltar and Minorca, the right to send one trading-vessel each year to Porto Bello on the Isthmus of Panama, and—by the *Assiento*, or contract, clause—the monopoly of supplying slaves to Spanish America. Further, the Hanoverian Succession was recognized in England, the Stuarts were to be banished from France, and the fortifications of Dunkirk were to be dismantled. By a later agreement between Louis and the Emperor, Austria was given the Spanish Netherlands—which thus became the Austrian Netherlands—as well as Milan, Naples and Sardinia. Unfortunately, the recognition of Philip as King of Spain involved the desertion of the Catalans who alone of the Spanish peoples had been consistent supporters of the Allies, and upon them Philip was free to avenge himself.

Effects of the Treaty.

The general significance of the Treaty of Utrecht for the future development and relationships of the Powers was clear. In one respect the Allies had not gained their immediate object in going to war, for Philip of Anjou had become King of Spain; yet the principle for which the Allies had fought had certainly been obtained, since Philip's

renunciation of rights to the French throne meant that the Spanish Empire could not be united to any other great European Power. Moreover the division of that Empire, so bitterly resented by the Spanish people, was the death-knell to the greatness of Spain.

France suffered terribly : the exhaustion produced by the long struggle was undoubtedly one of the reasons for the cataclysm that shook her before the century was out ; and the possession of the Netherlands by her enemy Austria, instead of by friendly Spain, put a barrier, even more effective than the fortresses manned by the Dutch, against her aggression in Holland.

That the southern Netherlands were owned by an inland and not by a maritime Power added still further to the security of England. Most significant of all the provisions of the Treaty were those relating to sea-power whose importance was so dimly foreseen when its clauses were signed. The possession of Minorca and Gibraltar gave England control of the Mediterranean, while her acquisitions in the New World were to be the bases of her future Empire.

Raj Kumar

CHAPTER IV

GEORGE I AND GEORGE II: HOME AFFAIRS, 1714-1760


AFTER the end of the War of Spanish Succession there was a quarter of a century of respite from war, and during that interval there were within England developments of the most momentous character. It is those developments which are the subject of the present chapter.

I. PARTY POLITICS

The New Monarchs.

The passing of Queen Anne on 1st August, 1714, was the passing also of the Stuart dynasty and, with it, of a number of political and constitutional customs that had long been accepted as matters of tradition. Anne was succeeded on the throne by the Hanoverians in the person of George I, son of the Electress Sophia who had been designated the next claimant by the Act of Settlement but who had died earlier in 1714. The Hanoverians, of course, retained their Electorate when they acquired the British crown.

George I and George II were both estimable men in several respects. They were personally brave, and though neither of them could be truthfully called a brilliant general, they both saw considerable service during the Continental wars. Another commendable feature of both of them was that, fortunately for Britain and for themselves, they did not attempt to introduce Han-



favourites into remunerative offices in their adopted country, though George I at least had about him numerous private German friends.

Growth of Party System.

One of the effects of the coming of the Hanoverian monarchs was that a great impetus was given to the English party system. George I had no real grasp of English political methods, nor was he particularly interested in them. Moreover, however earnestly he might have tried to understand those methods, he would have met a fatal obstacle in his complete inability to speak the English language. It must be remembered that George I was fifty-four years of age when he became King—having been born in 1660—and therefore was unlikely easily to acquire a new tongue. Indeed, he made no effort to do so. His son, who succeeded to the throne in 1727 as George II, could manage to make himself understood in English, though he spoke it with a decided German accent. George II was a genuine patron of literature and music—having a special regard for the composer Handel—but he did not particularly concern himself with politics.

In short, neither George I nor George II played any continuously active part in directing either the general policy or the small details of English politics. This was unprecedented in English history. Hitherto the monarch had been the centre and the inspirer of national policy, both domestic and foreign. Even so mild a sovereign as Queen Anne had exercised a most decisive influence on the rise and fall of parties, and hence on the trend of national affairs. Evidence of this is afforded by the titles of previous chapters in our history books: almost every chapter has had the name of a monarch at the head of it. This is only rarely so after the reign of Anne. We must not exaggerate the significance of this fact by assuming that henceforward the King was a nonentity: George III, for example, was anything but a nonentity

in English politics, and most of his successors have exerted real influence too. But that influence has been, for the most part, steadying and corrective rather than directive and initiating.

The inevitable result of the relatively minor part played by the first two Georges was that the politicians had much freer hands, and that the initiative passed from the monarch to his ministers. Also, incidentally, the removal of the personal influence of the King made party rivalry much more intense and bitter than ever it had previously been. Before we study this process at work, we must examine in more detail than hitherto the principles for which the two parties respectively stood.

Whigs.

The Whigs, it should be remembered, had had their origin in the group organized by Shaftesbury at the break-up of the Cabal in 1673 in the reign of Charles II. Their object had been to limit the power of the King and to compel him to rule through Parliament according to the accepted customs of the English Constitution; that is, they stood for constitutional monarchy. For the moment the astuteness of Charles II had defeated the Whigs, but the obstinacy of James had alienated the nation so thoroughly that William of Orange had been invited, mainly by Whigs, to become King, and hence, throughout the reign of William and through most of the reign of Anne, they had been the dominant party. Thus the Whigs stood for the Revolution ~~and~~ for the Act of Settlement which was its outcome. Naturally, therefore, they supported the Hanoverians who came to the throne by virtue of that Act.

Three classes of the community constituted the membership of the Whig party. The party leaders were, for the most part, nobles belonging to a not very numerous group of great landowning families. But the bulk of the party consisted of the commercial classes and of the Protestant

Dissenters. It was the former who had lent money to the Government and who therefore feared that the return of the Pretenders would involve the permanent loss of the loans. The result of the adhesion of the Dissenters was that the Whigs stood consistently for religious toleration and for the abolition of the tests whereby all but members of the Established Church were excluded from office under the Crown.

Tories.

The Tory party was supported by the smaller land-owning class, that is the squirearchy. In opposition to the Whigs, it was the champion of a strong king and of the Established Church, and was therefore supported also by the staunch members of that Church, especially by the parish clergy, though, curiously enough, the bishops tended to be Whigs owing to their being members of the great Whig families.

The extent to which these parties respectively represented the nation as a whole, either generally or on any particular issue, is very difficult to estimate. Probably the greater part of the nation, because of its attachment to the Church, favoured the Tories; but the Whigs were generally able to overbalance this by superior organization and by the judicious use of the wealth which both the great land-owning and the commercial interests were able to place at their disposal.

Ministries, 1714-1832.

The above sketch of the principles for which the Whigs and the Tories respectively stood goes far to explain the fortunes of the parties during the century following 1714. Under William III and Anne, there had been changes of ministers, though the Whigs had usually been supreme; but the accession of the Hanoverians, by virtue of the Settlement policy of the Whigs, meant a great increase of power for the latter. George I and George II happened

also to have no desire to override their Parliaments and to be willing to leave the main direction of politics to their ministers. In short, the first Hanoverians made the kind of kings who fitted excellently into the Whig pattern of monarchy. The Whig power was further strengthened by the fact that the Tories, though they were not all active Jacobites, were suspected of sympathy towards the cause of the Pretenders, who were Roman Catholics and favourites of the French. Hence the reigns of the first two Georges were an era of long, unbroken Whig rule. Some of the ministries of this period would now be regarded as of extraordinarily long duration: Walpole's lasted from 1721 till 1742, and the Pelhams' from 1744 till 1754. Even the ministry between 1742 and 1744, following the defeat of Walpole over the question of his policy in the War of Austrian Succession, consisted of a combination of Whigs.

But George III proved to be a man of very different calibre from that of either of his immediate predecessors. He made it one of his chief aims to recover the political power that they had allowed to lapse. Such a King was clearly not one to whom the Whigs could give their support; nor—and this was even more to the point—were the Whigs the party that such a King would choose to have in power. Consequently, the early part of George III's reign was occupied by a struggle between the Whigs, who were clinging desperately to the offices which they had held for so long, and the Tories, now reinforced by royal support. George III had ascended the throne in 1760: in 1770 a Tory ministry was formed under Lord North, and from that time the Tories remained in office, with only a few fleeting interludes, until 1830, when the Whigs were carried to power once more on the tide of the popular demand for reform. This long régime of the Tories meant that their party had given up their Jacobite tendencies and had become reconciled to the Hanoverian succession.

In spite of the general lines of policy outlined above, at certain points in the story it is extremely difficult to discover what principle determined the attitude of each of the parties towards particular questions. The truth is that often no political principle at all was involved, and at such times the only consideration that counted was that of immediate party advantage. There was, however, one matter on which the attitude of the parties never varied throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and which has been thus summarized by an eminent historian¹ :

"The continuity of the two parties . . . was to be found mainly in the unbroken connection of the Tories with the Church interest and of the Whigs with the Non-conformist voters."

"The underlying principle connecting the Liberals and Conservatives of Victoria's reign in an actually traceable succession with the Whigs and Tories of Charles II, was the continuous antagonism of Church and Dissent."

Bribery.

One feature of the methods of eighteenth-century politics needs to be mentioned at this point, namely, that both parties relied mainly for their influence not upon argument or ability but upon bribery on a colossal scale. The working of the so-called representative system during the eighteenth century will need to be explained in some detail when we consider the question of parliamentary reform early in the nineteenth century. What we must note here is that the total electorate of the country was only approximately three hundred thousand. That these voters were represented by nearly six hundred members of Parliament meant that each constituency must have been numerically very small according to modern standards. In many towns, for example, the only electors were the mayor and corporation. Further, as a fair proportion of the voters in each constituency would be definitely attached to one party or the other, only a relatively small number of the electors would need to be bribed in order

¹ G. M. Trevelyan, *History of England*, pp. 561 and 616

to turn the balance on one side or the other. At every election, therefore, an avalanche of bribery was let loose, each party trying unabashed to outbid its rival in the purchase of votes.

But bribery was by no means limited to the constituencies. In every parliament the government of the day set to work to secure a stable majority by bribing the members. Some received regular money payments, or "pensions", others received offices, many of which were meaningless sinecures to which were attached considerable incomes. Further confirmation of these conditions was afforded by the fact that when Pitt and Newcastle formed a ministry in 1757 they divided their duties as follows: Pitt made himself responsible for government policy and leadership, while Newcastle concentrated upon "managing" the members of Parliament.

It is difficult to understand how, in such circumstances, Parliament could, in any real sense, be regarded as a representative assembly. Yet one fact on the other side needs to be recalled, namely, that even such Parliaments were amenable to the influence of the popular will when this was vigorously expressed on particular issues. The case of Dr. Sacheverell has already shown us an example of such influence.¹ This present chapter will furnish examples in Walpole's abandonment of his Excise Bill in 1733 and of his being compelled to enter war against Spain in 1739 and against Prussia in 1740. Subsequent chapters will show several other similar examples. It was this outside pressure which, growing more and more widespread and organized, finally compelled even an unrepresentative Parliament in 1832 to reform itself.

2. WALPOLE'S RISE TO POWER

The outstanding personage of the long Whig régime of the first two Georges was Sir Robert Walpole. Before

¹ Chapter I, section 4.

becoming the leading minister of the Crown, Walpole had had a varied political career.

Early Career.

Born in 1676, he was the son of a Norfolk squire, and when a quarter of a century later he inherited the family estates he became a man of independent means. About the same time he entered Parliament as a Whig. In 1708, at the period of Marlborough's ascendancy, Walpole held the important office of Secretary at War, but he lost his office with the defeat of the Whig Government in 1710. This did not end his misfortunes, for the Tories, pursuing their advantage, impeached him for peculation and, without a trial, confined him to the Tower. These charges were never substantiated, and Walpole was shortly released. George I's accession saw the restoration of the Whigs to power, Halifax being First Lord of the Treasury, and Townshend and Stanhope Secretaries of State. In that ministry, Walpole held office as Paymaster-General and later as Chancellor of the Exchequer.

This was the ministry that had to face the 1715 Jacobite rebellion.¹ The rebellion was easily suppressed, but it was a sharp reminder that there were parties anxious to take advantage of any cause of unpopularity on the part of the Government. In 1715 the Whigs had been swept to power by a great majority because of the general fear of civil war; but, as usual, time soon served to diminish the ministry's following. George I was personally unpopular, and the rising of 1715 produced a fear that a Tory majority might be returned at the election which, under the Triennial Act, would be due in 1718. If this happened, the whole Succession settlement might be imperilled and England once more be torn by civil strife. Accordingly, in 1716 the ministry secured the passage of the *Septennial Act*, which allowed any parliament to continue in existence

¹ Section 6, below.

for a period not exceeding seven years. Thus the ministry would be safe until 1722.

Alberoni.

The real cause of the ministry's weakness came, however, not from outside but from inside ; for its members soon became divided by personal jealousies and by sharp differences of opinion, particularly over foreign affairs. We have seen that the Spaniards deeply resented the clause in the Treaty of Utrecht whereby they had lost their Italian possessions. Accordingly Philip V, under the influence of Cardinal Alberoni, an Italian adviser who was to prove himself one of the most adroit politicians of the day, began to scheme for the recovery of the lost provinces. Briefly, the basis of the situation was as follows : George I, as Elector of Hanover, had quarrelled with Charles XII of Sweden and with Peter the Great of Russia, both of whom were extraordinary personages who might be extremely dangerous, though their combination was unlikely owing to their mutual bitterness. Nevertheless, Alberoni achieved the seeming impossibility by forming an alliance with both of them. France, on the other hand, was drawn towards Britain ; for Louis XV, who had succeeded in 1715, was a sickly child, and the next heir was the Duke of Orleans, the Regent, who, fearful lest the ambitions of Philip V might induce the latter to ignore his renunciation of claims to the French throne, was anxious to uphold the Treaty of Utrecht. Stanhope, therefore, in 1717, formed the *Triple Alliance* of Britain, France and Holland with the object of maintaining the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht.

The reaction of these events upon English domestic politics—which is our immediate concern—is that Townshend opposed this policy because he disagreed with Britain's being entangled with continental affairs and because he believed that its real object was the preservation of Hanover. So sharp was the feeling between the ministers

one party. How and why the change came early in the eighteenth century we have now to inquire. Two factors contributed to the development of the modern Cabinet, namely, the Whig triumph and the personal ascendancy of Walpole.

Whigs Supreme.

The Whig régime resulting from the accession of the Hanoverians in 1714¹ was reinforced by the Jacobite attempt in 1715 to oust George I and place the Pretender on the throne. The story of the "Fifteen" will be told in a later section of this chapter. Here we are concerned only with its immediate result, namely, that henceforward the Whigs were more strongly entrenched in office than ever; for the Tories, being antagonistic towards the Hanoverian Succession, were naturally regarded as sympathetic towards the Jacobites; and, personally unpopular though the first two Georges were to become, the mass of the nation had no desire for the return of the Stuarts. The Whigs therefore procured the imprisonment of the Earl of Oxford in the Tower, and Bolingbroke for safety fled abroad: the Tories were completely broken, and two generations elapsed before a thoroughly Tory ministry was again in power. In the government of 1715 the effect was felt at once: Tories were excluded from every office, both high and low, so that the administration became solely Whig. This system, continued during the long period of Whig rule, set a precedent which subsequent ministries followed. Henceforward the general rule was that every government consisted of members of only one of the parties; those occasions on which this practice was not adhered to were regarded as temporary expedients for some particular purpose and were known as "Coalitions". Thus one of the conditions for a Cabinet in the modern sense was established: all the ministers belonged to one party.

¹ Section 1, above.

Walpole as "Prime Minister".

We have now to see how the custom arose for these ministers to be chosen and presided over by a minister instead of by the King, that is, by Walpole instead of by George I. This change was due to the simple fact that George I was unable to speak English, and, further, that he completely lacked interest in English politics. Hence his presence at a Cabinet meeting embarrassed his ministers and bored himself. Very wisely, therefore, he acquired the habit of absenting himself when the Cabinet met. But someone had to take the Chair, a duty that naturally fell to the most prominent of the ministers themselves, namely, as it happened, to Walpole. The latter had then to carry to the King a report of the proceedings of the meeting. Incidentally this was not easy: the King knew no English, and Walpole knew no German, and, as the only language they had in common was Latin, they had to make shift to converse in that, though neither of them was really adept even in this substitute, and the process was not helped by the fact that George's accent was strongly German while Walpole's was equally English. These difficulties, however, did not affect the principles involved. Previously the King had been the source of authority and initiative, and he had merely consulted ministers when and how he had chosen; but now the position is reversed, for it is the ministers who make the decisions and then consult the King. Moreover, the minister who habitually presided over his fellows and who acted as the intermediary with the sovereign was certain to acquire prestige over the rest. This was deeply resented by other ministers and was made the subject of bitter charges against Walpole; Walpole himself as vigorously denied that he was a "Prime Minister". But the facts were too obvious, and the necessity for such a minister proved too strong for the denial to hold good. In one respect only Walpole did not comply with our present-day

conception of a Prime Minister : he did not actually choose the members of his own Cabinets. Yet even here he fulfilled the rôle negatively if not positively, that is to say, he at least got rid of ministers who did not agree with him : thus one after another of the prominent ministers either resigned or were dismissed—Carteret in 1724, Pulteney in 1725, Townshend in 1730 and Chesterfield in 1733. The ascendancy that Walpole thus acquired was possible only because of the long, continuous period during which he held office—1721 till 1742. This not only gave to him a position of unique prestige, but also established that position as a precedent which his successors in office followed. We must not expect to find in this early Cabinet the same sense of common loyalty, responsibility and cohesion as characterize a present-day Cabinet : these things took time to develop. But already under Walpole all the principles of the Premiership and of Cabinet government were clearly established. That is what is meant by saying that Sir Robert Walpole was Britain's first Prime Minister.

5. WALPOLE'S FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION

Reasons for Success.

The most notable feature of Walpole's administration—apart, that is, from his contribution to Cabinet government—was in the realm of finance. His own financial skill had been exemplified, at the very outset of his ministry, by his straightening out the affairs of the South Sea Company. But, apart from Walpole's personal ability, two sets of circumstances combined to give this ability a chance to operate. For the first time for many generations there was the prospect of settled peace between England and France. The political reason for the French desire to keep on good terms with England has already been explained in connection with the Alberoni episode.¹ In 1726 Louis XV appointed Cardinal Fleury as his chief

¹ Section 2, above.

minister, and Fleury made the maintenance of peace the keystone of his policy. By a significant coincidence, Fleury's period of power (1726-1743) was almost identical with that of Walpole (1721-1742). Hence both countries had an interlude during which to recover their economic resources.

The second factor contributing to Walpole's successful administration was the large part that business, on an increasing scale, was beginning to play in the life of the nation. In spite of the series of wars, for many years English overseas trade had been growing steadily, and the merchant-class was becoming correspondingly important. This class, after the exhaustion resulting from the wars, was anxious for peace and for a national policy that would foster English trade. Thus, Walpole's rise to power happened to coincide with a demand for precisely the political programme that he had to offer.

Sinking Fund.

One of Walpole's first financial expedients was part of his efforts to clear up the damage done by the South Sea Company episode. After the Company's collapse, the Government had to resume responsibility for the National Debt; and in those days the existence of a National Debt was viewed generally with the gravest of apprehension, for, as in the case of a large debt owed by a private individual, it was regarded as only the prelude to bankruptcy. Walpole therefore devised a scheme for setting aside annually £1,000,000, known as the Sinking Fund, to accumulate at compound interest for the repayment of the debt. But the men with capital found, then as now, that Government "Funds" were very suitable for investment, and hence they did not favour the abolition of the debt. Before long, therefore, the project of the Sinking Fund was allowed to drop.

One of the healthiest forms of encouragement given by Walpole to trade was his improvement of the customs system. He found that taxes were being imposed upon

the import and the export of a very large number of articles, but that many of the taxes were so insignificant that their only effect was to place vexatious hindrances in the way of trade. Such taxes he abolished and, though the Exchequer lost only a relatively small amount, the trade of the country gained enormously.

Wood's Halfpence, 1722-1725.

Another item of Walpole's work more suitably treated under "Financial Affairs" than in any other connection, is that of Wood's Halfpence which, though of no great consequence in itself, is nevertheless of interest as illustrating the general tenor of the period. In 1722 an Englishman named Wood had, through influence with a courtier, obtained a patent for supplying copper coins to Ireland. Wood expected to make a fortune out of the transaction, and the Irish, fearful—though apparently unjustly—of debased coinage, boycotted the new issue. Wood, naturally irate through the disappointment of his hopes, threatened to "pour the coinage down the throats" of the Irish—an attitude not likely to calm the latter's hostility. Then Dean Swift¹ wrote a series of scathing attacks upon the whole business and published them anonymously in 1724 as *The Drapier's Letters*. These roused public feeling to such an extent that Walpole withdrew the patent and gave Wood a pension as a substitute for the prospective fortune lost.

Excise Bill, 1733.

Strangely enough, the soundest and best-known financial project associated with Walpole was one that he failed to carry into effect. Walpole aimed at nothing less than making England the central market for the world. To this end he proposed to remove the customs duties on the import of wines and tobacco. These goods, after import, were to be stored in bonded warehouses and then were to be allowed out of bond free of taxation if they were to be

¹ Chapter I, section 4.

re-exported ; if, however, the goods were taken out for home consumption they were to pay duty. Such a duty, being levied inland and not at the port, would be an excise duty : in short, Walpole's proposal was to substitute an excise for a customs duty on particular classes of goods. He believed that the free import of goods for re-export would give an impetus to English shipping and would give to the English market an advantage over all others.

Yet no sooner were the proposals made public than a howl of protest went up from all over the country. For this there were three main reasons. First, the Bill was generally misunderstood : the mass of folk expected that, in order to secure the execution of its provisions, an army of excise officers would need to be created and would have the right to search business premises and private houses for articles that had not paid duty. Second, these excise-men would have votes and, in accordance with the habits of the day, would be given their jobs in return for votes recorded for the Government : that this consideration seriously prejudiced large numbers of people against the Bill is proof of the extent to which elections were influenced by bribery and corruption. The most powerful source of opposition to the Bill was the third. During the eighteenth century, smuggling was practised on an enormous scale. Not only were there gangs of smugglers with regular landing-places on the coast, but there was a network of channels whereby the smuggled articles were distributed and sold. Moreover, very few people considered the occupation unworthy : magistrates and parsons were commonly in league with the smugglers or their agents. For example, when John Wesley began to form his societies he laid down as one of the rules—drawn up in 1739—to be observed by members that they should avoid “evil in every kind ; especially that which is most generally practised. Such is . . . The *buying or selling uncustomed goods*” ; and even that failed to banish the practice, for large numbers of the members would see in it nothing

disgraceful. One effect of the Excise scheme would have been to make traders liable to visits from the new customs-officers who would have demanded proofs that goods offered for sale had paid the requisite duties; and the best possible proof of the prevalence of smuggling was the reception given to the Excise Bill. The whole country seemed to rise against it: petitions were sent to the Commons; the army believed that the price of tobacco would increase and was near mutiny; and so forth. Walpole, convinced that to pursue the measure would bring defeat, bowed to the storm and withdrew the Bill.

Character of Walpole's Policy.

The foregoing account of Walpole's ministry should have served at least to show that heroic measures were not to be expected from him. Indeed, apart from his revision of the customs, most of his work was negative rather than positive. Time after time his actions were governed mainly by considerations of avoiding trouble. His abandonment of the Sinking Fund, of Wood's Halfpence and of the Excise Bill illustrates this point. Similarly, though he disagreed with the Test Act and the Corporation Act against Dissenters, he feared the opposition of the Church to the repeal of the measures and therefore substituted in 1727 an *Indemnity Act* which was to last for twelve months and gave to Dissenters an indemnity against infringements of the Acts. The measure in fact continued to be passed every year until 1828 when the Acts themselves were definitely repealed. Nevertheless, Walpole did give to England the peace which made prosperity again possible; and certainly the heroic age of Pitt would have been impossible without the more prosaic preparations for that age by Walpole. Walpole's work has been justly estimated in the following terms¹:

"Statesmen may fairly claim to be judged not merely by the successes they achieve, but by the dangers they avert. Estimated

¹ C. Grant Robertson, *England Under the Hanoverians*, p. 85.

by this test, Walpole has an indisputable place amongst the master-makers of modern Great Britain. . . . The twenty years of dull, plodding, but gifted statesmanship and administration under Walpole put the coping-stone on the fabric of 1688."


But it was in foreign affairs that Walpole's policy was most clearly and almost solely negative. In so far as he had a definite view on foreign policy, it was that Austria was of little use as an ally to Britain and that the latter's future lay rather with the northern and more vigorous power of Prussia. His supreme aim abroad, however, was to keep England free from all continental entanglements. Indeed, his final fall from power was due to his being forced, against his judgment and desire, into the War of Captain Jenkins' Ear in 1739 and the War of Austrian Succession in 1740. An account of his loss of office is therefore given at the beginning of the next chapter in connection with those wars.

Before we proceed to study the details of affairs abroad leading to and also following Walpole's fall, there are two other items that have to be dealt with, namely, the Rebellions of 1715 and 1745 and the Calendar Revision of 1751.

6. THE "FIFTEEN" AND "FORTY-FIVE" REBELLIONS

1715.

The Rebellions were the final attempts of the Jacobites to dislodge the Hanoverian dynasty and to restore the Stuarts. The story of 1715 is soon told. Notwithstanding the lack of enthusiasm provoked in the nation as a whole by the stodgy George I, in England only a very small section of extremists was any more enthusiastic for his rival. The Scottish Highlanders were the only body of men who could be found to engage actively on behalf of James, the Old Pretender—so called to distinguish him from his son, Charles Edward, who became known as the "Young Pretender". Even they were moved quite as



WILLIAM III IN IRELAND.
1745 REBELLION.

much by antipathy towards England as by any devotion to James Stuart, for they bitterly resented Scotland's loss of independence through the Act of Union of 1707.

Almost from its commencement the movement was doomed to failure. Though James was personally brave—he had fought gallantly for the French at Oudenarde and Malplaquet—he lacked enterprise and imagination, and the rising was already waning before he even landed in Scotland. Also, Louis XIV had died in 1715 just prior to the rising and, as we have seen already, the Duke of Orleans was anxious to maintain friendly relations with England; so the Highlanders received no reinforcements from France. Even the organization of the rebels broke down. Preparations had been made for risings in the west of England and in Cumberland, but these both came to nothing. A rising in the Lowlands of Scotland failed to co-operate with the Highlanders who alone, under the Earl of Mar—hence the movement is often known as *Mar's Rebellion*—had to face the Hanoverian army, led by Argyll, at *Sheriffmuir*. Neither side could claim the battle as a victory, but the exposure of the futility of the Jacobite outbreak caused the death of the rebellion. Shortly afterwards the Old Pretender set sail once more for France. In 1719 he married a Polish lady, and in 1720 Charles Edward was born. It was he who, in 1745, led yet another, and the final, Jacobite rising against the Hanoverians.

1745.

The Rebellion of 1745 was a much more serious business, and, though it failed, none can now gauge exactly how near it came to success. England was at the moment deeply engaged in the War of Austrian Succession and, earlier in the same year, her troops had been defeated at Fontenoy. The time therefore seemed ripe for another attempt. Accordingly, in July, 1745, Charles Edward landed at Moidart on the west coast of Scotland. He

was accompanied by only half a dozen friends and his arrival was not commonly anticipated. But Bonnie Prince Charlie presented a sharp contrast to his father: he was gay and buoyant and exactly suited to rally men in personal devotion to himself and to lead them against constituted authority. The Highland clans responded eagerly to his call and soon he had a force of several thousand men with the finest physique in the British Isles and whose natural trade was war. Their weaknesses were that they were not easily amenable to discipline and that they were but ill-armed to face a regular army.

Nevertheless, Charles was able to march into *Perth* and into *Edinburgh*, where he was warmly received. Government troops were hurriedly rushed back from the Continent and, after forming on the coast, marched towards *Edinburgh*. The two forces met at *Prestonpans* (21st September), east of the city, where Cope's army was routed and scattered in a few minutes. Nothing now stood between Charles and England and, judging rightly that a rebellion must take the offensive and win quickly or else fail completely, Charles decided upon invasion.


At the head of six thousand men he crossed the border, passed through *Carlisle*, and so, by the western route, made southwards through *Preston*, *Wigan* and *Manchester* to *Derby*, which was reached on 4th December. At that point he was within one hundred and thirty miles of London between which and himself the only barrier was a force north of the capital. The Londoners were convinced that the rebellion had already succeeded: the Bank of England had to sustain a "run"—for the assumption was that the Stuart would confiscate the coffers of gold lent to the rival dynasty—and saved itself only by paying out its creditors in sixpences; and George II, his belongings packed up, was awaiting the final signal to fly back to Hanover. But the Highlanders' success was apparent rather than real. As we have seen, they had to win quickly or not at all; and the fact was that they were

not winning. Though they had reached the heart of England, they met with no active response among Englishmen who, though allowing the insurgents to pass, made no sign of joining them. In the absence of increasing support, the Highland leaders realized that time was all on the side of their enemies, for sooner or later the Hanoverian armies would concentrate in such strength that the Jacobites would be crushed if only by weight of numbers. Had they pressed on to London, they would probably have succeeded in entering the city, but that they could have held it permanently, in face of general apathy, is very unlikely. A retreat was therefore advised, and Charles, much against his will, was obliged to agree. That decision settled the fate of the rebellion. Charles and his men returned to Carlisle, then on to Glasgow and Stirling, and so to the Highlands.

The Duke of Cumberland was given the command of the Government's troops, and he spent the opening months of 1746 in training them to sustain a Highland charge. The result was seen in April when, at *Culloden Moor*, near Inverness, Cumberland's men smashed the Highlanders. The district around Inverness then became the scene of the most horrible ravage and slaughter; and Cumberland's method of crushing out rebellion earned him the fitting title of "Butcher Cumberland". Between April and September, Prince Charles wandered from point to point among his loyal Highlanders, but though hunted like an animal by the redcoats, and though the price of £30,000 was placed upon him, no one ever sold him to the Government. At last, through the devotion of Flora Macdonald, he escaped in a small boat to Skye, and finally managed to reach Brittany. That was the end of the Stuarts' attempts to regain the British throne.

7. CALENDAR REVISION, 1751

The need for reforming the calendar had arisen in the following way. According to the calculations of the




This event was the immediate cause of a fresh series of European wars known as the War of Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War. The former is our immediate concern.

Pragmatic Sanction.

Charles VI was the last of the direct male line of the Austrian Hapsburgs, his children being daughters, of whom the eldest was Maria Theresa. Early in his reign, Charles had foreseen that the problem of the inheritance would be a complicated one, for the question of a female succession was without precedent. Since 1438 every Emperor had been a Hapsburg, but even Charles recognized that a woman occupant of the Imperial throne was unthinkable; and, in any case, the choice was beyond his control and lay with the Electors. His concern was with the family possessions of the Hapsburgs. But these also had never been ruled by a woman and there was the same problem, in view of this, of whether a woman was eligible. If for this reason Maria Theresa were excluded, the next in succession was a member of the Bavarian House. Charles VI was naturally anxious to preserve his dominions within the Hapsburg House and, with this object, he framed an agreement known as the Pragmatic Sanction—the solemn pledge—stating that on his death the Hapsburg dominions were to pass to his daughter Maria Theresa. The greater part of Charles VI's reign was spent in inducing the Powers of Europe—Spain, Prussia, Britain, Holland, Saxony, Poland and France—to agree to recognize Maria Theresa as the ruler of Austria in succession to himself. The Elector of Bavaria, who claimed the succession to be his, was honest enough to refuse to sign.

Rise of Prussia.

Would the signatory powers keep their promise? The answer to that question would decide the fate of Europe for many years to come, and the answer was not long in




being given: Charles VI died in October, 1740, and in December of the same year Frederick II of Prussia had invaded Silesia—an Austrian province—with the intention of making his own terms with Maria Theresa. In order to understand his objects we have to know something of the recent history of Prussia.

The Hohenzollern family, to which Frederick II belonged, had once been the counts of a small district near the source of the Danube. In 1415 the Emperor of the day had given them Brandenburg in north Germany. A series of vigorous and able rulers succeeded in extending the Hohenzollern dominions in all directions, as shown on the accompanying map. In 1700 the Emperor Leopold I authorized the Elector of Brandenburg to use the title of King, and the Elector Frederick III of Brandenburg thus became Frederick I of Prussia. The second King, Frederick William I, who reigned from 1713 till 1740, was fitly known as the Sergeant King, for the object of his policy was to train an army which, in size and efficiency, would enable the new Kingdom to rank with the older states of Europe. He brought the numbers of the Prussian army to over eighty thousand men, which was only slightly less than the strength of the armies of Austria and of France; and what little it may have lacked in numbers it more than counterbalanced by superior organization and equipment. Frederick William's pet scheme was the recruitment of a regiment of the tallest men he could find throughout his dominions, this regiment being known as the "Potsdam Giants". Moreover, all this was achieved without national bankruptcy; indeed he kept his treasury nearly as well stocked as he did his army.

Outbreak of War.

This was the inheritance which fell to Frederick II, the Great, when in May, 1740, he succeeded his father, and we can hardly be surprised if the young monarch—then twenty-eight years of age—determined to use the resources ready



to his hand in order still further to extend Prussian territory. The succession of a young, inexperienced girl in the Austrian dominions five months after his own enthronement seemed to offer exactly the opportunity he sought. Disregarding completely Prussia's promise of adherence to the terms of the Pragmatic Sanction, Frederick invaded Austrian territory at the point where it adjoined his own dominions, namely Silesia, and then tried to bargain with Maria Theresa. His terms were that if Maria Theresa would cede Silesia to him, he would support her against the Bavarian House, which was claiming the succession to Austria, and would give his vote to her husband Francis of Lorraine as Emperor; but if Maria Theresa refused this "offer", he would support the Bavarian claims. His hope was that Maria Theresa would grant him Silesia rather than risk the loss of the whole of her dominions.

Maria Theresa, however, although young and inexperienced, proved to be a remarkable woman. She returned to Frederick the only reply consistent with national dignity: she refused to grant him Silesia and prepared to defend her dominions. Unfortunately for Maria Theresa, she had succeeded to an empty treasury, to a neglected army and to realms divided by racial jealousies; for her father, instead of building up a strong, well-equipped state, had frittered away his strength and his opportunities in obtaining empty promises attached to the Pragmatic Sanction. The worthlessness of those promises became evident immediately war was declared: Prussia was joined by France, Spain, and Saxony—each of which wanted one of the Hapsburg provinces—and by Bavaria. Nevertheless, Maria Theresa courageously faced her problems: she appealed so effectively to the loyalty of her subjects that even the Hungarians for the moment rallied to her support. The one Power to honour its pledge to maintain the Pragmatic Sanction was Britain, and thus it was that, as Spain engaged on the other side, the War of Captain Jenkins' Ear became merged in the War of Austrian Succession.

3. BRITAIN AND THE WAR

Fall of Walpole.

The military campaigns are beyond our subject, for Britain played a relatively small part in them. The British contribution to the war was mainly in the realm of diplomacy. Though George II declared himself as the supporter of Maria Theresa, in the opening years of the war the Government's intervention was negative rather than positive and consisted of little more than advising Maria Theresa to buy off Frederick II by ceding to him Silesia. But the European situation contained issues that were so vital for Britain that she would be unable to adopt permanently a negative attitude only. As we have seen, Walpole's entry into the War of Captain Jenkins' Ear had been contrary to his own convictions, and Britain's championing of Maria Theresa, though inevitable by any code of honour, carried the great peace minister still further out of his depth. On all sides, forces were accumulating against his ministry. Not only the Tories, but most of the Whigs also were growing increasingly discontented with Walpole's handling of foreign politics. To continue to avoid active participation in Continental affairs was becoming more and more impossible; in other words the pretence of conducting a war in a peace-time attitude had to be dropped, and Walpole had to choose definitely between resuming his natural rôle of a true peace minister on the one hand, and, on the other, heading a thorough-going war-cabinet. The latter alternative was impossible to his temperament and the former equally impossible in the prevailing circumstances. Walpole's only course, therefore, was to resign. This he did in January, 1742. He was given the title of Earl of Orford, together with a pension of £4,000 a year.

Carteret.

Walpole's fall did not mean, however, that the Tories came into power: all that happened was that the ministry

was reconstructed so as to include those Whigs who favoured a more vigorous foreign policy. Lord Wilmington, as First Lord of the Treasury, was nominally head of the Government; but the effective power lay with three other men, namely, Henry Pelham and his brother, the Duke of Newcastle, who retained their respective offices of Paymaster-General and Secretary of State, and Lord Carteret who was admitted to the Cabinet as the other Secretary of State and who was chiefly responsible for foreign affairs.

Carteret's advent produced in British foreign policy a change that was nothing short of revolutionary. Carteret himself was a skilled linguist who, having formed his conclusions about European politics at first hand, had definite ideas about the right attitude for Britain to adopt towards the Continental Powers. Carteret still saw France as the real enemy of Britain, and he advocated what in effect was the renewal of the policy of William III and of Marlborough, namely, the formation of an alliance to keep France in check. With this as his aim, and caring very little for the particular issues between the other countries—for example, for the fate of Silesia—he began to exert his diplomatic skill upon the situation as he found it. His first step was to detach Prussia from France. Frederick had been steadily victorious and had secured his hold upon Silesia. A continuation of such victories would be disastrous to Maria Theresa, and Carteret therefore managed, in July, 1742, to persuade her formally to cede the province to Frederick in return for his neutrality. This was followed by the withdrawal of Saxony also. France was thus left as the only great Power fighting against Austria and Britain. The effect soon began to be seen. The Austrians were everywhere successful, and the French were compelled to withdraw behind their own frontier.

In 1743 Britain herself, along with Hanover, entered more vigorously into the war. In June an Anglo-Hanoverian force, led by King George II in person, met the Bavarians and their French allies at *Dettingen*, in

Bavaria, and, though George had led his men blunderingly into a trap which ought to have involved their destruction, he managed by obstinate courage to hack his way through and to carry off a victory. This, incidentally, was the last occasion on which a British King took part in a battle.

End of the War.

At that point the tide began to turn. For this there were two main reasons. First, Carteret's policy had been becoming generally unpopular in England; his European view-point was not shared by his fellow-ministers, and the prevailing opinion was that, since Britain had no concern with the quarrel between Austria and either Prussia or France, the only reason for active intervention must be the protection of Hanover—the mere suspicion of which was enough to make the War unpopular. In July, 1743, Lord Wilmington died and was succeeded as First Lord of the Treasury by Henry Pelham, who was the leader of the anti-Carteret faction. Steadily the opposition to Carteret grew and, notwithstanding the royal favour, in November, 1744, he had to retire from office. From that point the Pelhams remained in power for an unbroken period of ten years, Henry Pelham being Prime Minister and leader of the House of Commons, and his elder brother, the Duke of Newcastle (Thomas Pelham), being the leader of the House of Lords. Though nominally the reconstructed Government continued the policy of its predecessor, Britain's connection with her Continental allies tended to be less close than formerly.

The second factor that influenced the tide of war was that Frederick II, becoming alarmed at the success of Maria Theresa, broke his neutrality in 1744 and renewed the War against Austria. In 1745 an Anglo-Hanoverian force, under the Duke of Cumberland, was routed by the French at the *Battle of Fontenoy* and the French were able to overrun the Netherlands. In the same year, the Young

Pretender's Rebellion¹ caused the recall of the British troops from Europe where they did not again play any considerable part.

Thus the remaining stages of the war in Europe have no direct concern for us. But two events happened elsewhere, the significance of which only the future could show: in North America the English captured *Louisburg* from the French (1745), and in India the French captured *Madras* from the English (1746). The details of these events will be explained in their proper context in subsequent chapters when we trace the history of the British in North America and in India. During two more years the fighting continued in Europe, neither side being clearly victorious. Gradually Maria Theresa became convinced that she would never be in a position to win outright until hostilities had ceased long enough to allow the economic recuperation of her dominions and the re-organization of her army.

4. TREATY OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, 1748

Clauses.

In 1748, therefore, terms of peace were agreed upon at Aix-la-Chapelle. They were that Frederick II should keep Silesia, and that Maria Theresa should keep the remainder of her dominions, except certain lands in Italy. Madras was to revert to the British and Louisburg to the French.

Though this Treaty was called a "Peace" it could not in reality be more than a truce, for, though Maria Theresa formally acquiesced in the loss of Silesia, she did so with the secret determination not to rest until she had recovered the province and, as the next chapter will show, she spent eight years in preparing to achieve that object. Moreover the cessation of hostilities in Europe made but little difference elsewhere in the world: when Englishmen and Frenchmen met in India^a or America they always squabbled

^a Chapter IV, section 6.

and often fought. The future was to show that for Britain and France the crucial issue was colonial rather than European. How this issue became involved with Maria Theresa's renewed attempt to regain Silesia it is the business of the next chapter to show.

CHAPTER VI

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR, 1756-1763

THE Seven Years' War marked a new stage in the conflict of the European nations, for it was the first truly *world-war*. That is to say, wherever opposing combatants met—especially the British and the French—they fought, and they met not only in Europe but also in America and in India. The war had two contemporary, but independent, sets of causes, one in Europe and one in North America. The struggle in India was quite aside from these main causes and resulted from the local rivalry of British and French, though the fact that their respective governments were officially at war gave an additional excuse for fighting. As this fighting in India did not form an integral part—either in cause or in events—of the war as a whole, we shall omit all but incidental reference to it in this chapter and shall defer an account of the Seven Years' War in India until Chapter X, when it will be included in its proper place in the general story of the British in India.

Our first business, therefore, is to trace the causes of the war in Europe and in North America respectively.

I. THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION

Austrian Policy after 1748.

The temporary nature of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was not long in showing itself. As we saw in the previous chapter, Maria Theresa, when she signed that Treaty, had not the slightest intention of acquiescing in the permanent loss of Silesia. In her own mind, the Peace was intended to provide merely a breathing-space for the recuperation

and the reorganization of Austria's resources until the opportunity should present itself for a further attempt to regain the coveted province. Yet, no matter when or how that opportunity might come, a reliable ally would be a necessary condition of success ; and no sooner was the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle signed than Maria Theresa began to consider the question of which European Power was most likely to join with her. The answer to that question was ultimately reached by a process of elimination : the recovery of Silesia by Austria must involve a war against Prussia, hence Prussia would certainly not be an ally ; the traditional ally for Austria was Britain, but in the War of Austrian Succession it had been the British minister Carteret who had bought off Prussia and hence, in the eyes of Maria Theresa, had been responsible for Austria's loss of Silesia, so that Britain was not to be trusted for the future. In these circumstances the only remaining European Power of any consequence was France, and, though friendship between France and Austria was flatly contradictory to centuries of diplomatic tradition in Europe, mature consideration confirmed Maria Theresa in her determination to effect such an alliance.

Austro-French Alliance.

In 1750, therefore, Maria Theresa sent Kaunitz, her most capable and trusted minister, as representative to Versailles in the hope that he might be able to arrange terms of agreement between the two countries. But though the ambassador secured the personal goodwill of Louis XV, the latter was not to be persuaded to bind France by a definite treaty of alliance with Austria. The truth was that Louis himself was feeble and allowed his Court to be dominated by his favourite, Madame de Pompadour, according to whose fancies ministries were changing constantly. So unstable were French policies that Kaunitz completely failed to effect the permanent alliance that he sought, and during 1753 he returned to Austria in despair.

Yet in that very year the French found themselves involved in a quarrel with the British in North America. The result was that France saw no alternative to adopting the policy that Kaunitz had been so persistently urging upon her. Thus it came about that an Austro-French alliance was at last effected. This alliance was such a complete reversal of the accepted alignment of the states of Europe as to be appropriately known as "The Diplomatic Revolution".

2. ENGLISH AND FRENCH IN NORTH AMERICA

To understand the clash of British and French interests in North America, culminating in the Seven Years' War there, we have to bear in mind the historical development and the geographical background of the two sets of colonies. In nearly every respect the British and the French settlements were in sharp contrast to each other.

The English colonies had been founded at different times, by different types of people and for different reasons. But broadly speaking, they fell into two groups: in the south were the "plantation" colonies established for commercial purposes, and in the north were the New England colonies founded by men seeking liberty of religious worship and thought.

Virginia.

Virginia was the first English settlement in North America. Raleigh and others had made efforts to get the colony well established and had given it a name intended as a compliment to the virgin-queen, Elizabeth. These first attempts all failed, however, because the wrong type of settler was encouraged, namely, the roving buccaneer. In consequence, not until 1607, when a group of London merchants gave the colony a further start and when John Smith went out to organize the work of the settlers, did Virginia begin to flourish. Its prosperity became really

assured when its climate and soil were found to be particularly favourable to the production of tobacco, which European countries were demanding in increasing quantities.

New England.

Then in 1620 the *Mayflower* conveyed about a hundred English Puritans from Holland—where they had sought a temporary refuge—to Cape Cod, their settlement being New Plymouth. Their early experiences were by no means uniformly easy or pleasant, but their staunch Puritan spirit triumphed over all hardships and obstacles. The Laudian persecution of the reign of Charles I led to a considerable increase in the numbers of colonists: in 1629 an organized settlement of Puritans was effected in the district adjoining New Plymouth and became Massachusetts with its capital of Boston. This was followed by a steady stream of refugees from England, and within twenty years of the first landing of the Pilgrim Fathers there were some twenty thousand colonists organized into the four states of New Plymouth, Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Haven. These were the original New England colonies. The year 1643 saw an interesting experiment in colonial government when each of these four colonies sent representatives to a federal assembly to deal with matters of common interest to all alike, especially matters of defence. The federation was, unfortunately, soon characterized by jealousies so that before long the project was abandoned.

Plantation Colonies.

Towards the south also an expansion of the English settlements took place. In 1633 Maryland—so named after the Queen, Henrietta Maria—was founded north of Virginia by Lord Baltimore as a place of protection for Roman Catholics, though the colony gave toleration to Puritans also, a compliment not reciprocated by the New

England colonies of the north. Another colony, to the south of Virginia, was founded in 1663 and named Carolina after King Charles. The southern group was completed by the foundation of Georgia in 1732. These four colonies of Virginia, Maryland, Carolina, and Georgia—each, incidentally, bearing a royal name—had two features in common: they were established for trading purposes and, because there was not a sufficient supply of white labour to carry on the plantations, they were manned by slaves introduced from Africa by the barbarities of raiders and of slaving-ships.

The gap between the northern and the southern groups was filled in by the capture of the Dutch settlements during the reign of Charles II. New Amsterdam was re-named New York—as a compliment to James, Duke of York—the other colony being New Jersey. Pennsylvania also had been founded west of New York by William Penn, who was both a Quaker and a favoured personage at the Court of King Charles II, as a settlement especially for Quakers, though toleration was granted to those who held different faiths.

Characteristics of English Colonies.

The question of the statutory relationship between the colonies and the Motherland will be explained more thoroughly in connection with the revolt of the former for independence.¹ We may notice here that each colony enjoyed a large measure of self-government, though the form this took varied in detail from state to state and though the Governor of each was appointed by the Home Government. The various characters of the colonies produced much mutual jealousy, suspicion and even friction between the thirteen states, so that effective federation, or even co-operation, except sometimes of a temporary nature, was impossible between them. This was remarkable because only by mutual support could the

¹ Chapter VIII, section 1.

colonists secure themselves against their common enemy the Red Indians with whom they seem never to have taken the trouble to establish friendly relations.

French Colonies.

This was the more serious because the Red Indians were not the only enemies whom the English colonists had to fear. The French colonization had been contemporary with the establishment of Virginia. The French settled in Acadia—which, as Nova Scotia, had become British by the Treaty of Utrecht—and north of the St. Lawrence where Quebec and Montreal developed into the chief centres. Louis XIV's government encouraged the settlements whence touch was established with the Mississippi. A further French settlement—called Louisiana—was made at the mouth and later extended along the banks of that river, and the whole Mississippi Basin was claimed as French territory.

As the opening paragraph of this section suggested, the French colonies formed a sharp contrast with the English in every essential respect. They enjoyed no self-government but were controlled by the regulations of their Home Government. This effectually prevented different policies, mutual jealousies, and divisions: all the French settlements were united in obedient allegiance to their governmental superior. The significance of this for the English colonists was too plain to be misunderstood: the geographical distribution of the French along the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi rivers was such that if an effective junction could be established between those two lines of settlements, and if the French could work eastwards, they might literally push the English coastal colonists into the Atlantic. In such a move the French would be able to rely upon the help of the Red Indian with whom they were on most friendly terms; for the French had gone to Canada and Louisiana to trade, and hence they had avoided offending the natives who were their customers and agents.

It was the materializing of this possibility of the junction of the northern and the southern French settlements, with its implied threat to the safety of the English colonists, which precipitated the Seven Years' War in America.

3. OUTBREAK OF WAR

Fort Duquesne.

The obvious way for the French to strengthen their position was to erect forts at strategic points. These would serve both to hem in the English and as bases for attack when the opportune moment arrived. On Lake Champlain they built Forts Crown Point and Ticonderoga commanding the line of the Little Lakes—of which Lake Champlain was the largest—and the Hudson: if, in time of war, France could hold this line she would be able to drive a wedge between the New England and the southern colonies and to defeat each group separately; similarly if the English could force their way from the Hudson on to Lake Champlain northwards, they would have a means of attacking the French settlements on the St. Lawrence. Also, between Lake Erie and the River Alleghany, the northernmost tributary of the Ohio, the French had built Fort Le Bœuf. The implication of these forts was unmistakable: they were threats to the security of the English colonists, yet the latter had no legitimate cause for complaint, since the erection was confined to French territory.

At last the colonists moved to protect themselves, and in 1753 a contingent of Virginian militia, led by George Washington, marched to erect a fort at the junction of the Ohio and the Alleghany rivers. This site was on border-territory the possession of which was claimed by both British and French. By the early part of 1754 the Virginians were building their fort; but French forces advanced in such strength that Washington and his Virginians were compelled to evacuate the place. There-

upon the French took possession and erected there the notable Fort Duquesne, so named after the Marquis Duquesne, then Governor of Canada. The significance of this event was plain: the expulsion of the Virginians from territory claimed as British was an act of war, and war alone could settle the issue.

Braddock's Expedition, 1755.

Next year two regiments of regular soldiers, sent from England and commanded by General Braddock, set out to retrieve Fort Duquesne. With the utmost bravery and under perfect discipline, but in complete ignorance of the conditions of warfare in the strange land, Braddock and his men advanced against the French stronghold. While on the way they marched blindly into an ambush of hostile Indians. The close ranks in which the British were advancing made them an easy target and, as no attempt was made to deploy them in open formation, the Indians scalped and slaughtered the bewildered men in wholesale fashion, Braddock himself dying of wounds a few days later (July, 1755). Half-measures were clearly useless: if the French menace to the British colonists was to be removed, it could be done only by operations on a large scale. Both governments, realizing this fact, began to look round Europe for possible allies.

Austria, whose diplomatic policy had been settled long before,¹ refused British overtures of an alliance, and Britain therefore turned to Prussia. In January, 1756, by the *Convention of Westminster*, Britain and Prussia entered into a defensive alliance: Prussia undertook to protect Hanover in return for British support against foreign invasion of Germany. This brings us to the point at which we left the "Diplomatic Revolution" in the opening section of this chapter: France, finding herself isolated in Europe, saw no alternative to accepting the offers of Kaunitz, and, on 1st May the *First Treaty of Versailles*

¹ Section 1, above.

(so called because in the next year a Second Treaty revised the terms of the First) arranged an alliance between France and Austria. In the same month war was formally declared between Britain and France.

Byng at Minorca, June, 1756.

The opening events of the war were disastrous for British arms, the root cause being lack of competent organization on the part of the Home Government. Early in 1754 Henry Pelham had died and his elder brother, the Duke of Newcastle, took his place as First Lord of the Treasury and leader of the ministry. Newcastle was the most expert "manager" of elections and of Members of Parliament, but the most incompetent and ignorant bungler of political affairs that can well be imagined. The country had not long to wait for a practical demonstration of the effects of the ministry's incapacity. Immediately on the declaration of war, the French decided to strike at British sea-power before Britain had time to prepare herself. Quickly a fleet was gathered and sent against Minorca which had been ceded to Britain by the Treaty of Utrecht. The importance of retaining so vital a base in the Mediterranean was realized even by the Newcastle administration, and a fleet under Admiral John Byng was sent to defend the island. On arrival, Byng found that he had been fore-stalled: the French had been in possession several weeks. His squadron was slightly inferior to that of the enemy, and he declined to attack Minorca; and in an engagement with the French he failed to gain a decisive victory. Byng cannot be blamed altogether for his failure: he had been sent without an army, stores or siege-arms—mainly because it was only when he reached Gibraltar on his outward voyage that he learned that the French had seized Minorca—all of which would be necessary if an effective assault was to be made on the island. Judging, therefore, that the wise course was to secure the necessary reinforcements and equipment, he retired to Gibraltar.

The failure to retain Minorca produced a howl of indignant disappointment throughout England. Newcastle, fearing that the storm would cause the fall of the ministry, determined to find a scapegoat on whom to pile the blame. The obvious person was Byng. The Admiral was therefore brought home, court-martialled, and found guilty of "not having done his best". Byng paid the penalty—which ought more justly to have fallen upon Newcastle—by being shot on his own quarter-deck.

Fall of Newcastle.

For the moment Newcastle seemed safe, but only because Parliament would not be in session again until December, and so could not immediately focus its criticism upon the ministry. Another Minorca before December would certainly be fatal. This was exactly what actually befell, for in September England learned that the French had captured Fort Oswega on Lake Ontario. In these circumstances Newcastle, wisely preferring discretion to any other form of valour, resigned in November. The ministers were therefore re-shuffled: the Duke of Devonshire, as First Lord of the Treasury, became nominally the Prime Minister, but the real leadership lay with William Pitt, who became one of the Secretaries of State. It was Pitt who organized the British victory in the Seven Years' War and who was to become one of the greatest figures in British politics. This, therefore, is a convenient point at which to summarize his career and to estimate his work.

4. WILLIAM PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM

Early Career.

William Pitt possessed the type of genius that would have won distinction for him in whatever sphere of life he had entered. The quality of his oratory, for example, showed that he would certainly have won fame as an actor. In point of fact, his original interest had been military

rather than political. He was born in 1708 and, after an education at Eton and Oxford, in 1731 he obtained a commission in a cavalry regiment. Being quartered in London enabled him to attend Parliament, and in 1735 he was returned as Member for Old Sarum, a pocket-borough of the Pitt family. He sat as a Whig, but from his earliest parliamentary days was a sharp critic of what he considered the feeble administration of Walpole, and he became the leader of a group of politicians who made this the chief subject of their programme and who, being mostly young, were known as "The Boys". It was owing largely to the offence given in these attacks that the King withdrew the commission of Pitt, who thus fell back upon his other occupation and thenceforward concentrated solely upon politics.

Pitt's bitter criticism was one of the main influences leading to Walpole's fall. Even then he was not satisfied, but inveighed just as fervently against Carteret because of the subsidies which the latter granted to Austria and her allies during the War of Austrian Succession, for he claimed that all this was being done in the interest not of England but of Hanover. References to Hanover as "a despicable electorate" intensified George II's dislike of the man whom he—and many others—regarded as a young upstart. This royal opposition was one of the chief reasons why Pitt's early political path was far from smooth. Nevertheless his unflinching declaration of what masses of folk were thinking endeared him to the nation, and in 1746 the King was compelled by Pelham reluctantly to give a minor office to William Pitt and also to another rising politician, Henry Fox. Pitt continued in office until November, 1755, when he was dismissed owing to his opposition to a detail of royal foreign policy.

Characteristics,

In sharp contrast to Walpole, his great predecessor, Pitt was a man of an energetic mind, grappling gladly with big

world-problems and solving them by "thinking in terms of continents". In a word, Pitt was pre-eminently a war-minister, and most of his career is therefore necessarily connected with military history. But two modifications of this statement need to be made in order to preserve it from exaggeration. First, we must not suppose that Pitt gloried in war for its own sake. His great concern was for Britain's prestige in the world: he believed that Britain had a greater part to play than any she had yet played; he believed that a great positive policy—in contrast to Walpole's merely negative one—would not merely maintain Britain unharmed but would make her one of the greatest world-powers; he saw France as Britain's real enemy, and he saw Prussia, not Austria, as Britain's fittest ally. Second, his interest in foreign affairs was not an exclusive interest; that is to say, he was fully alive to the fundamental questions of domestic politics. Pitt was a firm believer in the need for a reform of Parliament, a policy which was closely allied with his antagonism towards the ramifications of corruption in English politics. For example, his opposition to Walpole had been largely an opposition to the system of corruption whereby that minister maintained himself in power. Pitt had many weaknesses—he was haughtily overbearing and rude to subordinates, he was theatrical and artificial in his oratory and in his general bearing—but when all possible criticism has been levelled against him, the fact of outstanding significance is that, in an age of corruption that was not merely all but universal in practice but was scarcely decried even as a principle, Pitt remained uncorrupted and incorruptible. Though a relatively poor man and though holding for nine years the office of Paymaster—whereby any other politician of the day would have become fabulously wealthy—Pitt would accept nothing beyond his salary. Moreover, he not only refused to take bribes himself, but refused also to administer them to his supporters; hence, because those supporters did not share

his views on the matter, he shared his functions with Newcastle.¹

It is strange, until we consider the conditions of late eighteenth-century politics, that such a commanding personage as Pitt should hold high office for only a very short time, from 1757 till 1761, and then from 1766 till 1768. That the relative pettiness of party strife should prevent a man of his skill and vision from all but a brief spell of unfettered service to the State seems little short of a tragedy: as we proceed we shall see that Pitt's statesmanship, if allowed free scope, might have saved Britain from blundering and loss in North America, India, Ireland and within Britain herself.

Much of the influence that Pitt enjoyed was due to the personal power he was able to exert over men both in the mass and as individuals. This rare quality is given, in its highest form, to only a few men of supreme genius: John Wesley, who was Pitt's contemporary, and Napoleon Bonaparte occur to mind as outstanding examples of this fact. In spite of Pitt's overbearing manner, he never lacked the ability to inspire individuals who met him with his own ideals and with the possibility of accomplishing them. In the House of Commons he was superb. Though often his rhetoric was extravagant both in content and in manner, it had the quality of high oratory: his speeches not merely carried logical conviction to the mind, but also swept along the audience in enthusiastic emotional agreement with the speaker. Pitt cast such a spell over the House that no one either could or would interrupt by a word. With the skill thus to influence men, he combined also the understanding insight to choose the right men for particular posts: the outstanding soldiers of the Seven Years' War were men whom Pitt selected, sometimes from quite subordinate office, for great responsibilities—General Wolfe was an instance in point.

Part of the explanation of this personal power was

¹ Chapter IV, section 1.

certainly Pitt's confidence in himself. When in the crisis of the Seven Years' War Pitt became Secretary of State, he expressed this confidence by saying: "I am sure that I can save this country and that nobody else can!" Occasionally he carried this conviction to extreme lengths, but the sentiment he expressed was literally true: Pitt's conviction in the greatness of his country and in his own ability to serve her, undoubtedly laid the foundations for Britain's world-greatness.

Pitt's War Policy.

At the end of section 3, above, we saw that Pitt took office under Devonshire in December, 1756. But two things combined to shorten the life of that ministry. First, the Newcastle faction was excluded; and Newcastle with his "management" of Parliament was an opponent too formidable to be kept out of office for long. Second, Pitt, with characteristic courage, did his utmost in defence of Admiral Byng, but Byng nevertheless was shot. This encouraged George II—whose hatred of Pitt was implacable on account of the latter's disparaging references to Hanover—to dismiss the Devonshire Ministry (April, 1757). Yet the King was to discover that however much Pitt might be detested, no one else was capable of carrying on the war. Pitt, on the other hand, learned that even his own ability and the needs of Britain would not suffice to keep him in office without the support of the Newcastle Whigs. For eleven weeks, in the midst of a great war, Britain was without any ministry at all. At last all sides agreed upon a compromise: Newcastle became nominally Prime Minister, though his functions were limited to leading the House of Lords and maintaining a governmental majority in the Commons; while Pitt, as a Secretary of State and as leader of the House of Commons, organized the war. Though Pitt resigned in October, 1761—that is nearly eighteen months before the Peace of Paris—by that time

he had seen the war through its critical stages, so far as British interests were concerned.

The presence of a new, controlling personality soon made itself felt in the operations of the war. In contrast to his predecessors, Pitt had a definite and comprehensive plan of operations. The pivot of that plan was British naval supremacy, the full significance of which in world affairs Pitt was the first man to realize. Pitt saw, as no one before him had done, that the true issue in the war was the possession of colonies and that the decisive factor in such a struggle must inevitably be sea-power. He therefore concentrated British energies mainly upon supporting and developing that power, and upon using it to control the Atlantic for the transport of British men and materials to North America and to raid the French coast. Nevertheless, Pitt did not neglect the other spheres of war; indeed, one of his chief claims to fame as a successful war-minister was his understanding of the mutual relationships of *all* the spheres of the war. In order to keep the French engaged in Europe—and thereby to divert their attention from North America—he sent regular subsidies to Frederick II of Prussia for the maintenance of large German armies, and he organized a combined Anglo-Hanoverian army to operate in western Germany. This subsidizing of Frederick by Pitt was quite contradictory to the latter's vehement denunciations of the same policy before he was in office. He justified himself by claiming that the object of his subsidies was not the protection of Hanover but the expansion of the dominions of Britain. It was, indeed, part of his resolve to "win Canada on the banks of the Elbe". It was characteristic of Pitt's daring vision that the new armies sent to North America included two regiments of Scottish Highlanders who only a dozen years earlier had fought for Bonnie Prince Charlie against the Hanoverian dynasty.

5. THE CAMPAIGNS, 1757-1760

War in Europe.

The year 1757 opened badly for the arms of Britain and her allies, for Pitt had to take over the inadequate preparations, the incompetent commanders and the lack of co-ordination which his predecessors bequeathed to him. In June Frederick II was routed by the Austrians at *Kolin*, in Bohemia, and was forced back into Saxony. In July the French at *Hastenbeck* defeated the British and Hanoverians under the Duke of Cumberland, who was later compelled to sign the *Convention of Kloster-Seven*, by the terms of which his army was to be disbanded and not to fight again for twelve months.

The first encouraging news was that Clive had won a great victory in June at *Plassey*, though that could not be put down to Pitt's credit. But later in the year there was definite evidence of the effect of Pitt's vigorous co-operation with Prussia. On 5th November Frederick gained a victory over the French and imperial troops at *Rosbach*, in Saxony. Then, with astonishing speed and decisiveness, he struck eastwards into Silesia to the relief of Breslau which the Austrians were attacking, and on 5th December he smashed them also at *Leuthen*. Early in 1758 Pitt repudiated the *Convention of Kloster-Seven* (which Britain had not formally confirmed), re-armed the disbanded troops and placed them under the Prussian Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick instead of the Duke of Cumberland. Frederick II was by no means uniformly victorious as the war proceeded. For example, at *Kunersdorf*, near Frankfurt, in August, 1759, the combined Russian and Austrian armies smashed the Prussian army so thoroughly that Frederick's escape from military annihilation was due solely to their failure to pursue their advantage. The turn of the tide in land warfare—though it was not so regarded at the time—had taken place a fortnight before *Kunersdorf*, when Ferdinand of Brunswick caught the French at the *Battle of*

Minden (1st August) and routed them. By one of the strange strokes of war the rout was prevented from becoming annihilation only by the stupid refusal of Lord George Sackville—whom, under another name, we shall meet later—to obey the order to lead the cavalry, which he commanded, into action at the crucial point of the battle. Henceforward the French were held in check, and the general effect of the war in Europe was that, notwithstanding some reverses, Frederick managed brilliantly to maintain his forces and his dominions until, in 1760, a series of events made all parties willing to consider peace.

American Campaign, 1758-1760.

The operations which were of especial significance for the future of the British Empire were those in America, and it was there that Pitt's directing energy showed itself most clearly. The basis of his plans there was the principle that our American colonies would be retained not by the merely defensive attitude of his predecessors, but only by a great offensive ; in other words, that the sure way to retain our possessions south of the St. Lawrence was to conquer Canada from the French north of it.

One of his first steps was the selection of suitable officers. Commissions were obtained in the army by methods not dissimilar from those whereby lucrative posts were secured in politics : a youth had a commission bought for him, and thenceforward he was promoted not according to merit or energy but according to seniority. The result was that the holding of high rank in the army was no guarantee of extraordinary ability in the holder. Pitt realized that a great war could not be won by such means. He therefore ignored seniority, as such, and chose particular young men of promise for particular tasks. Thus James Wolfe was selected specially for the hazardous responsibility of capturing Quebec, and Amherst was placed in general command of the North American operations.

Pitt's plan of campaign, beginning in 1757, was a com-

prehensive one. It consisted of a threefold attack on Canada ; one army was to proceed westwards, take Fort Duquesne and work down the Great Lakes on to the St. Lawrence ; a second was to go by sea, capturing Louisburg and Quebec ; and a third was to push up the Hudson and then down the line of the Little Lakes, seizing Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and so on to the St. Lawrence. All three expeditions were then to converge on Montreal. The sequel will show that though this final objective was ultimately gained, the details of the plan were not strictly adhered to.

The first of the divisions of the campaign proved to be the easiest of the three. General Forbes advanced westwards and found that the French, forewarned of his approach and unable to maintain their communications with Canada owing to the operations of a British force between the Lakes and *Fort Duquesne*, burned the latter to the ground rather than allow it to fall into British hands. The reconstruction of the fort was forthwith put in hand, and the new town that the British began to raise on the site of the old was appropriately called Pittsburg.

Meanwhile Amherst and Wolfe proceeded against *Louisburg* which commanded the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Realizing that a direct attack on the town would be useless, they besieged it and at the same time destroyed its fortifications by heavy gunfire. By the end of July, 1758, after a five weeks' siege, Louisburg fell into the hands of the British. At that point Amherst left Wolfe to continue alone the expedition up the St. Lawrence.

The reason for this step was that earlier in the year the central division of the campaign had met with disaster. The commander was Lord Abercromby, who was an example of the fact that long and varied service did not necessarily produce brilliant generalship. He had been accompanied by another of Pitt's chosen young men, Lord Howe ; but Howe was killed during the campaign, so that Abercromby was left to his own resources. The first great difficulty

encountered was *Ticonderoga*. There was no reason why this fort should not have been reduced by siege as was Louisburg later in the same year. Abercromby, however, decided to storm it. To do this without preliminary bombardment of the fortifications was a criminal waste of life: the attackers were shot to pieces, the whole expedition proved a failure, and the French were forewarned of the British intentions. Amherst, therefore, when he left Wolfe, did so to take over the command of this central section of the campaign; for the collapse of any one part of a concerted scheme of campaign might well wreck the whole. During 1759 the advance of Amherst compelled the French to evacuate Ticonderoga and Crown Point, but he was unable to force his way through to the St. Lawrence before the end of that campaigning season.

Quebec, 1759.

Meanwhile, Wolfe had been attacking Quebec. The problem of capturing that fortress was perhaps the most difficult that any British general had ever had to face. To do justice to the strategic situation and to the heroism with which it was successfully tackled needs treatment in considerable detail. Here we must be content with only the essentials of the story. The sketch-plan of Quebec shows the main features of the defence and attack.¹ Quebec stood out into the river where the stream narrowed and so was able to command the approaches. The French had strengthened this natural position and had posted military forces on the left bank of the river which they had also fortified with earthworks. Wolfe established his camp farther eastwards along the left bank; he also seized the Island of Orleans and put up a military post on the right bank directly opposite the town. His first plan was to attack the landward defences by carrying the French camps to the east. This, however, met with disaster, and the only alternative seemed to be direct attack from the

¹ Page 158.

river. During several weeks of 1759 Wolfe, who, though physically agile and brave as a lion, was constitutionally weak, was laid aside in enforced idleness through fever. The winter might bring the campaign to an early close, and therefore immediately Wolfe was sufficiently recovered he decided upon an attempt against the city.

Vessels bearing some thousands of men were dispatched up the river beyond Quebec. The French, however, were put off their guard by their conviction that the Heights of Abraham were impregnable and by the British activity east of Quebec, so that the French regarded the vessels to the west as a mere feint attack. Wolfe was really cruising in the hope that the perfect night for the maturing of his plans would arrive. On 12th September he decided that that night had come. The ships' boats were filled with soldiers who, with muffled oars, were rowed shorewards. They were detected by sentries, but pretended to be French provision-boats. Once ashore, they made for a steep, zigzag goat-track that scaled the cliffs known as the Heights of Abraham, and when 13th September dawned there were four thousand Britishers on the top of the rocks. It was an exploit worthy to rank with the most heroic in history. The impossible had happened. Montcalm, the French commander, was informed of the attack. At first incredulous, he awaited confirmation of the report and then brought up his forces. The ensuing battle consisted, on the British side, of two volleys delivered with the utmost coolness at close range and followed by a bayonet charge. The French were driven from the field, and Quebec was British. Unfortunately both Wolfe and Montcalm were mortally wounded in the encounter.

By this period of the year, winter was approaching and no further warfare would be possible. The only course was to garrison Quebec and to wait for the following spring in order to complete the work of conquest. The fashion in which the few defenders maintained themselves in Quebec throughout the hard, long winter—in spite of breached

defences, inadequate supplies, the rigour of the weather and the decimation of disease—is a story hardly less gallant than that of the capture itself. During the spring of 1760, Levis, Montcalm's second-in-command, tried to use Montreal as a base of attack against Quebec, and in April actually defeated the British General Murray. At that critical juncture, ships were seen approaching up the river: the nationality of those ships would determine the fate of Quebec and, with it, of North America. They hoisted the British flag: Quebec was relieved and remained British.

Montreal, 1760.

The summer of 1760 saw a concerted attack upon Montreal. Murray continued up the St. Lawrence and posted himself below the town; Haviland forced his way from Crown Point down the Richelieu; and Amherst came down from Lake Ontario. Montreal was thus invested on all sides with forces immensely superior to those of the French garrison. In September the French Governor, Vaudreuil, capitulated and, in doing so, acknowledged British sovereignty over the whole of Canada. Pitt's scheme for the preservation of the British North American colonies by the conquest of Canada was at last achieved.

Naval Warfare.

One aspect of the colonial warfare has been purposely omitted not because it is of small importance, but in order to give it separate treatment and so to emphasize its paramount significance. That aspect is the maintenance of British control of the sea. In spite of all that has been said above concerning the great achievements, in face of indescribable obstacles, by the British army, the fact remains that scarcely one of those achievements would have been possible without the work of the fleet. This work can be thought of under three heads. First, there was the general superiority of British sea-power whereby freedom of communication was maintained with the oversea

possessions in North America and—as a subsequent chapter will show—in India. That supremacy was the indispensable condition for success in distant warfare.

Second, some of the crucial operations of the army were directly dependent upon the navy's support and, sometimes, upon the navy's leadership. The capture of Louisburg by Amherst and Wolfe in 1758 is an instance in point. Even more notable still was the capture of Quebec. The Admiral in charge of the fleet which conveyed Wolfe's army was Saunders, whose task was wellnigh impossible on account of his complete lack of charts of the River St. Lawrence. The chief navigating officer was named Cook, who was later to win fame as the discoverer of Australia. It is bare justice to say that the capture of Quebec—and hence of Canada—was due at least as much to the amazing skill and the intrepidity of those men as to the generalship of Amherst and Wolfe.

Third, there were two outstanding actions at sea which confirmed the navy's supremacy over its enemies. One of the pet schemes of the French was the invasion of England. The obstacle was that their fleets were blockaded during 1759 in Toulon and Brest harbours, the former being guarded by the British Admiral Boscawen and the latter by Hawke. Boscawen's difficulty was that, not having Minorca to rely upon as a base, he could not maintain a long, unbroken watch on Toulon, and in August he was compelled to withdraw temporarily to refit at Gibraltar. Immediately the French broke out and were making for Brest to join their fleet there. News being brought to Boscawen, he literally leapt aboard and within three hours had moved his fleet in hot pursuit. Next day he came up with the French off *Lagos*, in the south-west of Spain, where he sank what ships he could and scattered the rest. Admiral Hawke continued his blockade of Brest until the storms of November drove him off. The French took advantage of this in order to escape. They made southwards just before the weather allowed Hawke to

return, and had reached *Quiberon Bay* before he caught them. A terrific storm arose, and as the French sought refuge in the Bay they were driven on the rocks where most of those escaping the British Admiral were smashed. That was the end of the invasion scheme, and it was the end also of the French challenge to British naval supremacy.

6. THE END OF THE WAR

Fall of Pitt.

Our story of the events in Europe and in North America has shown that by 1760 Britain and her allies were generally victorious. In that year several independent influences began to tend towards peace, most of which were connected directly or indirectly with Pitt.

First, in October, 1760, George II, dying suddenly, was succeeded by his grandson George III. George III's temperament was such that he detested the Whigs, who stood for the limitation of royal prerogative, and the special object of his hatred was the haughty arch-Whig, William Pitt. To counteract Pitt, the King appointed the Earl of Bute as his fellow-Secretary of State. Bute was personally an incapable nonentity; but as a royal instrument for focusing opposition to Pitt, with royal support, he might prove very useful, especially if there were other influences encouraging such opposition.

This brings us to the second aspect of antagonism to Pitt. In one respect Pitt was his own worst enemy: his overbearing, domineering manner towards political subordinates and even colleagues was such that he caused widespread ill-will that was less deep because, in the exigencies of war, there was no alternative to Pitt as chief minister. But when, by 1760, the British had clearly won all that they had set out to win and more, ministers felt a new freedom in opposing him, and they were therefore not indisposed to side with Bute.

The issue came to a head over the question of war with

Spain. During 1761, Pitt learned that France had at last persuaded Spain to join in the war. Spain was afraid lest a continuance of British successes overseas might make Britain greedy for the Spanish colonies also. The French Minister, Choiseul, offered Minorca to Spain as a bribe for the latter's intervention. Pitt wished to forestall this move by declaring war upon Spain. The matter was raised in the Cabinet, and Pitt was astonished at his failure to carry the ministry with him. Bute, instructed by the King, was heading the opposition to Pitt's proposal and Pitt found himself no longer able to cow his colleagues into submission to his imperious demands. Three times the subject was discussed and three times the project of war was rejected, and in October, 1761, Pitt resigned office. Early in the next year, the King took from Newcastle the control of the system of patronage, and in March, 1762, Newcastle also resigned, whereupon Bute became First Lord of the Treasury and Prime Minister. That the new ministry shortly afterwards found itself compelled to declare war against Spain is a proof both of Pitt's prescience and of the fact that the opposition to him had been due to personal rather than to political antagonism.

One of Bute's first actions was to discontinue the subsidies to Frederick II of Prussia. Frederick was not unnaturally indignant at this "desertion", though Britain on her side could justly say that she was under no obligation to continue indefinitely to subsidize Frederick, especially as there was every prospect that what both Britain and Prussia had originally aimed at would be achieved. Negotiations for peace were set on foot and came to a head in the following year.

Treaty of Paris, 1763.

By the terms of the Treaty of Paris Britain secured from the French, Canada, Louisiana east of the Mississippi, Cape Breton Island, Minorca, and the West Indian Islands of Tobago, St. Vincent and Dominica; and from Spain,

Florida. (Both Minorca and Florida were lost to Britain in the War of American Independence.) France retained certain fishing-rights off the coast of Newfoundland, and was allowed to resume her possessions in India on condition that these were not fortified but were used as trading stations only.

The separate *Treaty of Hubertsburg* between Prussia and Austria, signed at the same time as the Treaty of Paris, re-established the *status quo*, both sides retaining what they had before the war—thus Silesia passed permanently to Prussia so that the long, exhausting struggle had gone for nothing.

The effects of the Seven Years' War as summarized in the Treaty of Paris have been written large over the whole subsequent history of Britain. Canada and India were to become British and not French, and British interests thenceforward became more and more Imperial and less and less European. Of this there were numerous secondary but inevitable results. Among these, two call for special reference: in order to safeguard her growing Empire Britain was obliged to maintain her navy in a condition of supremacy unchallengeable by any or all of the other Powers; also, the expulsion of French power from Canada altered radically the conditions of the British coastal colonies south of the St. Lawrence and their relationship to the mother-country. This last factor was a primary cause of the revolt of those colonies culminating in the Declaration of Independence of 1776, and will be more fully explained in that connection.

Quebec Act, 1774.

One problem that called for treatment as soon as possible was how the newly won Canada was to be governed. Its territory consisted of little more than the present province of Quebec, its population was exclusively French, having its own customs of law, religion and government. At first the administration was in the hands of a Governor with an

Advisory Council, and not until 1774 was a permanent form of government established. This was laid down in the Quebec Act. Roman Catholicism was recognized as the religion of the colony ; the criminal law was to be that of England, and the civil law that of France ; and the government was to be in the hands of a Governor and nominated Council. This foundation of British government in Canada lasted only until 1791, when it was modified in view of the independence which had been won by the then United States of America.

CHAPTER VII

DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, 1760-1815

WHEN George III ascended the throne on 25th October, 1760, a new era began in British history. During his long reign, which extended until January, 1820, English life underwent profound changes in several major respects, economic, social, religious and political. The economic and social changes of the period are mainly those associated with the process known as "The Industrial Revolution" which, because of its far-reaching effects, has been reserved in this book for separate treatment.¹ The religious movement of George III's reign was that of the Methodist Revival which, though started in the earlier half of the eighteenth century, did not show its fruits until the latter half: this Revival, coming at the same time as the upheaval in industry, had an influence so profound that its significance is only now beginning to be appreciated at its true worth. The last section of this chapter aims at explaining the essential characteristics of eighteenth-century Methodism and at summarizing its effects.

Some indication of the political change beginning with George III has already been given in the general sketch of party-history.² Our first business in this chapter is to show how the personal character and views of George III affected English politics and what were the consequent reactions.

¹ Chapter XI.

² Chapter IV, section I.

I. KING GEORGE III, 1760-1820

Early Influences.

Both personally and politically George III formed a sharp contrast both to his immediate predecessors and to his successors. In his private life he was a simple, clean-living individual. His daily routine was almost severe in its regimen: he rose at 6 a.m., he ate only the plainest of food, he was fond of country walks and would converse freely with anyone he chanced to meet. Unlike George I and George II, the new King was thoroughly British in upbringing and was without any suggestion of German influence. This meant that he was not handicapped as they were in carrying out what had been the functions of the monarch: he was able to take an active, directive part in the country's political life. What was even more to the point, he had every intention of taking such a part.

This attitude was largely the result of his upbringing. George III's father, Frederick,¹ had been the son of George II; and Frederick when Prince of Wales had been violently opposed to his father the King. (This opposition of the Prince of Wales to the King was a common habit in the Hanoverian family.) Because George II had favoured the Whigs, Frederick had favoured the Tories and had been the centre of Tory machinations. Frederick had died in 1751, that is nine years before George II, leaving his son George, then only thirteen years of age, as the heir to the throne. The new Prince of Wales was therefore educated according to the ideas of his mother, Augusta of Saxe-Gotha, who had no real understanding of the principles of British Constitutional Monarchy and who derived her ideas of government from the little state to which she belonged. She did not understand that the government of a country like Britain could not depend

¹ See Table, Chapter IV, section 1.

upon the whims of its hereditary head as could that of a minor German Duchy. The young Prince was thus trained under the not very bracing or enlightening female influences of a semi-Court which was violently opposed politically to the Court of his grandfather, King George II. In these circumstances there is small wonder if by the time that George III ascended the throne at the age of twenty-two he had become petty and obstinate in character, narrow in political outlook, and without any real understanding of men or of public affairs.

His political bias was accentuated by the fact that the director of his studies was the Earl of Bute, a Scottish nobleman of only very moderate mental ability and without any practical experience of politics. Bute's sole idea in training the young Prince seems to have been to instil Tory principles firmly into his mind. His political textbook was Bolingbroke's *Idea of a Patriot King*. The character of the book can be guessed with fair accuracy when we remember that Bolingbroke had been St. John, the Tory leader of the reign of Queen Anne, that on the death of Anne he had been compelled to flee from England and had joined the Pretender, that he had been allowed to return to England in 1723 only by the express permission of King George I, and that even then Walpole had secured his exclusion from the House of Lords. The gist of the *Patriot King* was that the monarch should be the active leader of the whole nation, governing for the promotion of the true interests of his people and doing so by calling to his service the most able men of the State irrespective of parties. In a word, such a régime would have restored the essentials of Elizabethan government. According to this view, the Revolution of 1688, which had resulted in limiting and regulating royal power, had been a break in the natural political development of Britain and had transferred that power to the hands of a relatively small Whig oligarchy ruling selfishly in its own interests and ignoring the welfare of the nation.

Political Aims.

This political creed of the *Patriot King* was the one on which George III was nurtured, and which he believed it to be his mission to establish. But it is important to notice that, though George III's interference in British politics had disastrous effects both at home and overseas, his aim was far removed from that of the Stuarts. The latter used their personal influence to further their own selfish advantage; but when George III ascended the throne with his mother's injunction of "George, be King!" in his ears, he wished to "be King" in the interests of the whole State.

From the outset, however, he was handicapped in two directions. First, he was unfitted by his obstinate temper, by his narrow upbringing and by his third-rate mental abilities to fulfil the rôle which he had chosen for himself—or, perhaps more truly, which had been chosen for him. Second, as the political theory which was at the basis of his creed involved the displacement of the Whig oligarchy, George III was compelled by the logic of events to rely upon the Tories. Thus, though the King's theory was that of a national monarchy, in practice he became as exclusively a party monarch as either of his immediate predecessors, the only difference being that whereas they had relied upon the Whigs he became an ultra-Tory.

Political Summary.

We ought now to be in a position to understand the general features of the politics of George III's reign. Politically the reign divides itself into four main periods, namely, 1760-1770, 1770-1782, 1782-1783, 1783-1820.

The King's first step, in carrying out his self-appointed political task, was to undermine the Whig influence. Only then would he be able to establish a strong Tory government willing and able to do his bidding. This occupied the first ten years of his reign. During that

period the King schemed to accentuate differences between the Whigs and then to set the resulting Whig factions bitterly against one another. The effect is seen in a succession of unstable Whig ministries between 1761 and 1770. In the latter year a thorough-going Tory ministry, headed by Lord North, entered upon a twelve-year period of power. By the end of that time the American colonies had been lost, with the result that the Tories were thoroughly discredited among the nation at large, and the King had once more to accept the Whigs. Hence, there was a further succession of short-lived Whig ministries which meant that the King was choosing between a number of evils and that, in so doing, he was still trying to play off faction against faction. At last in 1783 the King called to power William Pitt the Younger, who, becoming the leader of the more moderate Whigs as well as of the "King's Friends" began an era of new Tory rule. During the closing years of the reign, the King was incapable of exerting any personal influence on politics owing to his being subject to bouts of insanity. The first was in 1765. In 1788 the trouble was seriously renewed and, though this particular attack did not last long, the malady increased as the reign proceeded. During the King's last ten years (that is, when he was between the ages of seventy-two and eighty-two) he was a pitiable object, being not only insane, but also blind and deaf.

We have now to study the four periods of the reign in somewhat greater detail.

2. EARLY MINISTRIES OF GEORGE III, 1760-1783

Earl of Bute.

The previous chapter has shown that, less than six months after his accession, George appointed his former tutor, the Earl of Bute, as a Secretary of State; that in October, 1761, Pitt resigned his Secretaryship; and that in March, 1762, Newcastle also resigned the Premiership

to which Bute succeeded. Newcastle's resignation was immediately followed by the disruption of the Whig party. Lord Rockingham became the official leader of the party which was still representative of the great aristocratic Whig families. But there were two sections of Whigs that did not adhere to the bulk of the party: first, Chatham led an influential group who were outside the exclusive aristocratic clique; second, George Grenville was at the head of a small number who had broken from Pitt in 1762 over the question of prolonging the Seven Years' War.

The fact was that the accession of George III produced a transformation in the character of both the political parties. Jacobitism had long since ceased to be an active cause, and when George III—the "true Briton"—became King, there was no logical reason why the Tories should oppose him. Indeed, since he was anxious to revive the royal power, which was the very principle for which they stood, there was every reason why they should support him. This necessarily modified also the attitude of the Whigs, for the Whigs opposed violently all tendencies towards what they regarded as tyranny. Thus the rôles which the two parties had played during the first two Hanoverian reigns were reversed: the Tories now supported the King while the Whigs opposed him. The weakness of the Whigs was, as we have seen, that they were divided against themselves, and of this the King took full advantage.

Bute's lack of political experience meant that he was quite unqualified to lead the State, especially at such a difficult juncture. The great service that he was able to render to his master was the formation of a group of "King's Friends" who were Members of Parliament willing—if suitably rewarded—to vote consistently according to the King's directions. Thus by a system of wholesale corruption the King was able to outbid even the Whigs and thus to go far towards undermining their former influence.

Henceforward his policy was to increase the numbers of his "Friends" by drawing into their circle more and more discontented Whigs.

Relative to the main issue at stake, the immediate causes of the rise and fall of ministries—of which there were seven in ten years—are of small importance; but, especially in view of their various policies concerning the American colonies, the order in which they held office must be clearly remembered. Bute's Premiership did not long survive the Peace of Paris which was regarded as having thrown away many of the valuable gains of the war. By April, 1763, Bute was unable any longer to withstand his general unpopularity and he resigned.

Grenville, 1763-1765.

The new Prime Minister was George Grenville, leader of one of the Whig groups and brother-in-law to Pitt. His ministry was notable for two things: the Stamp Duties imposed upon the North American colonies,¹ and the case of John Wilkes.

The latter is worth recounting at some length not merely because of its own inherent importance, but because of the light it throws upon eighteenth-century politics and society. *John Wilkes* was Whig Member of Parliament for Aylesbury. As a young man he had led a dashing and somewhat wild life, and he had a distinct *flair* for journalism. In 1762 he founded the *North Briton*, a weekly paper whose main object was to deliver virulent attacks upon the "North British" Premier, the Earl of Bute. "Number 45" of the *North Briton*, issued in April, 1763, contained criticisms of the King's Speech from the Throne respecting the Treaty of Paris, parts of that speech being described as disgracefully false. According to the accepted custom of the Constitution, for every act of the sovereign some minister is responsible; but the King was so furious that, regarding the attack as an

¹ Chapter VIII, section 2.

insult to himself personally, he ordered legal proceedings to be taken against the writer. Thereupon the Home Secretary issued a general warrant—that is, one in which no names are mentioned—for the arrest, on suspicion, of those persons concerned in the offending article. Some fifty were consequently arrested. The Courts released Wilkes, who pleaded the privilege of Parliament, and they also declared general warrants to be illegal. Wilkes retaliated by taking action against the Secretary of State for false imprisonment and by securing damages for the search of his house.

The next stage in the case was the discovery of a privately printed composition of Wilkes which made obscene references to certain members of the House of Lords. Grenville and the ministry then again took up the matter in the Commons: the House resolved that Number 45 of the *North Briton* was a seditious libel and was to be burned by the public hangman and that privilege of Parliament did not cover seditious libel. Wilkes, finding the ground cut from beneath his feet, fled to France, whereupon he was expelled by the House and outlawed by the Law Courts.

The end of the episode came some years after the close of Grenville's ministry, but is conveniently dealt with at this point. In the election of 1768, Wilkes—who had returned in spite of his liability to arrest—was elected Member of Parliament for Middlesex. He was, however, committed to gaol, where a great crowd gathered to cheer him as he went out to attend the opening of Parliament. This crowd and the soldiery collided, and several persons were killed. Wilkes then charged the Government with planning a massacre and was consequently again expelled from the Commons. Middlesex again elected and the Commons again expelled him and further declared him incapable of being elected for that Parliament. A third time he was elected and a third time was expelled. After a fourth election the Commons declared Colonel Luttrell,

his defeated opponent, to have been duly elected! This raised a constitutional issue of first-class importance: the Commons certainly had the right to settle disputed elections, but was the "Middlesex Election" disputed in any sense within the meaning of that phrase? That Wilkes was not morally a particularly commendable person was quite beside the issue that was being raised: the offence with which he was charged had received its punishment in the ordinary course of law, and for the Commons *in addition* to pursue Wilkes was very like punishing him twice for the same offence and was certainly a display of unworthy vindictiveness. Moreover, the vast majority of the electors of Middlesex were, in effect, disfranchised by the bare resolution of the Commons acting without a shred of authority in any Act of Parliament. Wilkes became a national hero, and "Wilkes and Liberty" the popular slogan. The people knew that this travesty of their rights was the result of the King's influence with his "Friends" in the House: during the Middlesex election squabble George had written to Lord North, "I think it highly expedient to inform you that the expulsion of Mr. Wilkes appears to be very essential, and must be effected." The common feeling on the matter was shown with sufficient plainness by Wilkes being chosen as an Alderman of London and then as Lord Mayor, a public subscription being raised to pay his debts.

An indirect but noteworthy—or, at least, notorious—by-product of the Wilkes episode was the publication of a series of letters in the *Public Advertiser*. They consisted of bitter attacks, full of savage personalities, upon the Government. The first one appeared in 1769, and they continued at intervals until 1772 and were afterwards published in book form. The only signature below them was "Junius", and the identity of their writer still remains one of the unsolved, and perhaps unsolvable, riddles of history. Philip Francis, whom we shall meet in connection with Warren Hastings' Governorship in India,

has usually been regarded as the author, but this is by no means definitely established.

This account has taken us several years beyond the ministry of Grenville which was our immediate concern. The full odium aroused by the first part of Wilkes' case fell upon Grenville as Prime Minister and made him extremely unpopular in the country. His combination of prosiness and obstinacy made him also unpopular with the King. In July, 1765, Grenville resigned.

Rockingham, 1765-1766.

George III was anxious to keep out the official Whig party, but as Pitt refused to take office there was no alternative, and Rockingham became Prime Minister. The ministry included a number of men of common sense and sound principle, but was sadly lacking in outstanding ability.

The one exception was the Irishman, *Edmund Burke*; but as he had not previously sat in the House, he could not well be given Cabinet office and was made Rockingham's secretary. Nevertheless, his speeches made a profound impression and he was evidently destined for great things. That he would become a great Parliamentarian was unlikely, for he was far from being a pleasing speaker. It was the matter rather than the manner of his speeches that won him so great a reputation; for they consisted of the application of lofty political principles to contemporary events, and his predictions had an almost uncanny way of proving correct. As we proceed we shall see that Burke's views on the War of American Independence, the French Revolution, Catholic Emancipation, and Slavery afford notable instances of his political judgment.

The real weakness of Rockingham's ministry was that George III, regarding a Whig government as only a stop-gap, renewed negotiations with Pitt behind the backs of his ministers. The declaration of the illegality of general

warrants and the repeal of the Stamp Act ¹ were the only two measures of consequence passed during Rockingham's ministry, and both increased the ill-will of the King who, in July, 1766, dismissed the Government.

Chatham, 1766-1768.

The real reason for the change was the prospect of at last inducing Pitt to form a government. Almost all his life Pitt had been a victim to the most terrible form of gout, and by 1766 was ageing fast. He therefore went to the House of Lords with the title of Earl of Chatham and proceeded to form an administration. His antagonism towards the prevailing system of corruption led him, in forming his government, to ignore party lines and to choose men from all parties on the score of merit. Chatham himself took the office of Lord Privy Seal which, being almost a sinecure, allowed him to devote himself to the problems of leadership; the Duke of Grafton became First Lord of the Treasury; and Charles Townshend became Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Chatham from the outset suffered under two limitations. First, his acceptance of a peerage gave the impression that even he had at last been bought by the King, and consequently much of his influence in the country evaporated at once; his removal from the Commons meant that he lost the spell which hitherto he had been able to cast over that Assembly. Second, no sooner had he taken office than his old enemy, gout, reasserted itself with such vigour that he had to retire from active politics. This left the control of affairs in the hands of subordinates, particularly of Townshend, who, during his chief's illness, tried to impose fresh duties upon the American colonists—with what serious results the next chapter will show. By 1768 Chatham was unable to maintain even the semblance of power, and in October of that year he definitely resigned. The following ten years were spent in suffering and retire-

¹ Chapter VIII, section 2.

ment, from which he made one notable break after the French intervention of 1778 in the War of American Independence. The effort was too much for him, and he was carried out of the House of Lords a dying man.

Grafton, 1768-1770.

Chatham's retirement in 1768 meant the withdrawal from the Government of the only man that could have given it any appearance of unity. Drawn from all parties as its members were, they tended to break up into factions. The Duke of Grafton became the head of the Government, but he was thoroughly incapable and allowed matters to drift on uncontrolled. In addition to the difficulties overseas, the ministry had to deal with the closing stages of the Wilkes episode and was unwise enough to annul the "Middlesex Election". This brought almost universal unpopularity, and in January, 1770, Grafton resigned. The King had thus tried all sections of the Whigs, who by this time were hopelessly divided against themselves, and he accordingly felt strong enough to strike for the ministry he had really been craving for: he entrusted Lord North with the leadership of the new Government.

Lord North, 1770-1782.

North's accession to power brings us to the second of the four periods into which, for convenience, we regarded George III's reign as being divided. Lord North was the eldest son of the Earl of Guilford and therefore until 1790, when his father died, he sat in the Commons. He was a man of genial, kindly temperament and was never known to be ruffled in even the most acrimonious debate. Such a disposition made him very popular in the House, and his tactfulness and ability for cogent speaking fitted him for leadership. Unfortunately his placidity was allied with indolence, and consequently governmental administration was allowed to become culpably slack and inefficient. Lord North's effectiveness in the Premiership was vitiated

most seriously of all by his view of the proper functions of that office, a view which appears to us to be singular in the extreme. He interpreted the word "minister" in its literal sense of "servant" and, regarding himself as the King's servant, he believed his simple duty to be to carry out unquestioningly the bidding of his master even against his own better judgment. Thus he thoroughly distrusted the King's policy of taxing the American colonists, yet deferred so completely to the royal will that he carried out the very policy with which he disagreed. The fact was that the real Prime Minister was George III and that North was merely the instrument for carrying out the King's wishes. The proof of this position was George's introduction of the Departmental System, which meant that the King, instead of exercising his political wishes through the Prime Minister, dealt personally with each of the responsible ministers and thereby controlled the policy of the Government at least as effectively as if he had been a Stuart sovereign presiding at Cabinet meetings.

The greater part of North's work was concerned with affairs overseas and will therefore be dealt with in subsequent chapters. It was he whose persistence with the Tea Duties finally provoked the Americans to revolt, and it was his inefficient handling of the resulting war that enabled the colonists to establish their independence. His dealings with India took the form of the Regulating Act of 1773 under the terms of which India was ruled throughout the Governorship of Warren Hastings.¹ And it was his Quebec Act of 1774² which organized the government of Canada which, since its conquest from the French in 1763 had been ruled by a military governor.

One strange episode at home took place towards the end of North's ministry, namely the *Gordon Riots*. In 1778 an Act had been passed repealing certain laws against

¹ Chapter X, sections 3 and 4.

² Chapter VI, section 6.

Roman Catholics and allowing Roman Catholic services to be held in public. The effect was an outcry among a section of Protestant extremists, and the fanatical *Lord George Gordon* worked up the London mob to support him in petitioning for the repeal of the Act. The result was a great "No Popery" procession. The Government took no steps to deal with the demonstration, the result being that the mob of some hundred thousand men ran amuck. The religious purpose of the movement was completely lost sight of: chapels were burnt, shops were looted, the prisoners were released from Newgate gaol, breweries were sacked and their contents were consumed amid scenes of indescribable orgy. For four days the whole of east London was a prey to a wild mob, and was saved only by the energy of George III who personally ordered out the soldiers. Peace was thus restored, though only after many of the rioters had lost their lives. The true calibre of Lord George Gordon may be estimated by the fact that he later became a Jew and ended his days a madman in prison.

The events in America were also not without their reaction at home. By 1781 the War of American Independence was over and the United States had won their freedom. Throughout the closing stages of the war there had been a rising wave of feeling against the ministry whose unstatesmanlike policy and administrative incapacity were costing Britain her colonies. With the disastrous end of the war this feeling grew, both in Parliament and in the country, into hot, indignant anger. The Whigs brought forward petitions and introduced motions for the reform of Parliament and of electoral methods, their purpose being to destroy the King's power to influence both elections and members by bribery and corruption. The "King's Friends" took care that these motions failed, but the earnestness of the debates and the surging feeling in the country were proof that even George III's methods would not be tolerated for ever. In 1780 the

House actually carried one of its most famous motions, namely that "the influence of the crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished". North, aware of the growing opposition to his ministry had for some time been anxious to resign, but was persuaded by the King to retain office. At last, on 20th March, 1782, North insisted on resigning, and the King was bereft of the one man who was both willing to be the royal tool and also acceptable as the leader of a ministry.

Whig Ministries, 1782-1783.

The only alternative to North was some brand of Whig administration. This meant that George III would cease to be, in effect, his own Prime Minister and would be compelled to accept whatever ministers and measures were presented to him. After trying several possible men, George finally offered the Premiership to *Rockingham*. This ministry gave an independent Parliament to Ireland¹ and also reduced the possibilities of political corruption by abolishing a number of sinecure offices, disfranchising revenue officers—formerly one-sixth of the electorate—and reducing drastically the amount payable in "pensions".

The death of Rockingham in July, 1782, reopened the problem of the Premiership. This time it was given to *Lord Shelburne*, the leader of the Chathamite Whigs, the Chancellor of the Exchequer being young Mr. Pitt, son of the Earl of Chatham and then twenty-three years of age. The most notable of the Whigs, Charles James Fox, as a Rockinghamite, refused to serve under Shelburne and retired. But his retirement was only temporary. His next step was to ally with North to outvote Shelburne. This happened twice, and Shelburne's position became untenable, yet when the King sought for an alternative he found that neither the Whig Fox nor the Tory North would, or could, form a ministry alone, yet that they would not allow anyone else to accept office. That these two former

¹ Chapter IX, section 2.

arch-enemies should combine forces was almost unbelievable. Moreover, to compel the King to accept, at one and the same time, North who had deserted him and Fox who had opposed him bitterly, was adding insult to injury in a fashion that George found very difficult to endure. At the moment, however, he had no alternative, and the *Fox and North Coalition* became a fact in April, 1783.

The country did not take the Coalition very seriously. Indeed, the only explanation of its existence was that both men were anxious for power. The fall of the Coalition was caused by Fox's India Bill which sought to transfer to the Government part of the powers and possessions of the East India Company. The Opposition concentrated its criticism against the transference also of enormous possibilities of patronage. The measure passed the Commons, but the King circulated among the Lords a statement that he would consider as his enemy any man who voted for the Bill, which was accordingly defeated. In December the King dismissed Fox and North, and was thus in a position to choose his own minister. The man he chose was young William Pitt.

3. WILLIAM PITT, THE YOUNGER

Early Career.

William Pitt was the second son of the Earl of Chatham. The title had descended to the elder son, John, on the death of his father in 1778, but Chatham's genius all descended to William. Only rarely does a greatly distinguished man have an equally distinguished son, and only rarely also does an infant prodigy grow to be a brilliant man. In both these respects William Pitt was an exception to the rule: though his statesmanship was of a somewhat different quality from his father's, it was equally great; and the almost unparalleled precocity of his boyhood was never outworn.

Born in 1759, he was brought up in a home in which

high politics seemed part of the very atmosphere, so that when seven years old he is reputed to have been able to talk intelligently on political subjects, and when fourteen to have argued on equal terms with the great Chatham his father! This prodigious development was helped by the fact that, being weak in health, he never went to a public school but had a private tutor. At fifteen years of age he went to Cambridge University where he studied classics and mathematics. In 1781 he entered Parliament; in 1782 he became Chancellor of the Exchequer; and in 1783, when only twenty-four years old, Prime Minister.

Pitt's position as Prime Minister was anomalous in the extreme: he was not the leader of a party, and had no following in the House. Apart from this, he was virtually an untried man; and the only assets he had were the name of "Pitt" and a reputation as a youthful genius. But neither Parliament nor the nation could be expected to fall down before him for those vague reasons alone. If he was to win through to supremacy his first task was to prove his own personal worth. Between December, 1783, and March, 1784, he carried on the government in face of an adverse majority. Slowly but surely his courageous persistence and evident ability won their way even among his opponents, and in March, 1784, the King and Pitt decided to take advantage of the rising tide of favourable opinion. Parliament was dissolved, and the resulting election gave a sound majority to the young Prime Minister.

Pitt's Party.

The nature of Pitt's majority needs to be understood. We have seen already that during the early part of George III's reign the Whig party split up into fragments, each of which, both before and after North's long ministry, had schemed against one another for office. This scramble not only weakened their own power—which, had they been

united, would still have been considerable—but also discredited them in the country generally. The final proof of the pettiness and insincerity of the Whig factions had been the unnatural Fox and North Coalition of 1783, and this largely explains Fox's loss of one hundred and sixty seats in the 1784 election. Pitt, like his father, was prepared to work with any who would put country above party; and thus his following was composed of "New Whigs", who were really the followers of his father, and the "King's Friends" Tories. This mixed company was bound to Pitt by personal allegiance only, and some time had to elapse before it could be thought of as forming an organized party. When that time came, their loyalty to the King, their inclusion of so large a number of "King's Friends" and the opposition of the Whigs caused them to be regarded as Tories. Thus it came about that the son of Chatham, the great Whig, became the leader of the Tories.

This must not be interpreted to mean that Pitt was subservient to George III. It was true that the latter's influence with his "Friends" could control something like a hundred votes in the Commons, but it was equally true that a rupture with Pitt would probably mean that George would have to accept a Whig Ministry. Thus the Minister and the King were necessary to each other and therefore gave to each other's views consideration and respect. In one way, Pitt's accession to power was an extremely healthy event, for it broke the tradition that the ministry should be dependent, if Whig, upon a close landed oligarchy, or, if Tory, upon the personal favour of the King. Pitt was not enslaved to either. Moreover, Pitt's leadership of the Tories did not mean that he had forgotten the influences of his youth. On the contrary, all the causes that he sought most earnestly to promote were in accordance with true Whig principles—the reform of Parliament, sound finance, the promotion of trade, and the maintenance of peace.

Parliamentary Reform, 1785.

In the matter of Parliamentary Reform, Pitt was unfortunate. It was a cause very near to his heart, and in the second year of his ministry he introduced a very moderate measure to authorize the State to expend £1,000,000 in buying up thirty-six "rotten boroughs"—that is, boroughs which, perhaps centuries earlier, had been given the privilege of sending representatives to Parliament but which had decayed so that they contained only a very small number of voters—which would thus have been disfranchised. The seventy-two seats thus available were to be given to the new towns of industrial England. But the opposition of the owners of the boroughs secured the rejection of the Bill, and Pitt did not renew the proposal. Thus Parliamentary Reform was delayed for nearly half a century.

"Wealth of Nations", 1776.

Most of Pitt's financial and economic proposals were based upon Adam Smith's epoch-making book, *The Wealth of Nations*, published in 1776. Adam Smith was a Scottish university professor who had travelled much and had made a special study of the sources of national wealth. He published his conclusions in *The Wealth of Nations*. His main contention was that each country had special natural resources for the production of certain classes of goods and that both the wealth of each individual nation and the sum total of the world's wealth reached their maximum when this natural productivity was least interfered with. He contended that to try to control trade by means of customs duties, though it might artificially stimulate one particular industry, resulted in hampering trade and in raising prices. He urged, further, that even though customs duties might injure the trade of a foreign competitor, Britain would not reap an equivalent gain, since a competitor in one class of goods was also a potential

customer in other classes, and if she were impoverished she could not afford to purchase so heavily from Britain. This argument cut clean across the Mercantile Theory which for centuries had held unquestioned sway among English statesmen, the theory, namely, that English trade could flourish only at the expense of others. Adam Smith's advice was, in short, to leave trade and industry alone: hence the economic doctrine of "Laisser-faire". There can be no doubt that this theory, gradually winning acceptance among politicians of the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries, became the foundation of British commercial world-leadership. At the same time, the caution must be added that Adam Smith's disciples applied the idea of "Laisser-faire" in extreme forms to spheres outside those which he had in mind and thereby, along with commercial prosperity, encouraged terrible suffering upon depressed classes of the community. Both these results will become more apparent when we reach the history of the nineteenth century. For the moment we are concerned to watch the effects of *The Wealth of Nations* upon the legislation of Pitt. Whether or not Pitt actually uttered to Adam Smith the words accredited to him—"Nay, we will stand until you are seated, for we are all your scholars"—the phrase accurately reflects the politicians' indebtedness to the great economist.

Finance.

It was in the realm of finance that Pitt showed himself a consummate master. The financial condition of Britain at his accession to office was extremely precarious. The National Debt was at the then unprecedented figure of nearly £250,000,000, Government credit was low and taxation was high. Far-sighted reforms, on a basis of sound economic principles, courageously carried out and combined with administrative efficiency, alone could save the State. Pitt's first step was to reorganize the methods

of tax-collection, to reduce the indirect and to increase the direct taxes. Also he set out systematically to reduce the National Debt. For this purpose in 1786 he renewed the idea of a *Sinking Fund*. His scheme was that £1,000,000 should be allotted each year to be invested until, by compound interest, the Fund was equal in amount to the National Debt which could then be paid off. Unfortunately the renewal of war in 1793 robbed Pitt's plan, like those of other great financiers, both before and since, of the chance of maturing. That, however, was no fault of Pitt.

Free Trade Tendencies.

Two other measures which he carried through, although financial in character, are interesting from another aspect also, namely, as showing Pitt's attitude to the principles of Adam Smith. The first, mentioned in the preceding paragraph, was the reduction of customs duties. For example, the tea duty stood at about 120 per cent. of the value of the tea. The result was that the smuggling of tea was carried on in a wholesale fashion, thus cheating the Treasury and encouraging disrespect for government and for good order generally. As early as 1784, therefore, Pitt reduced this tax to one-tenth its former rate. This was typical of his measures, the effect of which was to reduce smuggling in the most effective way, namely, by making it unprofitable.

Perhaps the most distinctive of Pitt's commercial measures was his *Treaty with France* of 1786. By its terms each of the two contracting countries agreed to allow certain of the chief products of the other to be imported on payment of a specially reduced rate of duty. Thus British hardware, textiles and pottery paid only low customs duties when imported into France, while French wines and oil received similar consideration when imported into Britain. The relationship of such terms to the teaching of Adam Smith is obvious.

War Finance.

Unfortunately for the financial projects of Pitt, during his periods of office he had only eight peace years. As a war-minister his methods are open to serious criticism. His actual conduct of war itself will be dealt with in Chapters XII and XIII, but we may conveniently summarize at this point his methods of raising the necessary money. Pitt's attitude towards the Revolutionary War was vitiated by the conviction that the French, with a disorganized people, army and treasury, could not long sustain a struggle against the rest of Europe. Consequently his methods were piecemeal and shortsighted. He tried to meet demands on the Treasury by raising loans instead of by bold measures of taxation, thus piling up the National Debt; and he persisted in his Sinking Fund, although the principle on which that Fund was based—namely that national income exceeded national expenditure—no longer obtained. One notable exception to this method of raising money by borrowing was his imposition, in 1798, of an income-tax which was regarded as a temporary measure to meet war-time exigencies only.

However, when all possible criticism has been levied, the double fact remains that Pitt's views on the war were shared by the most enlightened members of the nation and that certainly no other statesman could have commanded sufficient general confidence to have seen Britain so far through her critical struggle with Revolutionary France.

Subsequent chapters will show that Pitt's achievements were not limited either to war or to finance. In 1784 he secured an India Act which regulated the organization of British India until 1858; in 1791 the Canada Act established the Government of Canada as it continued until 1840; and in 1800 the Act of Union joined Ireland politically to Britain. It was this last which brought the end of Pitt's first ministry. For Pitt had allowed the

Irish to believe that, in return for Ireland's loss of her independent Parliament, Roman Catholic Emancipation should be granted; but George III believed that to sign an Act granting liberties to Catholics would violate his coronation oath to maintain Protestantism and he consequently refused to allow emancipation. Pitt, rightly considering his word of honour at stake, resigned in 1801.

Second Ministry, 1804-1806.

Pitt's successor was a member of his own party, Addington, who was well-meaning but incompetent. During his ministry the Treaty of Amiens was concluded with France, but when war was renewed in 1803 there was only one man who commanded the confidence of the whole nation, and in 1804 Pitt returned at the head of his second government. The whole of his time during that short ministry was occupied with organizing Britain for the war against Napoleon, the anxieties of which certainly hastened his death, which took place in January, 1806.

4. THE CLOSE OF GEORGE III'S REIGN, 1806-1820

The passing of Pitt left Britain without any outstanding statesman commanding universal confidence. He was followed by a succession of short ministries, all of which were occupied almost solely with the war against Napoleon. The first was a coalition known as the *Ministry of All the Talents*, in which Grenville (son of George Grenville) was Prime Minister and Charles James Fox was Secretary for Foreign Affairs. This ministry found time to abolish the Slave Trade, but before 1806 was out Fox died and in the following year the ministry and George III disagreed over Roman Catholic Emancipation. In March, 1807, the Ministry of All the Talents was dismissed. Then followed three Tory ministries, the first under the *Duke of Portland* (1807-1809); the second under *Perceval* (1809-1812); and the third under *Lord Liverpool* (1812-1827).

Abolition of Slave Trade.

This is a convenient point at which to summarize the events connected with the abolition of the slave trade. The plantations in the West Indies were worked mainly by slave labour, the slaves being rounded up in Africa and transported across the Atlantic where they were sold to the planters and where henceforward they lived in communities on the plantations. As the next section will show, one of the indirect results of the Methodist Revival was a kindling of humanitarianism in the nation at large, one aspect of which was the awakening of the nation's conscience on the subject of slavery. The prime mover in the matter was *William Wilberforce*, an intimate friend of the younger Pitt—they had been undergraduates together at Cambridge—and a member of the Evangelical Party of the Church of England. Wilberforce's advocacy of the cause of the slaves won over a number of influential Members of Parliament including Pitt himself and Charles James Fox. Nevertheless they soon discovered that any hope of immediately abolishing slavery was a false one, for the great English landowners, who controlled the majority of seats in Parliament, themselves owned plantations run by slave labour or belonged to the class of folk who did. The abolitionists therefore concentrated upon efforts to abolish the slave *trade* as distinct from the system of slavery, that is, they aimed at preventing the capture and transport of slaves from Africa.

Even to such a measure great opposition was offered by the commercial interests, because of the adverse effect it would have on British shipping. That this fear was not unfounded is shown by the fact that an average of 30,000 slaves per annum, at a price averaging £50 each, were shipped through Liverpool alone during the ten years following the 1783 Treaty of Versailles. But Wilberforce persevered. A Committee was set up to inquire into the question and a gruesome set of facts was brought to light.

Apart from the cruelty of rounding up the natives in Africa, of separating them from their families, of tearing them from the only kind of life they knew, and of sending them into the terror of the unknown, the conditions of the passage across the Atlantic were unspeakably horrible. Special ships were built for transporting the slaves, being designed to pack the greatest possible number of human beings into the smallest possible space. The slaves were herded together on shelves between decks, where every one was chained, where they remained for sixteen hours out of the twenty-four and where they received two feeds of horse-beans and one pint of water daily. In rotation they were brought up to the deck and compelled, by the persuasion of the lash, to jump for the sake of exercise. If any slave became a nuisance or contracted disease he was thrown overboard. The result of the spread of infectious disease in such conditions may be imagined. Such were some of the facts with which Wilberforce and his friends sought repeatedly to impress Parliament. From 1788 onwards the subject was frequently before the Commons, Pitt himself vigorously supporting the abolitionists. But even when Abolition Bills passed the Commons they were rejected by the Lords, and Pitt cared too much for his Premiership to stake its retention upon introducing such a measure as a Government Bill. Fox's accession to power, after the death of Pitt, improved the prospect, and his government pledged itself to see the project through. Though Fox did not live to complete the work, the ministry honoured its pledge, and early in 1807 both Houses passed a Bill prohibiting the Slave Trade from 1st January, 1808.

This measure was regarded by the abolitionists as only the first step towards the extinction of slavery itself in the British dominions. But not until the First Reform Act of 1832 had brought a new element into the House of Commons was that hope fulfilled. Slavery was finally abolished in 1833, Wilberforce living just long enough

to hear of the success of the Second Reading of the Bill.

5. SAMUEL JOHNSON, 1709-1784

In an earlier chapter ¹ reference was made to the work of the notable writers who included Defoe, Addison and Swift. These had their counterpart during the later half of the century in the "circle" of which Samuel Johnson was the centre.

Johnson's early life was marked by poverty and drudgery. His father was a Lichfield bookseller who, though sufficiently keen upon learning to send Samuel to Oxford, was too poor to allow him to stay there long enough to graduate. The youth was therefore thrown back upon his only resource, which was the literary taste and knowledge which the opportunities of his father's shop had allowed him to acquire. Hopes of earning a livelihood drew him to London, where for several years he managed somehow to exist, though of his means of doing so he has left no exact record. In 1750 he began to publish a periodical called *The Rambler*. Meanwhile he was working on his *Dictionary*, which finally was published in 1755. This remarkable work was the first comprehensive Dictionary of the English language ever written. The book showed certain defects inevitable in such circumstances, some of its definitions and its derivations of words being grossly faulty. But none of these errors of detail can obscure the larger fact that the completion of so vast a work by one man without the guidance of precedent or the encouragement of a contemporary was a colossal achievement possible only to an individual possessed of consummate powers of discernment and perseverance.

The date of the *Dictionary* shows that the bulk of Johnson's literary work was completed before the period

¹ Chapter I, section 4.

of George III. The inclusion of his name in this, rather than in an earlier, chapter, is nevertheless justified, for his peculiar contribution to English life was made after 1760. The just fame which the *Dictionary* brought to its compiler was reflected in George III's granting in 1762 a pension of £300 a year. Thenceforward Johnson was the greatest literary personage of his day. Around him there gathered a group of famous writers—Goldsmith, author of *The Vicar of Wakefield*; Burke, the greatest of the Whigs; Gibbon, remembered chiefly for his *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*; Sir Joshua Reynolds, master-painter and founder of the Royal Academy; and a host of others. His chief delight was to sit in some tavern of Fleet Street or the Strand with such company as this, Johnson himself acting by common consent as chairman and being a match for any of them or all of them together, in wit and argument.

For the story of the last twenty years of his life we are indebted to his friend Boswell who, in 1791, published his *Life of Samuel Johnson*. Boswell was frankly a hero-worshipper and doubtless painted a highly coloured portrait of his hero. Yet there is little in the details of the picture that does not agree with the figure as a whole. Johnson's epigrams were the natural expression of the man, and the man himself was much greater than anything he wrote or said. His chief contribution to literature was his refusal to be bound by the stilted conventions of his time. Though Johnson had his share of prejudices, these were not copied from other people, but were the results of his convictions and were commonly the reverse of the views then generally accepted. "Clear your mind of cant" was his own dictum, and was a just summary of his attitude to life and literature. It is fair to say that the greater simplicity and directness of succeeding generations of writers owe much to Samuel Johnson.

This forthrightness of Johnson was the more significant because it was hostile to the spirit of sentimentalism which

had been asserting an increasing influence on literature since the first decade of the century. The works of Richardson, whose best-known book was the novel *Pamela* (1740), and of Sterne, the author of *Tristram Shandy* (1767), are still read, but most of the mawkish sentimental books and dramas of the period are forgotten. Protest against the prevailing artificiality was made more effectively on the stage than in novels, in comedies such as Goldsmith's *She Stoops to Conquer* (1773) and Sheridan's *The Rivals* (1775).

6. THE WESLEYS

To do justice to the Wesleys, particularly to John Wesley, the elder of the two famous brothers, in a general history of the eighteenth century is almost impossible. John Wesley was by so much the greatest figure of his day that the only way to give him his rightful place is to make him the centre of the story of England during that century, for there was no phase of English life that the movement originating in him did not touch. Yet such a treatment would appear to lack balance and to be unjust to other contemporary men and events. We must therefore be content with some account of the Wesleys themselves, of their work and of its chief results.

Eighteenth-Century England.

The significance of the Wesleys is realized only when they are seen in contrast to the religious and moral life of their day. The standard of morality among all classes of Englishmen was probably lower during the eighteenth century than at any other period of modern history. Drunkenness, open, unashamed and of the most degrading type, was common in every rank of society. Crime, both serious and petty, was everywhere rife and was nowhere dealt with on any principle other than that of mere repression by fear. Religion was generally scoffed at. Upon

this decaying morality the Established Church had almost no effect. Indeed, it was itself in little better condition than the nation generally. Its bishops were politicians rather than spiritual leaders and had secured their offices because they were members of the great Whig families; quite commonly a bishop scarcely went near his diocese, which he regarded as merely a source of revenue, and some of them were suspected of being something akin to atheists. With these conditions prevailing in the upper ranks of the Church, efficiency in its lower orders was hardly to be expected. Not uncommonly a clergyman would be nominally the rector of several parishes from which he drew his income, but in none of which did he personally carry out his duties; instead he employed curates who worked for miserably low wages and whose fulfilment of clerical functions was regulated mainly by their own sense of duty. There still were, of course, pious and cultured clergy who gave of their best to their parishioners, and there were devout men and women who found what they needed in the services of the Church; but such folk were so exceptional that the general truth of the picture suggested above needs no modification. The Church had ceased to be of any value to the spiritual life of the vast mass of the people. Upon such conditions the influence of the Wesleys came like a bracing breeze.

The Methodists.

In 1729 a number of undergraduates and clergymen in Oxford formed themselves into a group for the purpose of mutually studying and practising religion. They arranged a routine of Bible-reading, prayer, fasting, prison-visitation, and teaching slum children. This group, because of the contrast it formed to the general practice of the day and because of the regularity of its methods, was variously dubbed "The Holy Club" and "The Methodists". Its leading members were John and

Charles Wesley, sons of the rector of Epworth in Lincolnshire, and George Whitefield.

The greatest of them all was undoubtedly John Wesley. In 1735 he visited Georgia, at the invitation of Oglethorpe who only three years previously had founded the colony. But Wesley's rigid methods caused much offence and he shortly returned to England. The real importance of the journey was that during the voyages he met members of the sect of Moravians who convinced Wesley that religion as he held it was not personal because, though he could give reasons for the general truth of Christianity, he had no consciousness of its particular application to himself. This idea worked profoundly upon his conscience until in 1738 he underwent a spiritual experience that transformed the meaning of religion to himself and that inspired him to lead others into a similar experience. His brother Charles was shortly afterwards moved in the same direction, and together they began to travel and to preach in any church where they could gain permission to do so. The very fact of two clergymen in deadly earnest was itself sufficient to draw crowds; but soon it was sufficient also to cause incumbents to refuse the necessary permission. George Whitefield, who had developed into a mighty orator of the most moving type, did not hesitate to accept the challenge by preaching outside churches, particularly to the colliers of the Bristol coalfield. The Wesleys soon had to choose between allowing themselves to be silenced and imitating Whitefield, and, though reluctant to break with Church precedent, there could be no doubt about their decision. Up and down the land they went preaching wherever they could find an audience—and that was never lacking. John Wesley regularly preached the first sermon of the day at 5 a.m., often to thousands of people, and would average fifteen or sixteen services each week, meanwhile riding some five thousand miles on horseback every year, during which process he contrived to read whole libraries of books.

His life spanned almost the whole eighteenth century (1703-1791), yet until almost the closing months he was physically and mentally as vigorous in old age as in his youth.

The *Journal* in which he records—in a system of private shorthand—his life's experiences is now published in eight large volumes and is an amazing work. In his early years Wesley met with much opposition, often at the hands of armed mobs who sometimes were egged on by the local clergy. Yet such was his personal power that quite often as the little man stepped out of a house before which a throng of ruffians were clamouring after him with sticks and brickbats, a passage was made for him and he quietly walked through. As time passed, these demonstrations became less frequent, and everywhere men and women flocked to hear him. Wesley's first care was to organize his followers into classes, each with a leader responsible for the spiritual welfare of his members. Then he found the demands of the work to be so great that he chose the most promising as preachers. These men, though often uneducated in the narrower sense, were so deeply convinced of the truth and urgency of their message that they became powerful factors in the movement. Another phase of Methodism was its hymn-singing. Charles Wesley was its hymn-writer and produced four thousand hymns, which include some of the greatest in the English language and which are eloquent of the spirit of the early Methodists.

John Wesley's own place in the movement has been justly summarized in the following sentences :

"Great as a preacher, he was greater as an organizer and leader of men. His gifts for command stamp him as probably the most striking of eighteenth-century figures, and leave him in the select division of the first class of the great leaders of all ages."¹

"One of the greatest missionaries and the greatest religious organizers of all history."²

¹ C. Grant Robertson, *England Under the Hanoverians*, p. 210.

² G. M. Trevelyan, *History of England*, p. 519.

Effects of the Wesleys.

The effects of the work of the Wesleys were both widespread and enduring. The most tangible witness to that work is the existence of various Methodist Churches not only in Britain but in America and, indeed, in almost every other country ; for Methodism has become the most numerous Protestant Church in the world, comprising, it is computed, over 30,000,000 members. To form such a separate organization was no part of Wesley's original intention. On the contrary, he did his utmost to prevent it : he hoped that his societies would merely supplement the work of the Established Church, and he carefully arranged that they should meet at times other than at Church service-times. To his dying day John Wesley professed himself a member of that Church. Yet Wesley, like all great reformers, was carried, by the impetus of his own movement and by the circumstances of his day, further than he either intended or knew. He might control his own relationship to the Church of England, but he could not control that of his followers, some of whom had been nonconformists before joining his societies, while many others refused to identify themselves with a Church that did not offer them the religious help they needed. To such people a number of the Methodist preachers, though not ordained clergymen, began to administer the sacrament, and Wesley, in not repudiating them, was recognizing a clear break from the customs of the Church. Further, after the American colonies had gained their independence in 1783 the need arose for the appointment of a superintendent to take charge of the Methodist work in the new United States of America. No English bishop would ordain a man for that purpose, so Wesley himself in 1784 took matters in his own hands and ordained a superintendent. But as Wesley was not a bishop this was an even more deliberate break from the Church of


England than allowing the administration of the sacrament by laymen.

A second result of Wesley's work, greater perhaps than even the establishment of Methodism itself, was its stimulating reaction upon the Established Church. The vigour of Methodism was a challenge to the stagnation of the parent body, and many clergy responded nobly to the challenge. There arose the evangelical party who, though not sympathetic towards the Methodists, aimed at carrying religion to all classes of men and women, and so tried to do within the Church what Wesley had wanted to do and what Methodism was doing outside it. Thus it is fair to say that the Church of England owes much of its nineteenth-century vigour to the Methodists whom it virtually ejected during the eighteenth.

Third, and last, we have to notice Methodism's social results. When Wesley started his work the mass of the poorest folk were "a neglected heathendom" for whom no one cared. Methodism's insistence upon the value of the individual soul, irrespective of what rank in society any particular individual belonged to, led to a new zeal for the welfare of this hitherto depressed and depraved mass. John Howard laboured for and secured the reform of some of the worst abuses in the condition of prisons; Robert Raikes became the pioneer of the Sunday School movement which was instrumental in instructing poor folk, both children and adults; and the sense of responsibility for the spiritual welfare of all men, irrespective of race and colour, caused an enthusiasm for missions overseas and hence produced, indirectly, the agitation for the abolition of slavery, the first step towards which was the Act against the Slave Trade in 1807. Further, little imagination is needed to see that if nothing had happened to uplift the masses of the people and to turn their thoughts in other directions, the French Revolution, when it came, would have found a fertile field for its doctrines. But by the end of the eighteenth century the classes which in

France were sweeping everything before them in the great revolutionary tide were the very classes which in England had become Methodists, so that Methodism could fairly claim to have saved England from the horrors of violent revolution.

SEVEN YEARS' WAR IN AMERICA — WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE.



CHAPTER VIII

WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE, 1775-1783

I. CAUSES OF THE WAR

WITHIN a dozen years of winning a new colony north of the St. Lawrence, Britain found herself struggling to retain possession of her old colonies south of that river, that is of the very colonies in whose interests the earlier war had been fought. Impartial examination of the events leading to the revolt of the American Colonies shows that its root cause was genuine misunderstanding, mixed with much obstinacy, on the part both of the colonists and of the Home Government. In order to appreciate the issues involved, we have to trace the historical relationship of the one to the other.

Conditions of the Colonies.

Our sketch of the foundation of the thirteen colonies¹ has shown that, owing largely to their various original circumstances and objects, the colonies differed widely from one another, and that each was so tenacious of its independence that it refused to unite, in any permanent or organic manner, with its fellows. There was no assembly or person in North America with any authority over all the colonies, and the only bond of union between them was their common allegiance to the British Government. Each colony had its own separate government. The details of the form of this government varied from state to state, but broadly they were alike in that each had an elected Assembly representing the colonists with power to legislate

¹ Chapter VI, section 2.

on internal affairs, including the levying of taxes, and that each had a Governor appointed by the Crown with power to veto decisions of the Assembly. In practice each colony was virtually self-governing, the only occasions when the Home Government actively interfered being due to extraordinary circumstances such as war, but wars, so far as the colonies were concerned, were rare events.

Colonies and Britain.

The self-government of the colonies was, however, limited in two main respects arising from the general idea of the proper relationship of colonies to their mother-country, which was very different in the eighteenth century from what it is in the twentieth. The accepted principle was that colonies existed primarily for the benefit of the parent-state of which they were regarded as forming an integral part. Hence, because economists and politicians agreed that a state should frame its policy so as to become self-sufficing, a similar object was aimed at for the Empire as a whole. The first purpose of the products of a colony—after supplying the needs of the colonists themselves—should therefore be to satisfy the needs of the mother-country, and in order to secure that purpose a number of trade regulations were in force.

This brings us to the first respect in which colonial independence was limited, namely, by Navigation Acts restricting colonial trade. An Act was passed in 1660, amplifying one of 1651, which forbade the colonies to manufacture certain classes of goods—such as woollen goods and hardware—because such articles would compete with similar ones made in England; also, certain colonial products had to be sent to England only and could not be exported direct to customers in any other country (thus the English Government received the import duties paid on the goods, and at the same time the English purchaser received them more cheaply than did the foreigner); and finally, all these goods had to be brought to England in

English or colonial ships manned by English or colonial crews. The severity of these regulations was modified in two respects, namely, that Englishmen were allowed to purchase certain classes of goods—notably tobacco, sugar and coffee—from the colonies only and not from any other part of the world, and that other classes of goods could be exported direct to any country. Moreover, however unreasonable such regulations may appear to us, we have to remember that Britain was carrying out a policy that was accepted as just by every European country that had colonies, and that Britain was much more lenient towards her colonies—as we saw when comparing the French and the British colonies in North America—than were her neighbours.

The second respect in which colonial self-government was limited was that, though the colonial Assembly fixed the internal taxes, the Home Government had always imposed customs duties on colonial trade. The right to levy such duties was unchallenged by the colonists. The importance of this distinction between customs duties and taxation will become more apparent as we proceed.

Effects of the Seven Years' War.

The immediate problem that calls for an answer is this: as the colonies had always been subject to the restrictions of Navigation Acts and customs duties, why did they suddenly raise objections to those restrictions in the latter half of the eighteenth century? The answer is that the effects of the Seven Years' War had radically altered the situation in America in three main directions. First, after the war there took place what occurs after every great war, namely an expansion in trade of which the colonists saw an opportunity of securing a large share. But in so doing they found themselves seriously hampered by the Navigation Acts: certain classes of goods demanded by Europe had to be exported first to England thereby making trade difficult and raising the price of those goods

to foreign customers; moreover, even so, English or colonial ships were not always available to transport those goods just when they were ready. In short, regulations that were of no great consequence when the volume of trade was small, became extremely irksome in a period of trade expansion.

Second, the Seven Years' War had removed the French from North America and had thereby removed the menace for defence against which the colonists had been dependent upon Britain. If before the Seven Years' War the colonists had chafed unduly against their restrictions, the Home Government might have grown tired of the colonies and have left them to their own devices—in other words, to the mercy of the French. But as, after 1763, the French had no longer to be feared, the colonists could afford to press their demands.

Third, the Seven Years' War had to be paid for, and as it had been fought mainly in the interests of the colonists, justice seemed to indicate that they should share in the cost. It was the attempt to enforce this policy which provoked colonial resistance and hence was the first of the events leading to the outbreak of war.

2. EVENTS LEADING TO OUTBREAK

Grenville's Stamp Act, 1764 and 1765.

When George Grenville became Prime Minister in April, 1763, immediately after the Peace of Paris, he succeeded to a National Debt that had been doubled by the late war, and he decided that new sources of revenue must be found to meet the resulting financial demands. Though unimaginative and unstatesmanlike, Grenville was a lawyer who loved business routine, and his investigations showed that American customs duties were producing a mere £2,000 per annum and were costing £7,000 for the process! The evident explanation was that the regulations were systematically evaded and that smuggling was taking

place on a vast scale. This suggested an obvious way of increasing national revenue. By the Revenue Act of 1764 new customs duties were imposed, the machinery for collecting them was tightened up and resolute efforts were to be made to suppress smuggling. At the same time Grenville proposed that towards the cost of maintaining an army in America for the protection of the colonists—computed to cost £350,000 per annum—an annual sum of £100,000 should be raised in the colonies by means of a Stamp Duty, that is by requiring that stamps, purchased from the Government, should be fixed to legal documents such as title-deeds to property, and the execution of a will. At the same time Grenville proposed that the Stamp Act, which contained these provisions, should not come into force for twelve months and that if during that period the colonists put forward an alternative way of raising the required sum, he would be willing to substitute that alternative for the Stamp Duty.

On the face of things there was nothing unreasonable in Grenville's proposal, which was certainly made in a conciliatory spirit. That a standing army was necessary in America was clearly demonstrated in 1763 by raids of Red Indians on Virginia, Pennsylvania and Maryland against whom the colonists would have been powerless had not British troops been still in the country. Moreover, that the French would take the first opportunity to renew their attacks was almost certain. Yet towards the cost of their own protection the colonists were being asked to contribute less than one-third, and the failure of the colonists to propose, during the stipulated twelve months, any alternative to the Stamp Duties seemed a proof that the method suggested for raising the necessary money was not irksome. In April, 1765, the Stamp Act became law.

Opposition soon began to manifest itself in the colonies where already the more stringent enforcement of the customs regulations was being felt as a grievance. Against the new Stamp Duties the colonists urged that internal

taxation had always been within the control of their own colonial Assemblies. They protested that the levying of taxes by a Parliament in which the taxpayers had no representation was contrary to the rights of Englishmen acknowledged as long ago as Magna Charta. Soon the cry was raised of : " No taxation without representation " ; and though the representation of the colonies in the Parliament at Westminster was not a practical proposition, that slogan was the rallying-point of the controversy which raged with increasing bitterness and obstinacy during the decade 1765-1775 and which led to the outbreak of war in the latter year.

Rockingham Repeals the Act, 1766.

The date on which Grenville's Stamp Act was fixed to come into force was 1st November, 1765. In July of that year Grenville had fallen from power and had been succeeded by Rockingham and the official Whig party. The latter was much more favourably disposed towards the colonists than the Grenville section had been, and was particularly influenced by the advice of Burke against the Stamp Act. Also, the colonists were offering a most stubborn resistance to the new measures : merchants were refusing to import goods subject to the new duties ; the colonists were refusing to purchase such goods and to purchase the hated stamps ; and, most significant of all, in October, 1765, a Congress of delegates from nine of the thirteen colonies met to consider the situation. Even so much unity was without precedent and was a clear indication of the depth of feeling that the issue was engendering.

In 1766, therefore, the Government repealed the Stamp Act, but at the same time passed a Declaratory Act which claimed that though for the moment the Home Government was refraining from taxing the colonists, it still retained the right to do so. This was typical of the paltry spirit in which Britain conducted the whole colonial business : she never granted concessions until she evidently

was afraid to refuse them, and then she granted them in such a grudging fashion as to cause almost more friction than if she had resolutely adhered to her original principle. In this instance, for example, the colonists put the emphasis upon the repeal of the Stamp Act while the Home Government put it upon the Declaratory Act, so that the end of the controversy, instead of being brought nearer, was pushed further off.

Townshend's Duties, 1767.

While matters were in this undecided condition, Rockingham fell in July, 1766, and was succeeded by the Chatham Ministry of which, through Chatham's illness, Townshend was the most vigorous member. Townshend was capable but rash, and it was particularly unfortunate that, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, he should have been responsible for the financial relations with the colonies. In 1767 he proposed to raise £40,000 by American customs duties on glass, paper, painters' colours and tea. These duties seemed to circumvent the colonists' objections to internal taxation. But by this time matters had got beyond hair-splitting theoretical distinctions. The colonists realized that the new duties, being substitutes for taxes, were indistinguishable from taxes, and they ceased to trouble overmuch about the theory involved. In so far as reasons were advanced against Townshend's duties, the colonists claimed that whereas true customs duties were intended to regulate trade, these were designed primarily to raise revenue. So the miserable controversy continued.

North and Tea Duty, 1770.

The next stage in the story was reached under Lord North's ministry which took office in January, 1770. In March, 1770, the Townshend duties were repealed except that on tea—another example of the unstatesmanlike obstinacy of British ministers. Instead of placating the colonists, this measure had rather the opposite effect: the

extremists among the colonists believed that the Government was weakening and that energetic demonstration would secure the repeal of the tea duty also. The prime mover of the opposition to the colonies was undoubtedly George III himself, who was so determined to be absolute master in his own realm that he would brook no questioning of his decisions. The pity was that Lord North, though not agreeing with the King's extreme policy, allowed himself to become its instrument. Inevitably in such circumstances the colonists became increasingly bitter, and violent scenes occurred. We have to note three events which were the expression of ill-feeling and which also made that feeling worse than it had already been.

The first was the *Boston Massacre*. In March, 1770, a mob in Boston assaulted a party of soldiers with snowballs and insults. This was the climax of a long-standing feud: the soldiers fired, and four or five civilians were killed. In itself the affair was small, but throughout the colonies it became known as a "massacre", and the tension between the two parties became more strained than ever. Blood had been spilled, and the avoidance of war was thereby rendered extremely difficult.

In 1772 H.M.S. *Gaspée* ran ashore on Rhode Island. The vessel was a revenue cutter engaged in anti-smuggling operations, and as soon as it grounded it was eagerly seized by a mob and burnt. The result was hot disputes between the authorities on both sides; no satisfaction was obtained and much friction was set up.

The third incident was more complicated, and is an excellent example of the results of genuine misunderstanding on both sides. The financial condition of the East India Company was unsatisfactory, and in 1773, with the object of improving the Company's trade, the British Government allowed tea to be carried direct from India to America instead of *via* England, thus shortening the journey and avoiding the shilling-a-pound duty at the English port. The result was that the tea was considerably

cheaper in America than it had ever been before and could compete easily with tea from Dutch plantations. The colonists, however, not unnaturally concluding that the whole business was a ruse to induce them to pay the tea duty, refused to accept the tea even at the reduced price. In December of 1773 a gang of colonists disguised themselves as Mohawk Indians, rowed out to a tea-ship standing in Boston Harbour, boarded the vessel and tossed three hundred and forty chests of tea into the sea "to see whether tea could be made with salt water!" This incident was not inappropriately known as the *Boston Tea Party*.

Boston was evidently the centre of disaffection, and the Government determined to suppress the trouble by punishing the town. *The Boston Port Act* of 1774 closed Boston Harbour and suspended the Assembly of Massachusetts so that the colony, losing its self-government, became a crown colony. Nevertheless the Assembly continued to meet in defiance of Parliament. This was an act of revolt. The actions of the other colonies left no doubt as to their attitude on the matter: the closing of the harbour ruined Boston and threatened to reduce the whole town to serious poverty, but the neighbouring states sent food supplies of every kind. The most ominous sign of all was the meeting, in September, 1774, of the *Continental Congress* in Philadelphia where delegates from twelve of the colonies met and were soon joined by delegates from the thirteenth—Georgia. The Congress demanded the repeal of the penal Acts, approved resistance by force, and resolved on the boycott of all British goods. The issue between the Colonies and Britain was thus sharply defined, and the outbreak of hostilities was a question of time only.

3. THE WAR

British and Colonial Resources.

At first sight the British seemed to have every reason to expect a speedy and certain victory. They had the

advantages of superior resources in wealth, man-power, experienced generals and a regular army, while the Americans were few in numbers, scattered geographically, divided by inter-state jealousies, and without seasoned troops or trained commanders. But experience was to show that this superiority of the British was mainly superficial. Their widely spread nature gave to the colonies a distinct strategic advantage; for to suppress and to hold the scattered inhabitants of so vast an area would have needed an army many times the size of that which Britain could send. The British generals also, though experienced, were handicapped by the incapacity and the constantly changing policies of the officials at home. The Cabinet Secretary responsible for colonial affairs was Lord George Germaine, who was in fact none other than the Lord George Sackville who had refused to lead the British cavalry into action at Minden,¹ since when he had seen fit to change his name though not his nature—the sequel will show that he remained still incapable and dilatory. With such incapacity at headquarters, the greatest skill and devotion on the part of generals and soldiers were likely to be negatived from the outset. A further weakness of Britain was that the whole question of the treatment of the colonists had become a party-question in the British Parliament and therefore never had a chance of just or dispassionate consideration; neither, after war had broken out, was there any opportunity for undivided concentration of national attention and energy upon winning it.

The colonists, on the other hand, though handicapped by the lack of any authoritative central Assembly for compulsorily raising money or organizing armies, were united on the main issue: they were struggling for freedom and for the defence of their homes. A section among them disagreed with the policy of open warfare against the mother-country, but its numbers were relatively small. The colonists, too, were intimate with the country and,

¹ Chapter VI, section 5.

because they were fighting in their own land, could rely upon the co-operation of the civilian population. Perhaps the greatest single advantage possessed by the colonists was the person of George Washington. The war was to develop in Washington qualities of high generalship such as could not be matched in any general on the British side. But the contribution which he rendered to the colonial cause was greater than mere skill in strategy or tactics: Washington displayed a confident faith in the justice of his cause and in its ability to win through which no adversity could shake. He alone overcame the petty inter-state jealousies and kept the colonial cause from guttering out during the opening stages of the war before the resources of the colonies had been organized.

The vital factor in the struggle was the three thousand miles that separated America from Europe. To cross them occupied six or seven weeks of good sailing, so that to obtain information from the authorities at home involved a wait of three or four months during which time the original situation might have changed and rendered the information, when it came, obsolete or even embarrassing. Moreover, that British troops and supplies had to cross the Atlantic meant that the effectiveness of British operations in America depended upon uninterrupted control of the sea. Once more, the war on land would be decided by the possession of sea-power: if the British lost that control they would lose the war. That, in fact, was precisely what took place: the intervention of European sea-faring nations on the side of the colonists jeopardized the naval supremacy of Britain and henceforward she lost the war in America.

We have now to see how these general principles worked themselves out in practice.

Lexington and Bunker's Hill, 1775.

In April, 1775, General Gage, who was in command of the British troops in America, sent a force from Boston to seize military stores which the colonists had collected at

Concord, a few miles distant. News of the operations spread, and when the troops were returning they were met at *Lexington* by a strong detachment of colonial militia who, avoiding a pitched battle, remained in ambush and inflicted severe loss upon the regulars. The first bloodshed of the war had taken place and the British had failed to hold their own. Reinforcements were sent over, and war on a big scale was rendered inevitable.

The colonists' next step was to try to blockade the British in Boston. They entrenched themselves strongly on *Bunker's Hill*, a strategic height overlooking Boston, and thereby threatened the security of the British forces. The latter attacked, but succeeded in ejecting the colonists only after sustaining considerable loss.

New York, 1776.

The following year saw operations opened on a larger scale, though they centred mainly in the north. Washington's army, as yet small in numbers and untrained, was on Long Island from which Howe, who was in command of the British forces and had his headquarters at Boston, determined to dislodge him. British reinforcements had arrived in May, and with nearly 30,000 troops Howe, co-operating with a fleet under his brother Lord Howe, began to attack. During August the colonists were decisively defeated at *Brooklyn* and had to withdraw to the mainland—a process they managed to complete successfully during the night after the battle owing partly to fog and partly to Howe's lack of vigilance. The British followed, seized *New York*—which remained in their hands until the end of the war—and overran New Jersey as far as the Delaware River. The first success, therefore, lay with the British.

In the meantime the situation had undergone a transformation through the issue by Congress, on 4th July, 1776, of the *Declaration of Independence*. This document was drawn up by Thomas Jefferson who, exactly a quarter of a century later, was to become President of the United

States (1801-1809). It contains three main sections: first, it asserts the equality of all men, and it enumerates the fundamental rights which all men consequently should enjoy; second, it sets out the ways in which George III and his government had violated these rights; and third, it declares that the Colonists were therefore severing their connection with Great Britain. This Declaration was mainly the work of the extremists, and was signed by the mass of the moderate colonists only reluctantly and from a sense of loyalty to the common cause. The object of its supporters was to secure allies. Far-seeing Americans had realized from the outset that if left to themselves they would never be able to withstand the resources of Britain, and they looked round for an ally. France, as the traditional enemy of Britain, and particularly as having so recently been defeated in America, was the obvious Power to approach; yet France was not likely to be induced to intervene in a mere domestic quarrel. Only if the colonies were definitely rebels so that the end of the fight would cause Britain to lose her Empire, could French aid be confidently invoked. This was one of the most powerful motives for the break which the Declaration of Independence involved. The result was not long in coming.

Saratoga, 1777.

For the next year's operations the Home Government decided upon a large, comprehensive campaign, the aim of which was to separate the New England colonies, which were the chief centre of disaffection, from the southern colonies where the life was modelled closely on that of the English manor and where a large proportion of loyalists was to be found. The plan was for Burgoyne to advance southward from Canada along the Little Lakes while Howe was moving northward up the Hudson River, so that the two could join forces and thus hold the dividing-line. Germaine sent details of this plan to Burgoyne, but, through culpable negligence, failed,

until later, to do so to Howe. The latter therefore carried his campaign towards the south: by September he had defeated Washington at *Brandywine* and had compelled him to evacuate Philadelphia where Congress had hitherto sat and of which Howe now took possession. Washington now found himself in sore straits: his army was cut to pieces and his base of operations had been seized from under him.

But events in the north more than compensated the Americans for this loss. Burgoyne, imagining that Howe had received a duplicate of the instructions that had reached him, began in June to move along Lake Champlain. After passing Ticonderoga he discovered that the enemy was becoming more numerous rather than less. Scouts sent ahead failed to make the expected contact with Howe's troops, and Burgoyne gradually came to the conclusion that something had gone wrong with the scheme. Clinton, whom Howe had left in charge at New York, tried to move up the Hudson in order to create a diversion, but Howe's operations had drained off the major part of the army and his efforts were doomed to be ineffective. At last Burgoyne was unable to press on any further, and in October he was compelled to surrender at Saratoga with his entire army, to the American General Gates. No such disaster overtook a British army afterwards until the surrender of ten thousand men under General Townshend at Kut in Mesopotamia in April, 1916.

European Intervention.

The full extent of the disaster, however, did not become apparent until the next year. Mention was made above of the desire of the colonists to secure the aid of France. Benjamin Franklin had been sent as the agent of the colonists for this specific object. He was received in Paris with great enthusiasm, but the French Government could not be persuaded to take any official action. Their experiences of fighting the British in North America were too

recent and too bitter to encourage them to renew warfare with their traditional enemy until they had some assurance of success. This was exactly what Saratoga seemed to offer, and in February, 1778, the French made an alliance with the colonists. Men and supplies were sent and, more important still, the French fleet, which had been steadily improved of late, would hamper the British on the Atlantic.

It was the intervention of the French which roused Chatham to his last effort. Since 1768 the old statesman had been compelled through ill-health to retire almost completely from politics. Before his retirement he had fought against the policy of taxing the colonies, but now that his ancient enemy the French was in the war he felt that all that he had given his life to secure for Britain was hanging in the balance. In May, 1778, though in a dying condition, he went down to the House of Lords and delivered his last speech in which, while still advocating concessions to the colonists in order to avoid a rupture, he called for determined resistance to France. The oration was unfinished when Chatham fell back in a swoon and was carried out dying.

In 1779 Spain followed France in declaring war against Britain, her hope being to recover Gibraltar and Minorca. The result was that Britain, in struggling against the toils that threatened her, became more seriously involved than ever. Realizing that control of the sea was the crux of the situation, Britain determined to use her navy to the full before the forces of her enemies could be brought completely into the war. Accordingly she began to hold up not merely enemy ships but also the merchantmen of neutrals and to search for contraband of war. This caused much hardship to the merchants of neutral countries, particularly, of course, to those of the maritime countries of northern Europe. The neutrals protested against the British claim to examine neutral ships on the high seas and they further contested the British definition of "contraband". The upshot was that, in March, 1780, Russia,

Prussia, Denmark and Sweden together formed the *Armed Neutrality of the North* for the protection of neutral ships if these were molested by a belligerent. Further, in December, 1780, Britain felt compelled to declare war against Holland because the latter was allowing the American colonists to use one of her West Indian islands as depôt for munitions. Thus, by the close of 1780, Britain was at war, either actually or potentially, not only with the Americans but also with every maritime Power of Europe. The critical nature of sea-power was now to show itself; nor was the result long in being seen.

Yorktown, 1781.

After 1780, operations in America had been confined, for the most part, to the southern states. In 1780 Clinton seized Charlestown, the capital of South Carolina, and made prisoners of the garrison of five thousand men. Clinton was then compelled to return to New York because the enemy was threatening that city. Cornwallis, who was left in command in the south, carried on the campaign in 1781 by invading North Carolina and defeating General Gates at Guilford Court House. But the men whom Clinton had left behind were too few to sustain large operations, and Cornwallis therefore decided to enter Virginia where he would be able to join with other British forces and to find support in the British fleet. Junction with the British forces was duly effected, and Cornwallis had some seven thousand men concentrated in Yorktown. Unfortunately, at the critical moment the British, owing to the intervention of European states, had lost supremacy at sea: Cornwallis was therefore unable to make contact with Clinton in the north and found himself besieged on land by an immensely superior combined force of Americans and French. On 19th October Clinton set out by sea with five thousand troops to raise the siege; but on that very day Cornwallis, ignorant of the

approaching relief, decided that he could no longer hold out and he capitulated to the enemy.

The surrender at Yorktown was the deciding stroke in America. The British were thereby crippled both in strategy and in prestige, and the colonists soon became the masters of the situation. In England the demands for the cessation of hostilities were renewed, and early in 1782 the first steps towards peace negotiations were taken.

War at Sea.

The failure of the British to hold undisputed supremacy at sea must not be interpreted to mean that the navy had been either idle or crippled. On the contrary, it had achieved a number of conspicuous successes, and, in the closing stages of the war, the services of Rodney, one of Britain's most distinguished sailors, alone recovered for his country sufficient prestige to enable her to negotiate peace-terms with some self-respect. That the navy was incapacitated in any degree was due not to the sailors but to the responsible officials at home. Throughout the reign of George III the navy had been neglected and, worse still, had been a prey to corruption in every branch. Lord Sandwich, who was First Lord of the Admiralty in North's administration, allowed his interest to be divided between gambling and political jobbery, but paid only the slightest regard to the genuine needs of the navy. With such neglect at the head, there is small wonder that the rot spread to the lower branches of the administration. The work of the fleet was achieved not by the help of but in spite of organization at home. In that work there were three events that call for special notice.

In the first of them Britain sustained a loss. In August, 1781, a French fleet arrived at *Chesapeake Bay* and was met by a British fleet inferior in numbers. The British, though fighting sturdily and skilfully, were beaten by numbers and had to retire. It was at that point that the

French fleet was able to enter the harbour at Yorktown and so compel Cornwallis to surrender.

The Mediterranean was the scene of the second set of events on the sea. One of the immediate effects of the intervention of the maritime Powers of Europe was that Britain had to concentrate so exclusively upon her task in the Atlantic that she had to allow the Mediterranean to take care of itself. Her two interests there were in Minorca and Gibraltar. The former was captured without great difficulty by the French and Spanish fleets in February, 1782. Around *Gibraltar* there hangs a different story. The Spaniards had made the capture of the fortress one of their first objects after declaring war, and in 1779 they had invested it by sea and by land. The three-year defence of the Rock by the British General Elliott and his little army of seven thousand men is one of the heroic episodes of history. In 1780 Admiral Rodney, on his way to the West Indies, fell in with the Spanish fleet off Cape St. Vincent, sank or captured eight out of twelve of their ships and revictualled the garrison. But the siege continued. At the end of a further twelve months a second squadron under Admiral Darby succeeded in bringing more relief. In 1782 the fall of Minorca allowed the French to join with the Spaniards in attempting to force the garrison into submission. The besiegers, whose numbers were five times those of the British, maintained a continuous bombardment. But Elliott and his men never quailed: though starving and ill, they not merely endured the rigours of the siege but even made sallies into the enemy's lines. During September, 1782, the French and Spaniards made a final effort; they mounted heavy artillery on specially constructed rafts and hoped thus to breach the defences. The defenders replied with red-hot cannon-balls which set the rafts alight and compelled the enemy to retire, after which the siege was never renewed.

The third naval action was crucial not merely in the War of American Independence but also in the whole

history of naval warfare. In April, 1782, a strong French fleet was making for the British island of Jamaica when Rodney met them off the small group of islands called *The Saints* and prepared to defeat their object. His manner of doing so made history. Formerly the traditional mode of fighting at sea had been for ships to draw alongside each other, deliver broadsides and then perhaps throw out grappling-irons, after which a hand-to-hand fight took place on deck, sharpshooters being posted in the riggings. In short, fighting at sea differed very little in principle from that on land. Rodney, however, as he manœuvred at *The Saints*, noted a weak spot in the French line and, instead of attacking broadside-on, he led his fleet in column against the enemy's line, cut that line in two sections, threw it into confusion, and was able to deal with each section separately. This manœuvre, known as that of "breaking the line", was the one adopted by Nelson at Trafalgar. Henceforward the art of naval warfare was gradually transformed and skill in seamanship became more important than ever before.

4. THE PEACE OF VERSAILLES, 1783

While these later events had been proceeding, negotiations for peace were slowly coming to a head. The Treaty was finally signed at Versailles in January, 1783. Its details can be briefly summarized. Britain recognized the independence of the thirteen colonies; she gave Minorca and Florida to Spain; and she restored certain stations in India and the islands of St. Lucia and Tobago in the West Indies to France.

The war had certainly proved one of the most disastrous in British history. Was the struggle inevitable? From the time that it occurred down to the present day, that has been one of the vexed questions of history. In a measure we have already answered it. Given an obstinate king and equally obstinate colonists, the break between

the parent-state and her offspring was sure to come. But the subsequent history of the British Empire is sufficient proof that there is no inherent reason why colonies should reach such a point in their development as to necessitate their separation. The truth is, of course, that Britain has had wit enough to learn the lesson that the American War taught and henceforward to allow proper scope to her colonies' legitimate ambitions for political self-expression. Even in the eighteenth century the task was not beyond British statesmanship, and there is evidence to show that, had Chatham been able to guide the State at that critical moment, he would have inspired sufficient confidence on both sides to have avoided the catastrophe. A proof that this could have been done is that no amount of persuasion by the revolting colonies could induce the Canadians to throw off their allegiance to Britain, though only a dozen years had passed since they had themselves been her enemies.

Results of the War.

Of the results of the war, the first has already been mentioned, namely, that Britain was taught a lesson which enabled her to avoid further losses elsewhere.

The second result was that the disastrous failure of the war brought complete discredit upon George III and his ministers and was one of the chief reasons for the end of his "departmental system" of government.

Within the thirteen colonies there still remained a strong body of men who disagreed with the policy of rebellion. Their lot was made so uncomfortable by their fellows that they emigrated to Canada and settled in districts east and west of the Province of Quebec. These men were British and accustomed to a different system of government from that allowed to the French already in Quebec. Moreover, they had moved from their homes in order to keep within British territory, and to allow them less freedom than they would have enjoyed had they joined the rebels would have

been most unjust. Accordingly in 1791 the *Canada Act* divided Canada into two parts, Quebec and Ontario. Each part was given a governor and some measure of self-government.

A further Imperial effect of the independence of the American Colonies was the impetus given to the development of *Australia*. Between 1768 and 1779 Captain Cook—who had been Wolfe's navigating-officer at the attack on Quebec—had made three voyages in the southern seas and was killed in the latter year in Hawaii. In 1770 he sailed into Botany Bay—so called because of its great variety of vegetation—and proclaimed the land of "New South Wales" to be a British possession. During several years the new land remained undeveloped: it was too far from Britain and from the usual sea-routes to attract settlers. But America, after the declaration of her independence in 1776, refused to accept British convicts, sentenced to terms of transportation, as she had formerly done. Gradually British gaols became choked with criminals, and some new outlet had to be found. In May, 1787, an experiment was made of transporting eight hundred convicts to Botany Bay, together with a guard of two hundred marines and some supplies in the shape of seed-corn and cattle. Early in 1788 the company landed and settled finally at Port Jackson, where Sydney now stands. The plan was for the convicts to support themselves by tilling the soil and then, after they had served their terms of imprisonment, for them to be given plots of land to cultivate. These convicts, it must be remembered, were not what we now mean by that term: in the eighteenth century the punishments inflicted for relatively slight breaches of the law were extremely severe, and infringements of the game-laws almost invariably brought sentences of transportation for long terms. The period was one of great distress among large masses of people owing to the unemployment and low wages resulting from the Industrial Revolution¹; and

¹ Chapter XI.

many a man obtained a meal by poaching rather than see his family starve. A large proportion of the prisoners sent to Australia were therefore not convicts in the modern sense, but were enterprising country-dwellers exactly suited to develop a new land. The early Colony passed through many varying vicissitudes, but gradually made good. In 1797 merino sheep were introduced from the Cape and formed the beginning of the future wealth of the Colony. After a few years free immigrants began to arrive, and, as their numbers increased, New South Wales ceased to be predominantly a convict settlement. The crossing of the Blue Mountains in 1813 opened up the vast pastoral plains beyond and so encouraged the development of the Colony, and of the other states which were established in other parts of Australia, during the early nineteenth century.

The last effect of the War of American Independence to be noted is its reactions upon Europe. Many Frenchmen—including the famous Lafayette—had enlisted for service in America. These men returned home fired with a new enthusiasm for freedom. Moreover, Frenchmen began to ask themselves why the French Government should fight for freedom for British colonists in America unless similar freedom was good for French citizens in France. In short the war was a great object-lesson to the French people and was one of the main contributory causes of the French Revolution of 1789. Later, in Chapter XII, we shall again pick up the threads of that effect.

CHAPTER IX

IRELAND

I. CONDITIONS AFTER 1689

[[T is appropriate that we should pass to the story of Ireland in the eighteenth century immediately after studying the War of American Independence, for the war had direct and far-reaching effects on that country.

The Penal Code.

We last left Ireland after William III's subjugation of the Roman Catholic opposition to his rule there.¹ This was concluded by the *Treaty of Limerick* in 1691, one of the clauses of which assured to Irish Roman Catholics the same rights as they had had under Charles II, that is, before the introduction of the Romanizing schemes of James II. Unfortunately for the peace both of Ireland and of England, this Treaty was hardly signed before it was broken in spirit and in letter. Almost immediately there was passed the first of a series of measures—known collectively as the Penal Code—which aimed at the complete subjection of the Irish people in the interests, political, religious and economic, of the English.

Roman Catholics were excluded from membership of the Dublin Parliament which thus became the instrument in Protestant hands for the oppression of the Catholic Roman Catholics were ejected from corporate towns so that they could not become barristers, army officers, masters or tutors, nor could they send their sons to university; they were not allowed to marry Protestants, to carry firearms, to buy land, or even to

¹ Chapter II, section 3.

worth more than £5. (The test of the last provision was that any Roman Catholic to whom a Protestant offered five guineas for his horse must agree to the sale!) Roman Catholic bishops were exiled, and Roman Catholic priests had to register themselves as though they were undesirable aliens. The extent of the oppressiveness of these regulations is realized only when we remember that they were designed against not a small minority—in which circumstance the injustice would have been severe enough—but against the majority of the nation; for four-fifths of the Irish people were Roman Catholics. Further, though Ireland had a Parliament of its own, the Upper House was dominated by the Protestant bishops, and the great majority of the Lower House were selected either by individual landowners or by the close corporations of towns. Also, by an Act of 1719, every Act of the British Parliament was applicable to Ireland irrespective of whether the Irish Parliament agreed or not. The representative of Britain in Ireland was the Viceroy, who, like all the administrative officials, was appointed by the British Government and who chose the Irish ministers, so that the latter were in no way responsible to the Irish Parliament.

In one sense the extreme severity of the Penal Laws defeated their object, for their enforcement against the will of the mass of the people was almost impossible. For example, the regulation against a Roman Catholic's owning a horse worth more than £5 appears to have been only rarely enforced. Nevertheless the unjust principle remained in theory and might at any moment be applied in practice, and the Irish Roman Catholics were so tightly bound that to struggle for the removal of their grievances was certain to be ineffective. Their only hope was that some act or situation might lead the Protestants of Ireland to make common cause with the Roman Catholics against their British oppressors. Something very like this actually happened.

Commercial Code.

The religious grievance was not the only one that Ireland had to endure. The attitude of England towards Ireland was exactly the same, in principle, as her attitude towards her other possessions, that is, Ireland was regarded as existing for the benefit of England, and drastic restrictions were imposed to safeguard English prosperity. As early as the reign of Charles II Ireland was excluded from the benefits of the Navigation Acts, thus being prevented from trading with the American Colonies, and the import into England of Irish cattle, sheep and pigs was also forbidden. This closed the only outlet for Irish live-stock, and the Irish farmer was consequently driven to make what profit he could from his animals without exporting them. He therefore concentrated upon rearing sheep for the sake of their wool. This so alarmed the English land-owners that an Act of William III forbade the export of Irish wool except to England where very heavy duties were imposed upon its import. These regulations, it should be noticed, applied to everyone in Ireland, Protestant and Roman Catholic alike. There was even a sense in which the Protestant was hit more severely than the Roman Catholic, for, as a result of the troubles in Ireland under Cromwell and William III, much land had been confiscated and given to Englishmen and Scots. So widespread had this process been that, at the opening of the eighteenth century, three-quarters of Ireland was owned by aliens. These therefore were the people upon whom the adverse effects of the commercial restrictions fell most heavily; and that the day came when the Protestants leagued with Roman Catholics against their common foe is not surprising.

The reaction of these conditions upon the mass of the Irish people was deplorable in the extreme. The only natural resources that Ireland possessed were agricultural, and these were being stifled so effectively that the popu-

lation was becoming steadily more and more impoverished. This result was intensified by the fact that many of the owners of Irish land lived in England, and hence, though they drained their estates of every available coin, only the smallest proportion of what Ireland produced remained within the country to stimulate its economic life. Frequently the landowners let their estates to a middleman who recouped himself by extorting the highest possible rents from the actual tenants. In brief, Ireland was suffering acutely from the evils of absentee landlordism. In such circumstances the young and vigorous sections of the Irish population, finding no opportunity for the use of their energies within their own land, emigrated either to America or to join the armies of the continental Powers in whose interests they fought against Britain. Almost every European monarch had Irish regiments in his army: for example, some of the hardest fighting against Britain in the battles of Fontenoy and Dettingen was done by an Irish Brigade. This draining of the vigorous elements from the Irish population meant that the economic outlook for Ireland became steadily worse: whole villages became depopulated, farms became neglected, and an atmosphere of depression pervaded the whole country.

2. CONDITIONS IMPROVED, 1778-1782


Almost suddenly, in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, two events combined to produce startling changes in Irish life, namely, the American and the French Revolutions, both of which provided the Irish people with an object-lesson whose meaning was unmistakable: what could be done by a united nation to secure liberty from an oppressive government in America and in France could be done in Ireland.

The Irish Volunteers.

One effect of the strain of the War of American Independence was that Britain had removed her garrisons

from Ireland which was thus left defenceless against internal disorder and external invasion alike. In 1778, as we have seen,¹ France allied with America and so jeopardized British sea-power. A French invasion of England immediately became a possibility, and the obvious plan for such an invasion was to use Ireland as a base of attack, since the Irish, on account of their discontent with England, could be relied upon to welcome the latter's enemy. But the Irish people—then, as so often since—defied every calculation that could have been confidently made about their conduct: so far from encouraging the landing of the French, the Irish raised forces of volunteers to resist the invader. This movement began among the Ulster Protestants, but soon spread among all classes of the population, and volunteers were enrolling in tens of thousands. The French invasion never materialized; but though the foreign danger passed, the Irish volunteers remained in being. The stress of exceptional circumstances had compelled the British Government to allow what in normal times it had sternly refused: even Roman Catholics had acquired a military organization and arms. More sinister than this, instead of the Irish being divided into Roman Catholics and Protestants, all alike were united in one cause and were in a position to demand the removal of their grievances.

Already in 1778 measures had been passed which allowed Irish Roman Catholics to buy land and to transmit it by will to their heirs and which included Ireland within the provisions of the Navigation Acts. These were but the foretaste of more substantial concessions to follow.

Grattan. 

The man who led the Irish in their campaign for freedom was Henry Grattan. By profession he was a lawyer, and from 1775 onwards he represented a pocket-borough in the Irish House of Commons. Grattan was the first, and

¹ Chapter VIII, section 3.

perhaps the greatest, of the line of mighty orators who were so profoundly to influence British history. Gifted with a wonderful power of persuasive speech, he was recognized immediately as the leader of the Irish Parliament and, even more, as the rallying-point of the ambitions of the nation. The Government, fearing that its difficulties with America and Europe might be complicated by trouble in Ireland, decided to make concessions, and in 1780 the British Parliament passed laws which removed the restrictions from Irish trade. The immediate result was to encourage the whole nation to believe that still further concessions were obtainable, and Grattan determined to press for the repeal of Poynings' Act of 1494, which had enacted that no measure could be introduced into the Irish Parliament without the English Government's consent, and the 1719 Act, which made every Act of the British Parliament applicable to Ireland. The campaign for securing the repeal of these Acts was maintained by Grattan, both inside and outside the Irish Parliament, and was actively supported by the Irish volunteers who continued their organization and were still in arms.

The climax was produced by the resignation of Lord North in March, 1782; for Rockingham and the Whigs who followed him in power were much more favourably disposed towards both America and Ireland than the Tories under North had been, and they included one of the greatest Irishmen of all history—Edmund Burke. In April, 1782, the Irish Parliament, led by Grattan, passed a resolution in favour of legislative independence, and in May the British Parliament repealed the 1494 and the 1719 Acts. At the same time many of the penalties under which Irish Roman Catholics had suffered were greatly modified: thus, Roman Catholics were allowed to become schoolmasters, and to own a horse whose value exceeded £5.

The most vexatious grievances of the Irish Roman Catholics were thus removed by 1782; yet in several

respects the condition of the people as a whole was almost unaffected. The bulk of Irish land remained in the hands of Englishmen and Scots, many of whom were "absentee landlords", so that Ireland was still drained of much of the wealth she produced, and her peasants were still subject to the grinding of "middlemen". In short, the daily life of the ordinary individual was but little improved by the Acts of 1782. Moreover, the granting of independence to the Dublin Parliament was worth almost nothing to the bulk of the Irish while Roman Catholics were still denied the franchise, for an independent Protestant Parliament in Dublin was not likely to be appreciably more sympathetic towards the Roman Catholic population than was a Parliament dependent upon Westminster. In 1783 and again in 1784 Reform measures were proposed in the Irish Parliament but, in spite of Grattan's warm support of Roman Catholic Emancipation, the composition of the House was such that the measures were overwhelmingly defeated. Relief came as a result of the second of the two events that produced changes in Irish life, namely, the French Revolution.

3. EVENTS LEADING TO UNION

United Irishmen.

A people in the condition of the Irish was certain to be profoundly affected by such a movement as the French Revolution of 1789 and onwards, for that Revolution illustrated the effective means of obtaining Ireland's cherished ambitions—the abolition of religious inequality and the destruction of a vicious land system. Irish nationalists thus received a great stimulus. The lead in the new movement was taken by *Wolfe Tone*, a young lawyer whose ideas were somewhat fantastic, but who found the promotion of freedom for Ireland to be a cause exactly suited to his mind. In 1791 he wrote a pamphlet called *The Northern Whig*, which, advocating votes for Roman

Catholics and a thorough reform of Parliament, achieved widespread popularity. The tangible result was the formation, in the same year, of the *United Irishmen* who, though founded primarily among the Ulster Presbyterians, sought for, and largely received, the co-operation, as its name suggested, of the Roman Catholics also. The Society's object was frankly republican: Roman Catholic Emancipation and Parliamentary Reform were to be but the means to complete severance from England. A movement which would in any circumstances have presented difficulties to the Government, became a serious menace when it coincided with war against France. In 1793 Pitt secured the passage of a Bill through the Irish Parliament whereby Roman Catholics were given votes though they remained ineligible for seats in Parliament.

Fitzwilliam, 1795.

The temporary lull thus produced in Irish activity was rudely broken two years later. In 1795 Pitt appointed Lord Fitzwilliam as Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. Fitzwilliam, as a Whig sympathetic towards the Irish, seemed likely to be successful in dealing with his new subjects. Unfortunately, with his sympathy he combined unreasoning rashness and indiscretion. Almost as soon as he arrived he made public his intention of securing an Act granting to Roman Catholics the right to sit in Parliament. He went further: he actually dismissed certain government officials and replaced them with men in agreement with his own views. These events had raised Roman Catholic hopes to the highest point, for the new Lord-Lieutenant's actions were naturally interpreted as expressing the Government's policy. On the other hand, the Protestants, particularly the official classes, became seriously alarmed, and they protested vigorously to Pitt against the new policy, with the result that Fitzwilliam was recalled within a few weeks of his appointment.

This was probably the crucial moment in modern Irish

history. The Roman Catholics, naturally feeling that they had been shamefully duped, lost all faith in the Government. They decided that there was no hope of securing justice by constitutional methods, and they therefore turned to the other alternative: the United Irish Society became a secret organization aiming at the complete severance of Ireland from Britain. While Ireland was under the political control of Britain, she was helpless, and the United Irish therefore negotiated actively for the co-operation of French Revolutionary forces in order to win her independence. In so doing, they were encouraged by a decree of November, 1792, when the French National Convention declared that it would "grant help and fraternity to all peoples who desire to recover their liberty". Wolfe Tone, who had been exiled from Ireland, went to France and convinced the French Government of the possibilities of success if a really effective force were sent to Ireland. In December, 1796, an army of 15,000 men under Lazare Hoche—one of the ablest of the French generals—was dispatched from Brest. But the gales in the Channel were so severe that the fleet was driven westwards into the Atlantic and only with the greatest difficulty managed to make its way back to Brest. Further attempts at invasion during 1797 met with similar failure.

Rebellion, 1798.

The original plan of Wolfe Tone and the United Irish had been for a rising in Ireland to coincide with the French landing. The failure of the French upset this project but did not prevent sporadic outbursts of violence. Throughout the country the United Irishmen were responsible for outrages upon persons and property, and troops sent out from England for the purpose of restoring quietness had rather the opposite effect: their very presence seemed to act as a challenge to the disorderly elements who responded by outrages more serious still. Both sides adopted the policy of reprisals, and terrible deeds were done in the name

of freedom on the one hand and of peace on the other. In 1797 the Government set out to enforce a systematic and thorough disarming of Ulster where the disorderly elements were strongest. This, however, did not deter the rest of the country, and anarchy grew instead of diminishing. Early in 1798, the policy of disarmament was extended to southern Ireland, and several notable leaders—including Lord Edward Fitzgerald, the central figure of the United Irish—were arrested.

The insurrectionaries, thus rendered leaderless, were powerless to carry out successfully the rebellion which had been projected for 1798. Here and there attempts were made to carry out the plan, but the rising proved to be serious only in County Wexford, where the leaders were two Roman Catholic priests, Fathers Roche and Murphy. Though the rising was a local and not a national one, it gained many thousands of supporters. The town of Wexford was entered and the Protestants were massacred in wholesale fashion. But General Lake, at the head of government troops from Dublin, stormed the rebels' encampment at *Vinegar Hill* (June, 1798), north of Wexford, and so broke the back of the Rebellion. The remaining embers of revolt were extinguished with much brutality, and Ireland lay prostrate. She had shot her last bolt and had failed: the next move was with the British Government.

4. THE ACT OF UNION, 1800

Preparations for Union.

The Rebellion's general effect upon the British ministers was to convince them that the only effective way of defeating the separatist policy of the large republican section in Ireland was to enact complete political union between Britain and Ireland; in other words, to abolish the Dublin Parliament. Immediately after the defeat of the 1798 Rebellion, this was the policy that Pitt set

himself to carry out. There were serious obstacles to its achievement: the Irish people as a whole, including many Protestants, would resent the removal of the semblance of their nationality, and the Dublin Parliament would certainly oppose its own extinction. This was confirmed by the debates early in 1799 when, after lengthy and fierce discussion, a Bill of Union was rejected. Yet the consent of that Parliament to the project of Union must somehow be obtained. Consequently a process of bribery on a great scale was begun: seats were bought up, members were paid for their votes, and numerous peerages were promised when the Bill was safely on the statute book. These methods in favour of union were more persuasive than Grattan's speeches against it, and the great orator found himself powerless against the phalanx of converts in the Irish Parliament. Probably the most effective factor in winning the acquiescence of the Irish people generally was the "understanding" that Roman Catholic Emancipation would in due course follow the passing of an Act of Union. Such thorough preparation of the ground removed all obstacles. In the early months of 1800 the Bill went through all its stages both at Dublin and at Westminster, and on 1st August received the royal assent.

Clauses and Results.

Its main provisions were that in the Westminster Parliament, Ireland was to be represented in the Commons by one hundred members and in the Lords by four bishops and by twenty-eight peers elected for life, and those Irish peers not so elected were to be eligible for election to the House of Commons by any British constituency; that there should be Free Trade between the two countries; and that Ireland should contribute two-seventeenths of the total revenue of the United Kingdom.

One omission of the Act was quite as significant as any of its contents: no reference was made to the removal of

the disabilities remaining on Roman Catholics. Pitt had genuinely intended that Emancipation should follow Union, and after the passage of the Act of Union he actually laid before the Cabinet draft proposals to that end. But as soon as he moved in the matter he discovered that George III was implacably opposed to such a measure owing to his conviction that to allow Roman Catholics to sit in Parliament would violate his Coronation Oath which pledged him to support Protestantism. Indeed, it is difficult to know why Pitt took for granted that he could carry a measure of Emancipation, for the King's opposition to the policy was neither new nor a secret. Pitt's only honourable course was to resign, and this he did in February, 1801. This, however, did not cure the malady set up by the disappointment of Irish expectations. The hope that the Union would usher in a period of peace was from the outset doomed to worse than mere failure: the Irish felt that once more they had been duped, and they distrusted the British Government more thoroughly than ever. Accordingly, the struggle between Ireland and Britain entered a new phase and took on an intenser form: throughout the nineteenth century the Irish hoped and worked for a repeal of the Act of Union. This was the meaning of the Home Rule movement which, during the latter half of that century and the opening years of the twentieth, was to become one of the most contentious of political subjects.

CHAPTER X

INDIA

I. THE ENGLISH IN INDIA, 1600-1750

East India Company, 1600.

THE foundation of British power in India was laid nearly a century before the beginning of the period covered by this volume. In 1600 Queen Elizabeth had granted to a group of London merchants a royal charter whereby they were assured of the monopoly, so far as Englishmen were concerned, of trade with the East Indies. Thus was founded the English East India Company. The reason for the monopoly is not difficult to understand. To reach India in those days round the Cape of Good Hope entailed a six months' journey so full of uncertainties and dangers that merchants were reluctant to sink capital in valuable cargoes unless they were assured of reaping the full benefit from whatever success they attained: trade with the East was extremely lucrative, and as soon as the pioneer merchants had opened up markets, other traders would be only too eager to step in and share the profits without having shared the early risks. To prevent this, and so to encourage trading enterprise, was the purpose of the monopoly given to members of the East India Company.

Though ultimately the Company was instrumental in bringing large tracts of Indian territory into British hands, its primary object was solely to trade. For this purpose, after negotiations with the Mogul—that is, with the Emperor of India—a depôt was opened at Surat in 1613 as a warehouse and a trading centre, this being the first

English concession in India. The next station—or “factory”, as more commonly known—was Madras, which in 1639 was acquired on a lease from the native ruler. Bombay had formed part of the dowry granted by the King of Portugal in 1661 to Charles II when the latter married the Portuguese Princess Katherine of Braganza. In 1668 Charles handed the island over to the Company who thus held it in complete independence of any native state. In 1696 another factory was opened at Calcutta and was protected by the erection of Fort William. Thus by the beginning of the eighteenth century which, as the following paragraphs will show, was a turning-point in Indian native history, the English were well established to take advantage of the new circumstances which then began to prevail.

Rivals of East India Company.

The English, however, were not the only people on the ground. The first European to round the Cape of Good Hope and to cross the Indian Ocean to India had been the Portuguese Vasco da Gama (1497), after which the Portuguese sailors and merchants had established ports of call and trading stations along the African coast and in India itself. But in 1580 the crowns of Spain and Portugal were united, and Portugal consequently became involved in the decline of Spain which began about that time—the Spanish Armada, for example, was defeated in 1588. Sixty years later Portugal regained her independence, but by that time the damage had been done and her trading interests had been acquired by other nations.

The Dutch soon followed the English by forming an East India Company of their own in 1602, but their operations centred upon islands such as Java and Sumatra in the East Indian Archipelago rather than upon the mainland of India itself. It was the Dutch, more than anyone else, who seized most of the Portuguese trade and stations.

The French East India Company had been founded in

1604 and had set up stations at Chandanagore near Calcutta and at Pondicherri south of Madras. Until near the middle of the eighteenth century the French company had been less successful than the English and was subsidized by its government.

Collapse of Mogul Empire.

The condition of India early in the eighteenth century was highly favourable to this intervention of Europeans. In 1526 India had suffered a Mongol invasion led by the great warrior Baber. The invaders had brought all the land under their sway and had set up in Delhi the capital of the Mogul Empire. The Great Mogul had ruled India by delegating power to provincial governors, or Nabobs. For the greater part of two centuries his Empire had thus continued, but towards the end of that period the Mogul's power began to be challenged by the Mahrattas who in origin had been warlike mountain tribes and who revolted against the oppression of the Mogul Aurungzebe. The latter's death in 1707 was the signal for the collapse of the Mogul Empire, and each of the former provincial governors tried to carve out for himself a state as large as he could make it at the expense of his neighbours: the Mahrattas established a Confederacy having Poona and Nagpur as its capitals and including a vast tract of territory stretching across the centre of India; the Nizam of Hyderabad—formerly the Mogul's Viceroy in the south—became an independent ruler; so did the Nizam's vassal the Nawab of the Carnatic. Mysore, Bengal and Oudh were all subject to a similar process. In short, during the first half of the eighteenth century the whole of India was in a state of ferment.

This political upheaval was accentuated by other causes of division, especially those relating to race and religion. The greater part of the population consisted of Hindus whose religion was based upon a system of castes—numbering many hundreds—so entirely differentiated that the

members of one caste would have no social dealings with the members of a lower one ; the highest caste of all—the Brahmins—was regarded as peculiarly holy and as liable to pollution by contact with any non-Brahmin person. These distinctions were rendered especially sharp and permanent by the fact that they were not determined by degrees of wealth but were religious differences into which Hindus were born. The Mogul rulers, on the other hand, were Mohammedans, and their conquest of India had in part been due to a religious offensive. This had naturally intensified the antagonism between the conquerors and those who had refused to accept their religion : the Mahrattas, for example, were Hindus.

Such conditions in India greatly facilitated European intervention, for each ruler eagerly welcomed any help that would give him an advantage over his neighbouring rivals. The French were the first to appreciate the possibility of exploiting this situation to extend their own power in India ; and the English soon learned the lesson from the French.

Dupleix, 1741–1754.

In 1741 the French Company sent out to India a man whose influence was to decide the whole future destiny not so much of his own people as of the British in India : that man was the Marquis François Joseph Dupleix, who in that year became the Governor of Pondicherry in which position he controlled French interests and resources throughout India. Dupleix's keen intelligence was not long in appreciating the opportunities which prevailing conditions in India offered for the extension of French power. He realized also the enormous superiority of European troops, and even of European-trained native troops, over the disorderly, though numerous, mobs which Indian rulers sent into battle. With this twofold fact in mind, Dupleix began to work. The details of his policy are not our present concern : its general purpose was to

employ the forces at his disposal in the interests of the native rulers of certain states which henceforward he would control and the resources of which he could use for the extension of French influence throughout India. The operation of this plan was postponed by the outbreak of the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748). France did not formally declare war against Britain until March, 1744, and Indian affairs were not thereby materially affected until 1746. In that year, the French Admiral Labourdonnais appeared off Pondicherri with a fleet carrying three thousand troops with whom he attacked and captured *Madras*, then the chief centre of British trade in India. The French failure to gain the maximum advantage from this victory was due to quarrels between Dupleix and Labourdonnais, the latter being shortly afterwards recalled to France. At the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle *Madras* was restored to the British in exchange for *Louisburg*.

Dupleix then set to work to carry out his schemes for which a disputed succession to the Nizam of Hyderabad gave the desired opportunity. Dupleix espoused the cause of one of the claimants and the British Governor of *Madras* supported another. Rival Nawabs of the Carnatic were similarly championed. Dupleix's foresight and superior diplomacy gave him so marked an advantage that in both instances the French candidate won. The British claimant to the Carnatic fled to the town of *Trichinopoli* where he was besieged. The result of this double stroke was that the new rulers gave valuable concessions to the French to whom they virtually owed their thrones, and at the moment there seemed every reason for supposing that the French were on the point of ousting the British from the whole of India. Yet the very challenge was producing the man to defeat it—Robert Clive, who used Dupleix's weapons to defeat the Frenchman's own scheme.

2. ROBERT CLIVE, 1751-1767

Early Career.

Clive had been born in 1725 at Market Drayton, in Shropshire. While still a boy his future *flair* for leadership was foreshadowed, for he was always the dare-devil ring-leader of the village boys in their pranks and fights. In 1743, that is when he was eighteen years of age, he was sent out to Madras as a clerk in the East India Company's service. Clive's buoyant spirit was apt to relapse into periods of melancholy, and this was a condition which his new work was more than likely to foster; for sitting at a desk was irksome in the highest degree to his adventurous, active nature. Twice he tried to shoot himself, and both times the pistol would not fire. Then, suddenly, circumstances provided the opportunity for his talents to express and develop themselves. His first experience of warfare was the French capture of Madras, and almost immediately afterwards he obtained a commission in the army. The new life effected a transformation in his person: he became keen and energetic and quickly won the confidence of his superiors.

Arcot, 1751.

It was certainly Clive's initiative which saved the Carnatic from falling wholly into French hands. We left the British claimant to that province shut up in Trichinopoly. Clive, appreciating that the fall of that town would cause the collapse of British power and—what would be of even greater consequence—of British prestige throughout India, urged that a diversion should be created by an attack on Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic. Saunders, the British Governor of Madras, was wise enough to agree to the suggestion and to give youth its chance: in August, 1751, Clive was sent with two hundred English troops and three hundred sepoys to attack Arcot. The audacious suddenness of the move threw the natives into wild panic,



INDIA IN THE TIME OF
CLIVE & WARREN HASTINGS.

and the invaders took possession of the town without a blow. But the real difficulty lay ahead. Thousands of natives were sent to seize the town, and before long Clive's force was reduced to two-thirds of its original strength. Yet the utmost endeavours of the native attackers failed to retake the town. For nearly two months the siege lasted and then, after a final terrific, yet still fruitless, onslaught, the besiegers withdrew. This marked the turn of the tide : British prestige in native eyes rose at a bound, many French-trained sepoys joined the new conqueror, Clive became deservedly the local hero, and he made the utmost use of the opportunity. Several French strongholds were seized and in 1752 Trichinopoli itself fell into British hands.

The immediate result was that the British candidate was enthroned in the Carnatic. A more far-reaching result was that the directors of the French Company, who never had agreed with Dupleix's political schemes, which cost too much and therefore reduced dividends, became convinced that his policy was wrong, and in 1754 Dupleix was recalled. His removal left the ground clear for Clive to carry on and improve upon the schemes of his discredited rival.

Black Hole of Calcutta, 1756.

In 1753 Clive had returned to England where he remained until in 1755 he was sent out as Governor of Fort St. David to the south of Pondicherri. He arrived in the nick of time to preserve British interests in India. Hitherto the centre of excitement had been in the south, while Bengal had been the scene of quiet trading by the agents of the two companies. But a shock of a terrible kind was in store.

When Clive arrived at Fort St. David on 20th June 1756, Surajah Dowlah had just succeeded as Nabob of Bengal. From the outset he resented the presence of the British at Calcutta, and he soon found an excuse for

ejecting them from his dominions. As soon as news of the Seven Years' War reached the British in Calcutta they began to strengthen their fortifications in anticipation of the outbreak of hostilities with their neighbours the French. This erection of fortifications within his realms intensified the Nabob's antagonism. The immediate cause of his action against the British was that the latter had sheltered a refugee from Surajah Dowlah's vengeance. With a formidable force, therefore, he marched against the Company's settlement at Calcutta. Resistance seemed useless, and on 20th June—the very day of Clive's landing at Fort St. David—the British capitulated and received in return the assurance that their lives would be preserved. They were compelled, however, to spend the night in a low prison barely twenty feet square and having only two small windows high up from the ground. Into that hole one hundred and forty-six Europeans were thrust at the point of the bayonet. The hot Indian night soon made the atmosphere unbearably stifling. Even to breathe became almost impossible, and the prisoners soon began to go mad and to fight desperately for space at the windows. Next morning, when the cell-door was opened, one hundred and twenty-three people lay dead and only twenty-three were able to totter out.

Battle of Plassey, 1757.

News of this horror in due course reached Madras. Apart from the question of the brutality to the individuals concerned, to allow such an action to take place unnoticed would mean the end of British prestige in Bengal and, ultimately, in India at large; and in October Clive was dispatched with nine hundred Europeans and fifteen hundred sepoys on board a fleet commanded by Admiral Watson. By February they had landed and had compelled Surajah Dowlah to pay a large sum to the Company as compensation and as a sign of his contrition. But Clive had no intention of being satisfied with mere regrets.

He began negotiations with certain of the Nabob's subjects with the aim of putting a more friendly person on the throne. The upshot of these intrigues was that Mir Jaffir, Surajah Dowlah's chief commander, agreed to desert his master and to bring with him a large number of troops ; in payment for this aid Mir Jaffir was to be made Nabob of Bengal. With this promise to rely upon, Clive marched towards the Nabob's capital at Murshidabad, and at Plassey met the native army of fifty thousand helped by a couple of hundred Frenchmen (23rd June, 1757). The battle resolved itself into a trial of strength between mere numbers and a disciplined few. A cannonade by the British in the opening stage of the battle threw the enemy's hordes into confusion. Then, at the crucial moment, Clive advanced his little army coolly, and the native rout began, led by Surajah Dowlah himself. The British casualties amounted to twenty-two killed. This victory was due largely to Mir Jaffir's neutrality during the early stages of the battle and to his open defection to the British side when the issue was no longer in doubt.

The immediate result of Plassey was that Mir Jaffir became Nabob of Bengal, and, as he owed his throne to the British, he paid them enormous sums of money and gave them absolute possession of Calcutta together with the control of the land from that point to the sea. Its most significant result, however, was that all question of British and French rivalry in India was permanently settled: British prestige was incontestably established and her Empire in India is rightly dated from the battle. That the dominance of the British was due in the main to Clive was universally recognized, and in 1758 he was made Governor of all the British possessions and settlements in Bengal.

Wandewash, 1760.

Elsewhere in India the French did not give way without a struggle. In 1758 Count de Lally, a French nobleman

of Irish descent, became Governor of Pondicherry, and he promptly set out to recover the supremacy which, since the recall of Dupleix, the French had lost in south India. Before the year was out he had seized Fort St. David and Arcot and was threatening Madras. Such operations were, however, hampered by the British control of the sea—thanks to Pitt's foresight—so that the French were unable to obtain reinforcements or supplies from Europe, and Lally was compelled to raise the siege of Madras. His misfortunes were increased by the change in the natives' attitude resulting from Plassey: whereas previously the natives had usually supported the French, they now supported the victors of Plassey. The climax came in January, 1760, when at Wandewash—midway between Madras and Pondicherry—Sir Eyre Coote, the British commander, routed the French and next year captured Pondicherry. This completed what Plassey had begun: the French power was eliminated throughout India. By the Treaty of Paris at the end of the Seven Years' War, Pondicherry and the other former French possessions were restored to France, but on condition that they were not fortified and were used as trading depots only.

Meanwhile, in February, 1760, Clive had returned to England, where he was made Baron Clive of Plassey in the Irish peerage and where he remained until 1765.

Mir Cossim.

Clive's absence from India allowed the true conditions, both of the Company and of native rule, to reveal themselves. The Company's servants, who were miserably paid, recouped themselves by practising every possible means of extortion and swindling against the natives, thereby producing much discontent against the Company itself, whose finances suffered so severely that bankruptcy seemed to be approaching. Almost more serious than this, as a cause of friction, was the anomalous political

position in Bengal, where Mir Jaffir, as Nabob, nominally ruled the province and raised the taxes, but did so under the advice of the Company's representatives to whom also he handed over a large proportion of his revenue. When difficulties arose, the Calcutta Council deposed Mir Jaffir and installed his son-in-law, Mir Cossim, in his place. But the new Nabob proved to be anything but a merely passive tool in the hands of his masters, who treated him with scant consideration and even with insolence. In 1763 Mir Cossim retaliated by murdering the British agent and other British people at Patna. He then fled and took refuge with the Nabob of Oudh, whereupon the Company restored Mir Jaffir as Nabob of Bengal. Having gathered forces, Mir Cossim advanced into Bengal, but was soundly defeated at the *Battle of Buxar* in October, 1764. These troubles caused the Directors at home to urge Clive to return to India, which he reluctantly did as Governor of Bengal in 1765.

Clive's Reforms, 1765-67.

Clive's governorship was too brief to enable him to carry out thoroughgoing reforms. Nevertheless he did effect a number of changes which not only were valuable in themselves but which indicated to his successors the lines that further developments should follow. The accuracy of Clive's diagnosis of the weak spots in the relations between the Company and the native rulers was shown by the fact that much of Warren Hastings' work later was little more than the extension of the reforms begun by Clive.

First, the position of the Company in Bengal and Behar was regularized and placed on a sounder basis: instead of the taxes being collected by the Nabob's agents, the Mogul consented to their being collected by the officials of the Company; and out of the revenue thus received the Company paid a fixed sum to the Nabob. The financial administration would thus be more efficient and

honest, and the Company became not only the practical but also the recognized ruler of Bengal, the Nabob being little more than the pensionary of the British. Second, having thus established control of Bengal, Clive allied with the ruler of Oudh so that the latter might be a buffer between the Company's new territory and the rest of India. Third, Clive strictly forbade private trading by the Company's servants, who, however, received substantial increases of salary so that they need no longer be tempted to supplement inadequate incomes by irregular means.

Unfortunately, Clive was unable to remain in India long enough to see these reforms firmly established. His health made a prolonged stay in India impossible, and in January, 1767, he had to return to England. But though something had been done towards organizing British interests in India, much dissatisfaction was felt in England with the position as it stood. The Directors of the Company feared lest Clive's increase of the servants' salaries might cause reduced dividends; and the politicians distrusted the arrangements whereby the Company exercised governmental powers in Bengal. In 1767 Chatham had prepared a scheme whereby the political powers of the Company were to be transferred to the Government, but his work was incomplete when his health broke so seriously that the proposal was dropped. Instead, the Company appointed its own supervisors of taxation and paid to the Government £400,000 a year. This arrangement was clearly only a temporary one, and Lord North in 1772 set up a Committee of Inquiry to investigate the whole question of the British in India. This Committee delved deeply into the Company's dealings in India and unearthed many discreditable facts. In the course of the proceedings, Clive was summoned to give an account of his Governorship. At first the Committee was decidedly hostile towards him, but Parliament, where his case was finally reviewed and where the Company had much

influence, finally resolved that " Robert, Lord Clive, has rendered great and meritorious services to this country ". Though a favourable verdict was thus ultimately pronounced, Clive had felt very acutely the strain and the implied ignominy of the inquiry. In the impaired state of his health this played so seriously upon his mind that in 1774 he committed suicide.

3. REGULATING ACT, 1773

Position of East India Company.

However favourable the finding of Parliament might be towards Clive personally, there could be no doubt that the uneasiness about the position of the Company generally was due to a sound judgment. The Company had been formed originally for purposes of trade only, and its constitution had been framed to that end; and though its other activities in India had been intended primarily to facilitate trade, Clive had given it a political interest in India so considerable that thorough reorganization seemed inevitable. For example, the Company's servants were chosen as traders, and there was no guarantee that a successful trader would be also an efficient government official. Moreover, as the Company's proper business was the securing of dividends by means of trade, there seemed grave danger lest the work of government might be manipulated so as to produce profits: if this took place to any appreciable extent, the way would be opened for corrupt financial administration of the worst kind. In short, the possession by a trading company of governmental powers over twenty-five million people in Bengal from whom some £4,000,000 was annually collected in taxes, was extremely anomalous, and Parliament decided that steps must be taken to place the relationship between the British and the Indians on a much more satisfactory and regular basis.

This, in effect, is the meaning of the three Acts of 1773,

1784 and 1858 which progressively took from the East India Company more and more of its political powers until in 1858 the Company ceased to exist and the government of Indian territories in British hands was exercised exclusively by the British Crown.

Two reasons especially led to the first of those measures. First, when Clive left India in 1767 there was no one strong enough to enforce the reforms which he had initiated, and matters got worse rather than better. Second, in 1770 the Company experienced its first great Indian famine. In those days, irrigation works and methods for storing water were unknown, and the failure of the crops through some vagary of the weather reduced many thousands of the natives to abnormal poverty, starvation and even death. The adverse result upon the Company's trade was extremely serious and the financial position of the Company—already embarrassed by the yearly toll of £400,000 taken by the Government—became highly precarious. In 1772 Warren Hastings was sent as Governor of Bengal, his special task being the reorganization of the Company's affairs in that Province. In the following year Parliament passed Lord North's Regulating Act.

Clauses.

The clauses of the Act effected four main changes in Indian administration. First, the Governor of Bengal was to be Governor-General of British India, a central unifying authority being thus for the first time established. Second, a Council of four members, nominated by Parliament, was to assist the Governor: over this Council the Governor was to preside and decisions were to be made by a majority vote, but in case of a tie the Governor could exercise his casting vote, that is his second vote. Third, a Supreme Court was to be set up in Calcutta to settle all legal questions in which British subjects were involved. Fourth, in return for the loss of political power which these provisions entailed, the Company was compensated by certain

financial concessions: for example, henceforward it was relieved of the £400,000 a year hitherto paid to the Government.

That the principle of this Act was a step in the right direction is undeniable: that is to say, the Act began to limit the Company to its proper function, namely trade, and to transfer its political powers to the proper quarter, namely the Government. But in detail the Act proved thoroughly bad, and by 1784 had to be superseded by a more comprehensive one based upon the experience of the intervening decade. The flaws in the Act centred mainly in three factors. First, the Governor still had to fulfil the dual function of the representative of a trading company and of the British Government; properly to discharge both these tasks—that is, not to allow the maintenance of even justice to interfere with the earning of high dividends, and vice versa—was beyond human capacity. Second, the rule that the executive government had to depend upon a majority vote of the Council of four might reduce the Governor to a position of impotence, for on a committee of five persons the Chairman would have little opportunity to exercise a casting vote, so that if three of the members opposed the Governor he might be continually out-voted throughout his whole period of office. Third, the relationship between the Governor and the Supreme Court was not precisely defined, and the resulting ambiguity might easily cause friction or even the perversion of justice.

Such were the terms of the Act under which Warren Hastings, who was already Governor of Bengal, became the first Governor-General of British India. His career was to exemplify clearly the defects of the Act, and though we shall have to review a number of regrettable incidents in his rule, we shall see also that almost without exception these were due to the impossible nature of his task and to vexatious circumstances over which he had no control.

4. WARREN HASTINGS, 1772-1784

Administrative Reforms.

Warren Hastings had entered the service of the East India Company in a humble capacity as a youth and step by step had risen to fill the highest positions at Madras and Calcutta. During this long and varied experience he had acquired a mastery of the official native language and an exceptionally acute understanding of the native mind. This equipment, combined with great administrative capacity and an energetic, determined personal character, made him the ideal governor for the difficult days following Clive's final retirement from India.

Immediately on his appointment as Governor of Bengal in 1772 Hastings began his work of restoring order to the administration of the Province by enforcing and developing the reforms which Clive had instituted but which had been mostly ignored since their author's departure in 1767. First, in pursuance of the powers conceded by the Mogul to Clive, Hastings set out to reorganize the whole financial administration of Bengal. To this end he removed the exchequer from the Nabob's capital at Murshidabad to the Company's capital at Calcutta; he carried through a new land-assessment of Bengal; he took the collection of taxes away from the native agents and in their places appointed British collectors; he halved the annual allowance made to the Nabob; and, with the object of helping the people to recover from the terrible economic effects of the famine, he modified the customs duties.

Rohilla War, 1773.

It was during this early period of Hastings' Governorship of Bengal—that is before he had become Governor-General of British India—that he had trouble with the natives which was to become of some practical consequence later. One of the achievements of Clive had been an alliance

with Oudh, so that that Province might form a buffer between Bengal and the northern and western natives. In 1773 the Mahrattas invaded Rohilcund, a province north-west of Oudh inhabited by Afghan mountain tribes. The Rohillas immediately called upon the Nabob of Oudh to come to their aid and to expel the invaders. As soon as the Mahrattas had been repulsed the Nabob asked for the subsidy which, according to treaty, was due to him from the Rohillas for the help rendered. This subsidy was refused, and the Nabob accordingly applied to his ally Hastings for military assistance to compel the Rohillas to fulfil their contract. Accordingly a body of troops was loaned to the Nabob, who marched them into Rohilcund, which he overran and annexed. This strengthened Oudh as a buffer state for Bengal, but unfortunately the Nabob had carried out the work with great brutality and bloodshed. Irrespective of the justice or otherwise of the Nabob's case against the Rohillas, that British troops should have been used by one native ruler to ruin the people of another and to filch away their independence left an unfortunate impression upon India and was used later by Hastings' enemies at home as one of the pieces of evidence against him.

Hastings and the Council.

In 1774, when the Regulating Act came into operation and when the members of the Council, set up by the Act, arrived in Bengal, Hastings' difficulties began in earnest. Three out of those four councillors were from the outset ranged against the Governor-General. The leader of this trio was Philip Francis whom we have met already as the suspected author of the *Letters of Junius*.¹ Francis's object was to hamper Hastings at every turn so as to make his work impossible and consequently to discredit him, in the hope, it would appear, of himself securing the Governorship. In this policy he was continually supported by two

¹ Chapter VII, section 2.

other Councillors, namely Clavering and Monson. None of these three had any previous experience of Indian affairs and, apart from their personal antagonism to Hastings, they were moved by uninformed prejudices which they brought to bear upon Indian affairs. The only member who had previous experience of India was Barwell, and he consistently supported the Governor. Nevertheless Hastings, thus out-voted on his own Council, was thwarted and tied at every step. Not the least serious aspect of the situation was that the natives, quick to perceive the facts, took every advantage of the Governor's impotence. The effect of these galling conditions upon his temper is easily understood, and explains some of the high-handed and ill-considered actions which marked his administration. Some relief was gained when Monson died in 1776, thus allowing Hastings to use his casting vote, and when Clavering died in 1777. The two new members appointed in their places generally supported the Governor. In 1780 Francis himself returned to England, and Hastings was at last free to conduct affairs in his own way.

The following incidents in Hastings' career are selected as illustrating how the provisions of the Regulating Act and how local circumstances worked themselves out in the actual practice of government.

Nuncomar.

His first difficulty arose through personal jealousy felt against Hastings by an influential native. This man was Nuncomar, who was a Brahmin and was therefore held in the highest esteem among the Hindus. Nuncomar bore a grudge against Hastings because the latter, during the reorganization of the finances of Bengal, had failed to appoint him to a lucrative position to which he thought himself entitled. In 1775 he tried to revenge himself by giving to Francis particulars of bribes received by Hastings. Francis and his supporters resolved to pursue these charges.

when suddenly Nuncomar was arrested on a long-standing private charge of forgery, was tried before the Supreme Court, found guilty, condemned to death—that being the punishment for forgery in England at that day—and hanged. The Hindus were horrified at the deed, partly because a Brahmin was a sacred person in their eyes and partly because forgery was not to them a serious crime. Moreover, the affair was not without its suspicious circumstances: Impey, the chief justice of the Court, had been a school-fellow of Hastings and was therefore suspected of not giving an unbiased judgment; also the charge against Nuncomar was brought at a time so convenient for Hastings that the latter was supposed to have trumped up a case in order to save his own position. Natural though such conclusions are, subsequent investigations failed to substantiate them. The truth seems to be that the documents which Nuncomar placed in the hands of Francis were themselves forgeries, that the charge brought against him was a genuine one, that he was given a fair trial, and that Hastings had no connection with the action. The incident illustrates clearly the inherent weakness of the Regulating Act in placing the Governor at the mercy of the members of his own Council, for if the independent charge had not removed Nuncomar at the critical moment, an able and unscrupulous person like Francis would almost certainly have been able to damage the reputation of Hastings at least sufficiently to obtain his recall.

Begums of Oudh.

The next incident illustrates equally clearly the effect of his occupying the dual position of Governor and of the chief servant of a trading company. The Directors of the latter were continually clamouring so loudly for profits that Hastings, at his wits' end for money, was driven to actions which, in the cold light of later days, are apt to appear regrettable. An example is his treatment of the

Begums—that is, royal ladies—of Oudh. Evidence of the details of that treatment varies, but the main facts appear to be as follows. Shujah Dowlah, the Nabob of Oudh, had died in 1775 and was succeeded by his son Asuf. The widow and the mother of Shujah Dowlah claimed a large portion of the latter's treasure. As Oudh was a tributary of the East India Company, these claims came before the Council. Contrary to Hastings' advice, and in spite of the fact that the treasure in question did not belong personally to Shujah but was State property, Francis's majority on the Council upheld the Begums' appeal. Consequently Asuf urged that his impoverished condition made impossible the payment of the customary tribute to the Company. The upshot was that in 1781, when the war against Hyder Ali was straining Hastings' resources to their utmost limit, Hastings agreed to help the Nabob to recover the treasure on condition that the subsidy payments were renewed. Finally, after pressure had been brought to bear upon the stewards of the Begums, the latter disgorged their wealth and both Asuf and Hastings were satisfied. Accounts of the nature and degree of the required "pressure" vary considerably. Hastings' share in any blame would appear to consist not in any act for which he was directly responsible but in giving to the Nabob authority to use methods which, though legitimate in native eyes, were contrary to the standards of white men. Yet once more, though circumstances may never justify a wrong action, Hastings could point to the financial necessity of the moment as presenting a keen temptation to employ upon natives methods which they themselves would not condemn in others.

Hyder Ali.

Though the flaws in the Regulating Act made possible the chief perplexities of Hastings' life, the serious danger to British power in India came from another direction. As soon as the French intervened in 1778 in the War of

American Independence, they found an able ally in Hyder Ali who had been an officer in the army of the ruler of Mysore but had won for himself a position of such power that he had seized the throne from his master and himself ruled as "Sultan" of Mysore. Hyder, though unable even to write, displayed military abilities of a quality amounting to genius: he trained and led native armies in a fashion that made him invincible against his neighbours. This was the man with whom the French allied and, instigated by them, in 1780 he suddenly marched an army of 80,000 men into the Carnatic and threatened Madras. News of the danger was brought to Hastings, who, acting with characteristic promptitude, forthwith dispatched Eyre Coote—the victor of Wandewash twenty years earlier—to take over command of the British troops. Coote was by this time a veteran, but he carried on the war with great courage in spite of illness. At *Porto Novo*, south of Pondicherri, he caught Hyder Ali, routed him soundly and so saved Madras. Nevertheless the appearance of a fleet under Suffren, the greatest French admiral of the day, and the landing of French troops, seemed to restore Hyder's fortunes. Suffren fought a series of battles against Hughes, the British admiral, but without any decisive result. In 1782 Hyder Ali died and was succeeded by his son Tippoo who, however, lacked the genius of his father. The Peace of Versailles between the French and the British in 1783 led to the end of warfare in India: Tippoo and the British agreed to the restoration of conquests by both sides. Thus Hastings had been in India long enough not only to reform the internal administration of the Company's possessions but also, for the moment at least, to secure them against danger from outside. He left Calcutta for England in February, 1785.

Impeachment of Hastings.

The service which Hastings had rendered to both the Company and the Government in India did not exempt

his administration from the searching criticism of politicians at home. Even as early as 1781 Parliament instituted an inquiry into the East India Company's government. Both of the appointed committees had reported adversely and in such strong terms that Hastings' recall seemed imminent. The Company, however, stood by him, and further action in Parliament was frustrated through the question becoming a party issue. But as soon as Hastings landed in England the case against him personally was taken up vigorously. One of the prime instigators in this action was Philip Francis, who, since his return home in 1780, had been working for the revenge against his rival which he had failed to obtain in India. After preliminary statements of charges, a formal impeachment action was begun in Westminster Hall in February, 1788. This dragged on until 1795, during which time one hundred and forty-five days altogether were occupied by the trial. The lead against Hastings was taken by the Whigs Sheridan, Burke and Fox, who brought to light details of Hastings' conduct, respecting the Rohillas, Nuncomar, the Begums of Oudh and several other similar incidents. But though the rhetoric of these famous orators attracted throngs of the most fashionable men and women of the day, their lawyers failed to sustain the charges in detail. Indeed the trial served to show the magnificent work which Hastings had accomplished in spite of enormous difficulties, and that, however unjust some of his financial extortions had been, he had never used them for his own private gain. Ultimately he was acquitted on every charge and received from the East India Company a pension on which he lived comfortably until his death in 1818.

All that history has subsequently revealed about Hastings' career has vindicated his acquittal. Though at certain points he acted in a way which cool consideration, removed from the press of the immediate circumstances, might condemn, one broad undeniable fact remains: the genius and energetic character of Warren Hastings saved

the British in India during the greatest crisis that she has yet had to face in that country. The real significance of the impeachment was not so much its reflection on the past as its result on the future ; for, though Hastings was acquitted, the very fact of the trial and of the widespread interest that it aroused were evidence of the high standard which the British people would demand of its future representatives in India.

5. PITT'S INDIA ACT, 1784

Meanwhile steps had been taken to remove the root causes of the difficulties which Hastings had experienced. We have seen already ¹ that in 1783 Fox had introduced an India Bill which had been defeated through party opposition and through fear that it would transfer to the Government sources of patronage on a dangerously large scale. In the following year Pitt introduced a measure which, though transferring much political power to the Government, left to the Company its commercial rights and privileges.

The chief features of Pitt's Act were that a Board of Control of six persons, appointed by the Crown and presided over by a member of the Cabinet, was to be responsible for the government of British India ; the Governor-General, also nominated by the Crown, was to be responsible to the Board and not to the Council in India, the latter body having henceforward only advisory powers ; the highest officials, including the commander-in-chief, were also to be appointed by the Crown, but the Company was left free to fill all its other posts.

Though the Act was clearly a compromise, it did remove the worst defects of the Regulating Act. It increased the Governor-General's powers by removing him from the authority of the Council and, because he was the nominee of the British Government, it ensured that the policy

¹ Chapter VII, section 2.

pursued in India should be that of the Government. Under the provisions of Pitt's Act India was governed for seventy-four years, that is until the Mutiny made inevitable a thorough reform of the relations between Britain and India. This was accomplished by Lord Derby's Act of 1858. Since 1784 the Governors-General have always been men of high rank and ripe political experience, and together they have formed a line of rulers distinguished for ability and for a genuine desire to govern India in the interests of her own people. Here we are concerned with only two of them, Lords Cornwallis and Wellesley.

6. CORNWALLIS AND WELLESLEY

Cornwallis, 1786-1793.

The Marquis Cornwallis was a most suitable choice as the first Governor-General under Pitt's Act. He had had a distinguished career as a soldier—he was the defender of Yorktown in 1781—and, more important still, was a man held in high esteem for the honourable character of his personal life. His aim was to use the powers which the India Act conferred upon the Governor-General in order to place the government of India upon a permanently peaceful basis. This in the main constituted his work, but before his term had expired he found himself confronted by circumstances which compelled him to take up arms.

The most important administrative achievement of Cornwallis was his *Permanent Settlement* of the land revenues dating from 1793. The actual collection of taxes was in the hands of hereditary native officials called "zemindars" who were responsible for collecting from the peasants a certain proportion of the value of their land; out of this sum the zemindars were allowed to retain a fixed amount as their own salary, the remainder of the revenue being paid over to the Government—to the Mogul under the ancient régime and to the British since

the inauguration of Clive's reforms. Warren Hastings had begun a reorganization of the revenue system, but the final stages were left to Cornwallis to carry out. Formerly the land had been periodically re-valued, but Cornwallis determined upon a settlement that should not be subject to revision but that should be permanent. As a basis for this he carried out his own survey and valuation. This occupied three years. He then converted the status of the zemindars from that of mere collecting agents to that of the owners of the land of their districts, but, as the amount the zemindars were allowed to collect and the amount they were to pay over to the Government were both fixed, their own incomes were also permanently settled. Cornwallis's idea was that this arrangement would encourage the peasants to put labour and capital into the development of their land since all extra profits would be theirs alone. The practical effect has been, however, that the Government has been unable to derive any increased revenue from the enormously increased value which the land has acquired with the passage of years. The other provinces, forewarned by this mistake in the Bengal Settlement, have made settlements subject to periodical revision.

While Cornwallis was pushing forward his land-valuation, his attention was diverted to another direction. In 1790 *Tippoo Sultan* of Mysore attacked the British-protected state of Travancore in south-west India. Cornwallis was therefore compelled to act. Tippoo's trained army and his aggressive attitude had aroused such apprehension among his fellow-princes that Cornwallis easily arranged alliances with the Nizam and the Mahrattas. Unfortunately the natives, cowards in the field and treacherous out of it, were worse than useless. During a great part of 1791 Tippoo was able to hold his own, but in February, 1792, Cornwallis was so near to capturing Seringapatam, the capital of Mysore, that Tippoo capitulated and, by the terms of peace, ceded nearly half of his territory to the

victors; some of this territory Cornwallis granted to his allies, and the rest, especially on the western seaboard, was added to the Bombay Presidency.

After the expiration of his term in 1793, Cornwallis was followed as Governor by Sir John Shore, an able Indian Civil Servant. His period of office was on the whole peaceful and undistinguished.

Wellesley, 1798-1805.

Lord Wellesley, who succeeded Shore, formed a sharp contrast to both his immediate predecessors, and his Governorship was marked by a policy of deliberate expansion of British influence in India. Apart from Wellesley's natural disposition towards such a policy, two factors combined to make aggression almost inevitable. First, the year of his landing in India was that of Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt.¹ One of the objects of that expedition was eastern conquest, and the French were known to be intriguing with the Indian princes. Hence Wellesley realized that to frustrate French designs would be to help to defeat the French elsewhere. Second, Shore's period had been peaceful partly because he had neglected to assert British superiority, the result being that British prestige in India began to suffer. If this were allowed to continue, still greater troubles would certainly accrue. For both these reasons, therefore, Wellesley felt himself bound to take a vigorous course.

One of the chief allies of the French in India was *Tippoo Sultan* of Mysore. Tippoo was urged to renounce the French but refused to do so. Thereupon in 1799 Wellesley advanced against and took Seringapatam, Tippoo himself being killed during the assault. Part of Mysore was given to the Nizam of Hyderabad, part was retained for the Company, and the rest was restored to the heir of the ancient Hindu dynasty of Mysore from whom Hyder Ali, Tippoo's father, had seized the throne, the boundaries of

¹ Chapter XII, section 4.

the state made over to the Hindus being identical with those when Hyder Ali had seized it.

In 1800 the *Nizam* made an arrangement whereby he ceded to the Company all his gains from Mysore in return for which he accepted the protection of a British army and agreed to disband the whole of his own native army. In 1801 Wellesley annexed the *Carnatic* from its Nabob and also Rohilcund and the Doab from *Oudh*.

Finally in 1802 Wellesley determined to deal decisively with the warlike *Mahrattas*. In this work he was ably assisted by his brother Sir Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington. Throughout 1803 the process of defeating one chief after another was continued. In 1804, however, the British met their match in Holkar, one of the most famous of the Mahratta chieftains. The reverses suffered at his hands brought to a head a distrust of Wellesley's policy of expansion, a distrust which for some time had been steadily growing in Britain. In 1805 Wellesley was recalled. The now-aged Cornwallis was sent out to bring to an end the policy of expansion; but the strain was too great, and in October, 1805, Cornwallis died.

The next Governor-General of outstanding distinction was Lord Hastings, but as the greater part of his period (1813-1823) falls outside our period, we must postpone treatment of his work until we deal with nineteenth-century India.


CHAPTER XI

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

I. THE REVOLUTION SUMMARIZED


THE Industrial Revolution is the name given to the process which revolutionized Britain's industrial life both in manufactures and in agriculture. In one sense that process is still continuing, but in the special sense in which the term "Industrial Revolution" is commonly used, its immediate events and direct results may be thought of as covering the century beginning about 1730.

If we are to understand the transformation which the Revolution effected in Britain, we must begin with some knowledge of the outstanding features of industry before 1730. The manufacturing methods of the early eighteenth century did not differ in any essential from those which had prevailed during several preceding centuries: manufacturing processes were carried out by hand and in the houses of the workers. To both these statements exceptions could be found: a trade like milling, for example, had developed long past the hand-mill stage and, because wind- or water-power was needed, could not be carried out in a house; also such simple machines as the spinning-wheel and the loom had been in use from very ancient times. Yet even spinning and weaving were carried on not in large factories specially constructed for the purpose but in private houses. So widespread were these methods that they are referred to under the general term the *Domestic System* of industry. The manufacturing phase of the Industrial Revolution which we are to trace in this chapter consisted of the introduction of machinery that



DENSITY OF POPULATION IN ENGLAND ABOUT 1700.

Under 40 per sq. mile
 Between 60-100 p.sq.m.
 Between 40-60 p.sq.m.
 Over 150 p.sq.m.



DENSITY OF POPULATION IN ENGLAND ABOUT 1800

- Under 40 per sq. mile.
 Between 60-100 p.sq.m.
- Between 40-60 p.sq.m.
 Between 100-150 p.sq.m.
- Over 150 p.sq.m.

needed more than man-power to drive it and hence transformed the Domestic System into the *Factory System*.

In agriculture, the Revolution produced changes no less far-reaching than in manufactures. Prior to the early eighteenth century large areas of England were cultivated in scattered holdings by primitive methods described more fully in Section 4 of this chapter. These scattered holdings consisted of strips unenclosed by hedges or walls. The new agricultural processes introduced later in the century, if they were to become effective, needed the re-arrangement of land holdings so that each land holder could have all his land together instead of in separate and scattered strips, each holding being then surrounded by hedges or something similar. The changes which the Industrial Revolution produced in agriculture are therefore summarized as a change from the *Open-Field* to the *Enclosed-Field* system.

We have now to deal separately with each of the two phases of the Revolution.

2. INVENTIONS IN MANUFACTURES

~~D~~omestic Methods.

The changes in manufactures began in the textile industry which, like other industries, had been carried on by "domestic" methods. Spinning was done by women and girls, often in the families of farmers who obtained the raw wool from their own sheep. The yarn was then woven into cloth on a hand-loom either by someone in the same family or by a whole-time weaver who worked in his own cottage. These looms were somewhat crude affairs, and every operation had to be performed by the hand or the foot. Hence, because the shuttle carrying the woof had to be passed through the warp from hand to hand of the weaver, the cloth could not be wider than was convenient for this manipulation, the usual width being three-quarters of a yard; in order to weave "broadcloth", two men had to be employed. In spite of the primitive nature of the

looms, weaving was so much faster than spinning that one weaver could use up yarn as quickly as half a dozen spinners could produce it for him, and one of the problems of the textile industry was to meet the weavers' demand for yarn.

Textile Inventions.

These processes of manufacture were alike, in all but details, for both wool and cotton. It was in the manufacture of cotton, however, that the first changes came. In 1733 John Kay of Bury invented a device called the *Flying Shuttle* whereby the shuttle was propelled from side to side mechanically. This made possible the weaving of broadcloth by one man. More important still, the speed of weaving was doubled so that now ten or a dozen spinners were needed to supply one weaver with yarn, and actually weavers were unable to obtain all the thread they needed. Hence there was urgent need for a new process to accelerate spinning, and in this, as so often elsewhere, necessity was the mother of invention. Yet a generation was to pass before the need was met: in 1764 Hargreaves, of Blackburn, devised a *spinning-jenny*—so called after his wife "Jenny"—by which one operator could spin at first eight threads, and afterwards, as the "jenny" was perfected, many more threads at the same time. This enabled the supply of yarn to balance the demand. Then in 1769 Richard Arkwright, a young Bolton barber, constructed a machine called a *water-frame*. This consisted of two pairs of revolving rollers: between these the thread was passed and—because the second pair was revolving more quickly than the first—was thereby stretched, becoming both finer and stronger in the process. Not the least significant fact about the "frame" was that water-power was used to turn the rollers. Its immediate consequence was in another direction: hitherto the cotton thread produced in England was so coarse that when a fine "cotton" fabric was desired the warp invariably consisted of linen which raised the

price considerably. Now, however, a very fine fabric could be produced of cotton throughout, thus not only cheapening the price in Britain but also allowing the manufacturers of Lancashire to compete in the world-market with the cotton fabrics from India. In 1775 Samuel Crompton, a fellow-townsmen of Arkwright, produced an arrangement which combined the processes of the spinning-jenny and of the water-frame and which, being thus a "cross" between the two was known as Crompton's mule. Meanwhile, weaving was still being done by hand, and, because one result of the improvements in spinning was an increased demand for cotton goods owing to the reduction in prices, there had been a boom in hand-loom weaving. Indeed, the prevalent conviction was that weaving was a process too complicated ever to be carried on otherwise than by hand. But in 1784 this notion received a severe shock through the erection of a power-loom by Edmund Cartwright, a Leicestershire clergyman. His first model was, however, too clumsy and imperfect to be a practical success, and several years were to pass before improvements made its adoption at all general.

Steam-Power.

The fact was that inventions in manufacturing processes had been carried as far as they could be until development took place in another direction. Hargreaves' spinning-jenny was first designed to operate only eight spindles because friction and similar mechanical hindrances made that the greatest number that could be operated successfully by hand. Yet theoretically there was no reason why the eight should not have been eighty or eight hundred or ~~even eight thousand~~. The same thing in principle might have been said about the other machines. Water-power, as we have seen, was employed as a driving-force; but water was subject to the obvious disadvantages of being limited in area—only hilly districts provided the

slope required to give a stream the necessary "power"—and of being liable to dry up in summer. In short, further progress in mechanical invention was unlikely until a more effective form of "power" was discovered and applied to industry. This came in the form of steam, its pioneer being James Watt. But Watt was by no means the first man to realize, or even to use, the possibilities of steam as a source of power. The idea had been in men's minds for centuries, and numerous experiments had been made to convert the theory into practice. In 1689 Thomas Savery had taken out a patent for an engine driven by steam and designed to pump water.. Early in the eighteenth century Newcomen carried on the principle of Savery's engine, but even Newcomen's engines suffered from serious drawbacks: they were slow in motion, clumsy in workmanship, frequently went wrong, and, being built one at a time by hand, had no standardized parts.¹

James Watt was by profession a scientific instrument-maker of Glasgow and, having been called in one day to inspect a Newcomen engine which refused to work, he was struck by its wastefulness. His inventive mind began to work around the subject and, after many experiments and some partial success, by 1776—the year of Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* and of the American Declaration of Independence—he had designed an engine which overcame all the defects of the existing one. In 1768 Watt had gone into partnership with Matthew Boulton of Birmingham, and henceforward they worked together as an ideal combination: Boulton supplied the capital and the business acumen—without which his partner would have been a complete failure—while Watt supplied the engineering inventiveness. Having once produced an engine sound in design and efficient in operation, all that remained was to adapt it to the requirements of various

¹ For a description of Newcomen's and Watt's engines, see any popular encyclopædia or a volume of boys' magazines; e.g. *Meccano Magazine* for March–August, 1927.

industries. This was a matter of time and experiment : by 1785 spinning machines were being driven with steam-power, and by the close of the century steam-engines were to be found in every part of England.

Iron.

One of the immediate results of the introduction of machinery was a great demand for iron. Hitherto this metal had been worked by primitive methods and by hand. The only fuel that could be used for smelting—that is, for extracting metal from ore by melting—was charcoal, the result being that the forests of Britain were being used up at an alarmingly rapid rate. But soon after 1730 Abraham Darby, of Colebrookdale, discovered a method of smelting by coke. For some years this remained a family secret, but gradually the process became more common ; and by 1760 a means had been discovered of smelting by coal. As a result, what remained of British forests were saved ; and also, as coal and iron were usually found together, the iron could be conveniently worked close to the mine without the necessity of either conveying fuel to the ore or the ore to the fuel. As iron became worked with increasing efficiency and cheapness, new uses for it were continually being found : in 1779 the River Severn was spanned by the first iron bridge, and ~~in 1787 an iron canal boat was launched.~~

There was, however, a still greater result of the widespread use of machinery. The early inventions had consisted of improvements in the processes of home industries so that those industries grew more prosperous than ever. But when the new machines began to be driven by steam-power, the “domestic system” was doomed for two reasons : first, steam-engines could not be fitted up in cottages and, second, by their use spinning and weaving could be conducted on a vaster scale and more economically than by hand methods. To house the new machines and their driving-engines, factories were necessary. These were

built for the most part in the neighbourhood of coal-mines, because to transport raw materials to the coal was cheaper than to transport coal to the raw materials; that is, the factories were built chiefly in the north of England. Around them houses were built quickly for the workers who had migrated to the district. Thus small villages often grew, in the course of a few years or even months, into large manufacturing towns cursed with all the evils of insanitary dwellings crowded together without any comprehensive plan. To this aspect of the subject we shall return in our survey of the general results of the Industrial Revolution.

3. IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS

Though manufacturers tried in their own interest to reduce the carriage of fuel as much as possible, a very considerable increase of transport was caused by the expansion of industry: stone, bricks and timber were required for the factories and houses; machinery and raw materials had to be conveyed to the factories; manufactured articles had to be dispatched throughout Britain and to the ports of shipment. Moreover, passenger traffic increased proportionately to that of goods.

Roads.

The only existing means of communication whereby the new transport demands could be met were the roads, which then were reputed to be the worst in western Europe. Under a statute of 1555 each parish was responsible for maintaining its own roads and bridges, but most parishes did only the minimum of work required: repairs either were carried out perfunctorily or were neglected altogether. During the eighteenth century something had been done to remedy the worst of these conditions by Turnpike Acts which were private Acts of Parliament empowering particular landowners or other local persons or bodies to

maintain specified roads and to levy tolls, according to an approved schedule, upon those who used the roads in question. This seemed to promise some real improvement, and as some twenty thousand miles of roads ultimately came under turnpike authorities, the highways were certainly kept in better repair than formerly. The Turnpike Acts, however, touched only a part of the problem: first, their provisions did not usually apply to any but the high roads, and hence the roads commonly used by large numbers of the population remained unimproved; second, nothing had been done to tackle the root of the difficulty, namely, how to build a road that would stand heavy traffic. The only method of repairing known to even turnpike authorities was to fill up holes with brick-ends and the like and to allow these to be trodden in by the traffic using the roads. Roads thus treated proved quite inadequate to meet the demands of the ever-increasing traffic which the Industrial Revolution was sending upon them. Arthur Young, the notable agricultural authority of the eighteenth century, records how wagons, on a road into Tilbury, became stuck so fast in the mire that the only course was to wait until several of them were similarly fixed and then to use their combined teams of thirty or forty horses in order to drag them out one at a time. Similarly he states that on the turnpike road between Preston and Wigan there were ruts four feet deep. Indeed, during the winter months, the only way of sending goods by road was on pack-horses, a method altogether inadequate to the growing needs of trade.

Then, in the opening years of the nineteenth century, a change for the better set in. Telford and Macadam began to practise road-building on a scientific system: they carried off the surface of the tracks then in existence, put in a foundation of large stones and gradually built up to a fine surface. In time, as this new method of building became generally adopted, the state of the roads underwent definite improvement.

Canals.

In the meantime, however, the pressure upon the roads had caused relief to be found in another direction. The lead was given by the Duke of Bridgewater who owned some coal-mines at Worsley, seven miles out of Manchester. Yet, though the distance was so short the cost of transport was so high that the price was double in the town what it was at the pit-head. The Duke therefore determined to build a canal, and he engaged as his engineer James Brindley who, though quite uneducated in the narrow sense of the term, was gifted with such natural resourcefulness and determination that he finally overcame all obstacles and between 1759 and 1761 the canal was brought to a triumphant conclusion. The result was a great outburst of canal-building throughout industrial England, and Brindley himself constructed or planned over three hundred and fifty miles of canals. Before long the chief rivers of the country—Thames, Severn, Mersey and Trent—were interconnected by a network of waterways without which the unprecedented expansion of industry and commerce would have been impossible.

Early Railways.

The beginning of railways took place at a date later than that covered by this volume, but, as they were only a further development of the process we have been following, this is a convenient point at which to summarize their early stages. The particular form taken by railways as we know them to-day was the result of much experiment and experience. Railways of a crude kind had been in use during the early part of the eighteenth century: they consisted of wagons running along wooden rails and drawn by men or by horses. Such primitive railways were naturally of limited use, and short lengths of them only were employed for the haulage of heavy goods, more especially of coal from the pithead to canals and the like. During the second half of the century iron rails were intro-

duced and also flanged wheels so that the wagons kept more surely to the track. But in transport as in the textile industry no great advance was possible until means were found for the application of a new system of "power". Experience gained in the driving of manufacturing machinery showed clearly that the desired power would be found in steam.

The colliery where locomotive history was to be made was that at Wylam, near Newcastle. It was there that *George Stephenson* was born in 1781. His father was in charge of the pumping-engine and hence the boy was familiar with engines from his earliest years. Though, like Brindley, he was quite uneducated in the ordinary sense, Stephenson showed a natural aptitude amounting to genius for dealing with engines. Along with another engineer, in 1814 he constructed "Puffing Billy" which was a locomotive that would haul trucks but was too wasteful to be a practical success. Persevering experiments gradually cured the most serious defects in design. In 1821 a line between Stockton and Darlington was begun, the purpose of its designers being to use the track for horse-haulage; but under Stephenson's persuasion the project was changed, and in 1825 the operation of the railway was opened by a locomotive engine driven personally by George Stephenson. This railway was so successful that a more ambitious scheme was next attempted in the shape of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway which was opened in 1830. Stephenson's engine, "The Rocket", had won the test for the type of engine to be used on the new railway, having developed a speed of thirty-five miles per hour. Unfortunately the opening ceremony was spoiled by a sad accident: Huskisson, a former President of the Board of Trade, miscalculating the speed of "The Rocket", was knocked down and fatally injured. After 1830 there was a phenomenal development of railway building, and by the middle of the nineteenth century most of Britain was covered by a network of railways.

Similar progress was made in water-transport. Steam-driven vessels had been in use for some time on lakes and rivers, particularly in America and on the River Clyde. In 1838 a great stride in steamboat development was taken by the passage of the "Great Western" from Bristol to New York in fourteen days.

INVENTIONS IN AGRICULTURE

Open-Field System.

Meanwhile equally epoch-making inventions were taking place in agriculture. As our preliminary summary indicated, over large areas of England land was held and cultivated on the "open-field" system which was only a modification of the method prevailing throughout the Middle Ages. The arable land of a village was divided into three large fields in which the proprietors had their holdings scattered about in acre or half-acre strips, some proprietors having a large number and others a small number of those strips. The strips were marked by boundary stones or posts. Cultivation was carried on solely according to the methods traditional to each manor from which no individual tenant ever departed. A three-fold rotation of crops was universal, each field bearing wheat one year, barley the next year and lying fallow the third year, so that for any particular year only two-thirds of the arable land was under cultivation. Each farming operation—such as ploughing and sowing—was performed at one time by all the holders. When the crops began to push through the soil, temporary fences to keep off marauding cattle were erected around the two fields being cultivated in that particular season. In the autumn after the crops were gathered, the fences were removed and the cattle were allowed to graze on the stubble. Around the cultivated fields were common meadowland where the peasants could graze their cattle, and woodland where they could cut fuel.

Disadvantages of Open-Field.

Under this system the cultivators were tolerably well-off : though high profits were impossible, serious destitution was uncommon, for almost every member of a family was able to contribute towards the common purse something from the fields, meadows or woods, and unemployment was rare. Moreover, in most homes the income derived from the land could be supplemented by spinning or weaving. In short, the accepted economic standard of life was so modest that it was attained without great difficulty.

A wider view, however, reveals fatal flaws in the system. That one field in three should be uncultivated every year was terribly wasteful of land, and that a man's strips should be scattered without method was equally wasteful of time and efficiency. But the most serious evil was that the methods followed by any individual holder were so unalterably fixed that no matter what advantages were to be derived from newer methods such methods could not be adopted without the active consent of the rest of the villagers—a condition in practice impossible of fulfilment. Hence, when during the eighteenth century more scientific methods of agriculture began to be known, either these could not be applied or else the old system had to be abandoned. In order to understand the position more clearly we must examine the nature of the new agrarian knowledge.

New Methods.

The first step towards a more scientific method of agriculture was taken by *Jethro Tull*, who experimented with various soils, crops and modes of cultivation and who in 1733—the year of Kay's "Flying Shuttle"—published his conclusions in his book *Horse-Hoeing Husbandry*. The basis of Tull's teaching was that the roots of plants obtained full nourishment only when the soil around them was well broken up. This could be effected only by hoeing : hence

Concordia
Concordia

the title of his book. But if a horse-hoe was to be put on a field without damaging the crop, the seed must be sown otherwise than by the broadcast method then universally employed. Tull therefore invented a drill so that the seed could be sown in lines, a suitable distance apart, straight across the field.

The next notable contribution to agriculture was made by *Viscount Townshend*, who, after retiring in 1730 from the Secretaryship of State in Walpole's Ministry, devoted himself to farming. Adopting Tull's principles, he made investigations on his own account and finally advocated a fourfold rotation of crops which might run as follows: wheat, turnips (or some similar crop), barley, clover. This plan had the obvious advantages that no plot of land ever bore cereals in two consecutive years, that the fallow-land was abolished, and that the roots provided food for cattle. The last-named advantage was to cause a revolution in itself. Hitherto, as we have seen, the village cattle had been turned out to graze on the stubble and any other form of vegetation they might chance to find. Such a method produced animals that were mainly skin and bone, and it also rendered selective breeding impossible. The new roots, however, provided winter food so that cattle could be fed in the stable.

These results were utilized by *Robert Bakewell*, of Dishley, in Leicestershire, who experimented in the breeding of cattle and, more particularly, of sheep. The latter had hitherto been reared primarily for their wool but Bakewell succeeded in producing a breed—the “*Leicesters*”—which bore not only rich fleeces but also served for food. As a result of the adoption of Bakewell's principles, the condition of English cattle and sheep improved rapidly and to a degree almost incredible: records at Smithfield market show conclusively that in 1795 the average weight of every class of animal—sheep, lambs, beeves and calves—was between two and a half and three times what it had been in 1710.

The spread of the new methods both in tillage and in stock-rearing was due largely to *Arthur Young*, who, though personally unsuccessful as a farmer, had most enlightened views on the subject, travelled incessantly through Britain and even France comparing various methods in vogue, and became Secretary to the Board of Agriculture which Pitt had inaugurated, and, wherever he went, advocated the application of scientific agriculture.

Enclosures.¹

To this application, the open-field system of land-holding and cultivation, wherever it prevailed, presented an insuperable obstacle. In an open-field village no single individual could introduce the new methods. For example, the accepted three-field division of land made impossible the adoption of a fourfold rotation of crops; also, while all the cattle of the village roamed together, no individual owner could improve the breed of his own stock. In short, if the new knowledge was to be applied, the open-field system must be swept away and must be replaced by a system in which each landowner could have all his land in a solid block instead of in scattered strips, and around which he could put permanent fences of hedges or walls. He would then be able to adopt as much or as little of the new agriculture as he chose. Yet each individual had the right—based either on custom or on documents—to his particular plots, and unless *all* the holders in a village agreed to a re/ tment of the land, nothing could be done unless / ment passed an Act overriding existing rights. In / stances mutual agreement was attained; in others the / d of the manor was able to exert pressure of various kin / —such as raising rents—to induce tenants to leave their holdings which he then incorporated with

¹ For a fuller account of Enclosures and their results, see J. L. and B. Hammonds' *The Village Labourer*, Chapters III-X, to which the present writer's indebtedness is obvious and is gratefully acknowledged.

his own estates ; but in the great majority of instances an Enclosure Act had to be obtained.

The process towards an Act was begun by a Petition which Parliament demanded should be supported by the owners of four-fifths of the land affected. This in practice often meant that one or two men might be able to carry their desires against those of all the rest of the villagers, and Parliament therefore later insisted that due notice should be given locally when a petition was to be presented and that commissioners should be sent to see that the re-allotment was carried out impartially.

Results of Enclosures.

At this point one question inevitably presents itself, namely, if the new methods were really advantageous, why did anyone oppose their adoption ? The answer in general terms is that to reap the advantages of the new methods the latter had to be practised on a large scale so that, whereas a wealthy landowner would gain materially, a poor one would certainly lose by their introduction. A few details will illustrate this generalization. An Enclosure Act cost money and the expenses of the Bill had to be defrayed by the owners affected, as had also the cost of surveying and re-dividing the land. Further, the re-allotted land had to be permanently fenced ; this too was expensive, and a simple calculation will show that the smaller the holding, the higher the cost of fencing relative to the area held. Indeed, so heavy were the initial costs that often a small farmer found all his capital exhausted by the time the process was complete. Consequently he had nothing left whereby to put the new methods into effect : he could not afford to improve his stock, or marl and drain his land, or buy necessary implements. His only course was to sell his holding to a richer neighbour who could work it at a profit ; and the richer neighbour, knowing that the poor man was compelled by circumstances to sell, could offer almost any low price he chose.

Moreover, a villager who had held only a very few strips and who, on their re-allotment, was given an equivalent area in one compact holding, found that the latter was too small to support him and his family. He too would almost certainly be compelled to sell. Under the former system such a man had contrived to live on the produce of his few strips because he had also the right to use the common land for pasturing any animals or geese he might possess. When the village-lands were re-allotted, this common land was included with the arable fields, so that each holder obtained a proportion of it in addition to the area equivalent to that of his strips; but the small portion each individual thus received was no adequate compensation to a poor man for the loss of his common-land rights. Also, those villagers who held no land, lost their common-land rights without receiving any compensation at all.

Such results explain sufficiently why large numbers of villagers were bitterly opposed to enclosure. Yet they were powerless to prevent it. They were ignorant of the legal methods whereby Parliament might be petitioned to re-consider the conditions in any particular district; they were too poor to carry forward such a petition even if they knew how; and they would stand but little chance of success even if these obstacles were overcome, for Parliament represented almost exclusively the landowners and their interests.

The process of enclosure therefore went on unhindered, and between the years 1760 and 1800 Parliament passed some two thousand Acts authorizing the enclosure of over three million acres of land. In 1801 a General Enclosure Act rendered private Acts unnecessary. Thus by the opening of the nineteenth century the face of the English country-side had undergone a transformation; but the change in the lives of the masses of the people was no less than that on the outward appearance of the land. We therefore conclude our survey of the industrial Revolution

by reviewing the general effects both of its manufacturing and of its agricultural phases.

5. RESULTS OF THE REVOLUTION

Both phases of the Industrial Revolution had similar general results: the changes in manufactures and in agriculture entailed severe immediate hardship upon the workers but produced ultimately a vast expansion of trade and an improvement in the standard of living.

Unemployment.

The introduction of machinery which took the place of hand-labour inevitably caused widespread unemployment and consequent distress. Allied with unemployment was the hardly less evil of low wages earned by—or rather, paid to—those who were employed; because the large numbers of applicants for each job enabled the masters to fix rates of pay at extremely low levels and almost without consideration for what we are accustomed to call a “living wage”. An indirect result was that tiny children were sent by their parents into factories in order to earn at least a little to supplement the family income. These were evils which might be partially alleviated at once but which only time could cure thoroughly.

Expansion of Trade.

To some extent the cause of the evils itself effected their relief in the following ways. First, the new machinery had to be manufactured, and thus engineering arose as a fresh industry ever-expanding to meet the growing needs of various branches of manufactures and absorbing increasing numbers of unemployed people. Second, the cheapening of goods meant an increased demand for goods and therefore a great expansion in the volume of trade generally which was thus able to employ large numbers of men not only in the actual manufacturing processes but

also in many other incidental directions such as transport, clerical work and commercial travelling. This increased demand for goods was by no means limited to Britain herself: that the Revolution occurred first in this country gave to Britain something like a half-century's start ahead of other nations who therefore became her customers on a vast scale. The third result follows from the second, namely, that Britain became enormously wealthy relative to what she had been previously and to what the Continental countries then were. This is one of the chief explanations of Britain's ability to sustain the long struggle against Napoleon and to subsidize her allies. Further, the fostering of British trade became, in the eyes of the ruling classes, a fetish with which nothing must be allowed to interfere. Hence the popularity of the *laissez-faire* theory following the publication of Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*.¹

New Towns.

Unfortunately the rapid development of manufactures produced conditions of working and living highly injurious to large numbers of those concerned. We have seen already that the use of steam-power necessitated factories. Most of these were erected solely to house machines, that is, without any consideration for the people who were to work in them: the air space was small, ventilation was often almost non-existent, the position for working was cramped, and hardly any attempt was made to guard dangerous moving parts of machinery, so that terrible accidents were only too common. Evidence of these evil conditions of working is afforded by Parliament's attempts to remedy them. The first Factory Act was passed in 1802 and, applying only to cotton and wool mills, enacted, among other things, that factories were to be properly ventilated and to be whitewashed at least once a year—which seems to justify the deduction that previously

¹ Chapter VII, section 3.

they had not been properly ventilated or whitewashed every year. No serious attempt, however, was made to enforce these provisions and the Act remained a dead letter. Not until the reformed Parliament of 1832 was the condition of the factories really dealt with, the first effective Factory Act being that of 1833.

A similar story has to be told of the factory-workers' houses. The new mushroom-towns which sprang up around the factories were allowed to take their own shape without regard to either the health of the existing generation or the needs of future ones. Intense overcrowding became common, and the later nineteenth and the twentieth centuries have reaped the result in the form of slums and all their attendant problems. Closely connected with the growth of towns was the change in the distribution of the people throughout England. The period of the industrial Revolution was a period also of rapid growth of the population. To what extent the two are related as cause and effect is not easy to determine.¹ Be this as it may, the essential fact is that the eighteenth century was marked by a great increase in population and that, because of the position of new industrial centres, the weight of that population shifted from south to north. Some idea of this change is conveyed by the accompanying population-maps.

Parliamentary Reform.

A more indirect result of the industrial development was its political reaction. Hitherto England had been predominately an agricultural country, and the great mass of the population had been rural as distinct from urban. Even those who lived in the typical town of the seventeenth or early eighteenth century did so in semi-rural conditions. Hence there seemed nothing unnatural that supreme political power should be in the hands of the great land-

¹ For a summary of the arguments, see G. M. Trevelyan's *History of England*, pp. 602, 603.

owners. The industrial and the commercial interests as such had no representation in Parliament. By the close of the eighteenth century, agriculture was no longer the staple industry of the country, and the unrepresented classes began to demand political recognition. Moreover, the distribution of parliamentary seats remained as it had been for centuries before the Revolution, so that, while many tiny towns and even some villages returned two members each, the new towns remained unrepresented. These two reasons—the growing importance of the manufacturing and business interests and the rise of unrepresented towns—produced a demand for parliamentary reform which came to a head in 1830 and expressed itself in the Reform Act of 1832.

Results in Agriculture.

The immediate results of changes in agriculture have already been explained in connection with enclosures, the effect of which was the almost complete extinction of the yeoman farmer, that is of the farmer who, though not owning farms other than the one he himself worked, was not the tenant of any other man. Henceforward English rural society consisted of large landowners (or squires), tenant farmers, and labourers. Two alternative courses were open to the small independent farmer who, because of the new agricultural conditions, found himself unable to continue in his former occupation: either he migrated to a neighbouring town to work in a factory or to swell the ranks there of the unemployed, or he remained on the land as the labourer of one of his more fortunate rivals. No single change produced by the Industrial Revolution was more significant than the disappearance of the yeomen who for centuries had been regarded as the backbone of the English people.

Severe though the hardships of the enclosure movement were, the passing of the former antiquated agrarian system was essential to any improvement in agricultural methods.

The new methods undoubtedly effected a great improvement in British agriculture and allowed the production of a much larger supply of food for the people in the industrial towns. Actually, however, even the new methods were unable to keep pace with the increasing population, and Britain became definitely and permanently a food-importing country.

Poor Law.

One effect of the hardships caused by the Revolution on both town and village remains to be considered, namely, the means adopted for the relief of poverty. So desperate was the condition of masses of the people that desperate measures of alleviation seemed justified. In 1782 an Act known as *Gilbert's Act* was passed stating that able-bodied persons unable to find employment were not to be sent to workhouses, but that work must be found for them near their own homes, and, since much of the poverty was of such a kind as to be undefinable in legal terms, allowing to Justices of the Peace discretionary powers for its relief. This Act was clearly concerned only with mitigating the worst results of unemployment and made no attempt to deal with its cause. The very fact that able-bodied men could not find ordinary employment meant that most of the work which, under the 1782 Act, had to be found near their own homes was useless or even wasteful.

But a more far-reaching outcome of that Act was due to its other provision: as unemployment increased rather than decreased, the Justices fell back upon the use of their "discretionary powers". In May, 1795, the Berkshire magistrates met at Speenhamland, on the outskirts of Newbury, to fix a scale of reliefs. They drew up a table showing what they considered to be an adequate wage for a worker, this wage being made to vary according to the price of corn and the number of persons in the worker's family. Any man whose wages were below this scale was to have those wages subsidized out of the rates so as to

bring them up to the standard. This was the famous *Speenhamland System*. Soon the principle of this scale was all but universally adopted in England and in consequence is sometimes known as the "Speenhamland Act".

The humanitarian motives of the originators of the System may have been excellent, but the practical results were nothing short of disastrous. Employers, realizing that their workers would be equally well-off whether wages were high or low, paid miserably small pittances which were supplemented out of the rates. Inevitably rates rose by leaps and bounds, so that wealthy employers became still richer and richer at the expense of their poorer neighbours. More serious still, large masses of the population grew accustomed to existing on pauper relief; indeed, so long did the method continue that a whole generation was born into and grew up in a condition of pauperism, having known no other. The effects upon the economic state of the nation as a whole and upon the moral state of the section directly affected, were certain to be in the highest degree evil. The truth was that the unprecedented nature and scale of unemployment so completely bewildered the politicians of the day that to cope with it on any sound comprehensive principle was beyond their powers. Not until 1834 did a new Poor Law Act review the whole situation. That measure falls outside the period of this volume. Here we may note that relief of able-bodied persons outside workhouses was to cease: henceforward anyone applying for relief was to be sent to a workhouse—where conditions were purposely made unpleasant—and anyone refusing this was to be ineligible for help at all. This application of the "workhouse test" entailed much hardship upon the section of the population that had become accustomed to state-relief, but only by such surgical treatment could moral and economic health be restored to the body of the nation.

7.

CHAPTER XII

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR

I. FRANCE AND THE REVOLUTION

WHILE the changes related in the previous chapter were taking place in England during the closing years of the eighteenth century, on the other side of the Channel a revolution of a very different kind was being enacted. Though the events of the latter are not themselves part of our present concern, no understanding of the relations between Britain and Revolutionary France is possible without some knowledge of the causes which combined to produce the Revolution. For the French Revolution was so complex a movement that it cannot be explained by any single event or condition. Its cause is indeed to be found not in any one great motive but in the focusing together of several tendencies, some of which had been in existence for centuries while others were only the immediate occasion of the outburst.

Class Distinctions.

The most striking and perhaps the fundamental characteristic of French society lay in the inter-relationship of its various classes. The nobles and their families formed an exclusive, though very numerous clique, separated from the rest of the nation by an impassable barrier: they were exempt from taxation, they alone were eligible for commissions in the army, as landlords they extorted from their peasants every stroke of labour and every *sou* of dues which they spent in prodigal luxury at Court, and they were so jealous of their privileges that even the most

prosperous business man and the most cultured lawyer were kept out of their society or—if services rendered to the King made such a man a power at Court—were tolerated scornfully. For most of these features of French society an historical explanation might be found, usually in the ancient system of feudalism; that, however, did not alleviate the crushing grievances of the mass of the nation. This division of society even invaded the Church whose bishops were nobles treating their sees as lucrative sources of revenue, but whose parish priests received miserable pittance only a little better than those of the poor to whom they ministered.

The distinction between the privileged and the unprivileged orders may thus be summed up as one not of class merely but of caste. Herein lay the root explanation of the intensity of the bitterness which at last broke out in the Revolution of 1789 and which was then clearly expressed in the alignment of parties: the upper clergy and the nobles were attacked together and the common folk were led by the *bourgeoisie* (that is the business people of the towns) and by the lawyers.

Taxation.

The disabilities which the unprivileged orders had to endure were, however, not limited to social inequalities. Their most vexatious grievances were connected with taxation. Every possible possession and transaction seemed to be seized upon by the Government as an opportunity for levying a tax. Three examples may suffice as illustrations. The *taille* was a tax mainly on property, originally levied only in time of war, but long since become permanent. The *gabelle* was a tax on salt which was a government monopoly: every family was compelled to purchase each year a certain quantity of salt varying with the size of the family but always far in excess of its needs, so that the difference between the amount which the family needed and that which it had to purchase was

virtually a tax. To such straits was the Government reduced in order to find an excuse for raising money. Another form of taxation was the *corvée* whereby the peasants could be compelled to repair the main roads: for this they received no payment and, as it necessitated their absence from their fields, it also was in effect a tax. These are but typical examples of impositions too numerous to mention.

The oppressiveness of taxation was accentuated in two respects. First, the nobles, who owned about one-fifth of the land of France, were exempt from taxation because they had once rendered feudal services to the State; and the Church, which also owned another fifth, was allowed to assess the amount of its own contribution to the Treasury—a contribution which fell far below the level which the Church's wealth justified. Consequently the unprivileged part of the population had to bear not only its own just share of national expenditure but also what ought to have been the share of the privileged orders who were best able to pay. Second, the taxes were collected by the vicious and wasteful system of "farming" them out: that is to say, the collection of taxation was a monopoly granted by the Government to the farmer-general who was responsible for paying to the Exchequer a stipulated lump-sum which he collected by delegating the collection to subordinates each of whom was responsible for raising a given amount from a district in which he also had a number of agents, and so the system was continued down to the actual collectors. None of these officials was paid a salary in the ordinary sense of the term, but each paid to his superior less than he collected. At each stage in the series this process was repeated. The method had for the Treasury the advantage of simplicity, but for the actual taxpayer it had the disadvantage of extortion; for obviously the total amount paid in taxes was far in excess of that which the Government received. The general effect of the number of taxes and of the wasteful methods of their collection

was that four-fifths of the total amount earned by a peasant was paid away in taxation.

No Parliament.

The wonder is not that there was an outburst in 1789 but that the depressed orders had endured their conditions so long. The explanation seems to be that the peasants, who were the chief sufferers and who formed something like 90 per cent of the total population of France, were utterly ignorant, and for generations they and their fathers had been accustomed to none other than this traditional mode of existence in which they hopelessly acquiesced. Not until some set of circumstances served to focus their attention upon their injustices and to combine all the non-privileged classes in one common objective, was any improvement likely. This in effect was what happened in 1789. Moreover, no constitutional means existed whereby the people's grievances could be expressed or redressed. In Britain, though only a few besides land-owners had a vote for members of Parliament, Parliament was regarded as representing the whole nation, and even the unfranchised classes had an unpredictable habit of influencing that Assembly at crises when they were deeply moved.¹ France had no such representative assembly. Its nearest approach had been the States-General, but that body had not met since 1614. Hence, if ever the people were roused to demand redress, their only method of doing so would be violent revolt. This again explains what happened in 1789.

The Philosophers.

Enlightened Frenchmen had long been aware of the anomalies and injustices which characterized their nation. During nearly a century prior to the Revolution, France had produced a wonderful group of literary giants each writing about his own particular subject but all alike

¹ Chapter IV, section 1 (last paragraph).

having one theme—"Liberty". *Montesquieu* (1689-1755), a lawyer interested in methods of government, published his *Esprit des Lois* (1748) which, analysing the forms of existing governments, concluded in favour of constitutional monarchy as exemplified in England. *Voltaire* (1694-1778) aimed his criticisms chiefly against the Church as being characterized, in his view, by superstition and bigotry. *Rousseau* (1712-1778), whose most famous work was the *Contrat Social* (1762), fulminated against the artificial bonds by which men consented to be enslaved both in society and in government. His remedy might be expressed in the one phrase, "Back to Nature". Within the same period a group of writers, known collectively as the *Économistes*, were expounding the idea that land—all land, including that of nobles—and land alone, should be taxed: such a system would, of course, have swept away the whole fabric of privilege and exemption. Each of these men had numerous disciples, but with these we have no concern: the mere mention of the chief Philosophers should have sufficed to indicate that their common theme was freedom—from an absolute monarchy, a corrupt Church, a false social standard, and a vicious economic system. We must not draw the conclusion, however, that because these doctrines had been current for nearly half a century before the Revolution, everyone in France had imbibed them and was eager to apply them to society as it then stood. The peasantry could not read and would not have understood the Philosophers' theories if these had been retailed to them. The cultured section of the population alone had become influenced by the literature of liberty; and the real importance of that literature was that, when other and more practical issues had provoked a popular revolt, the leaders found in the writings of Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, and the rest, text-books justifying the step they had already taken. We must now turn, therefore, to the causes immediately provoking the outbreak of revolution.

American Independence.

Two matters especially call for emphasis. The first of these has already been mentioned, namely, the War of American Independence¹ which provided the French people with an object-lesson on political liberty and how it might be won. But the effect of the American struggle went further than that. The French intervention in the war cost money and, as might have been predicted, enormous extraordinary expenditure by a State already bankrupt was likely to produce critical results.

Louis XVI, who had become King in 1774, was a well-meaning man genuinely anxious to do what was best for the welfare of France but very slow of wit and, even when shrewder men pointed out sound remedies for the State's maladies, always lacking the courage to put precepts into practice. In 1774—that is even before the American War—Turgot, a famous financial administrator, was called to chief office. He instituted far-reaching reforms and economies; but because these infringed the privileges of nobles, Louis yielded to the general clamour and in 1776 Turgot fell. A similar fate overtook his successor Necker, whose period of power ended in 1781. The next minister of note was Calonne (1783–1787) who, though personally gifted and attractive, was a noble typifying the prejudices of his class. He reversed the economic policies of his predecessors, tried to maintain the Government by enormous loans—which made ultimate collapse inevitable—and in 1786 had to confess failure.

Bad Harvest.

The second of the more immediate events tending to revolution was a bad harvest. While the King and his ministers were trying to devise expedients for staving off bankruptcy, events over which they had no control were taking place to defeat their efforts. The harvest of 1788

¹ Chapter VIII, section 4.

was ruined by drought, followed by hail, and, to make matters worse, the winter of 1788-1789 was exceptionally severe. The peasants, who had no reserves upon which to draw in times of special need, were faced with famine. By hundreds they began to drift into Paris—and other large towns—where they seemed to hope that something might be done for them. Hence there was a starving crowd of idle folk in Paris at the very time when the gathering of the people's representatives—as related in the next paragraph—was focusing general attention upon the ills of France. Such a situation was not likely to be conducive to peace or good order in the capital.

Opening Events.

Demands for the meeting of the *States-General* had for some time been growing louder and more widespread, and at last, after many delays, a States-General actually met at Versailles in May, 1789. Upon this body all France centred its hopes for the ushering-in of a new order. Yet in this, as in everything else, the King and his ministers showed such incompetence as to lose the good that the summoning of the States-General might have gained them: no provision had been made for the conduct of business, and friction between the three houses—nobles, clergy and Third Estate—inevitably resulted. Finally on 17th June the Third Estate declared that, as the representatives of the great majority of the people, it had the right to speak for all, and it therefore called itself the "National Assembly".

Following upon this step the situation rapidly developed. On 14th July the Paris mob, searching for firearms, assaulted the *Bastille* where large stores were believed to be kept. The Bastille, once a fortress, was then in use as a prison and was far too strong to be captured by a mob: but the governor seems to have taken fright and to have capitulated. The fall of the Bastille did not in itself bring any benefit to Paris. The significance of the

event was symbolical rather than actual: the building had typified the old order of things and its fall seemed like a portent of change.

On 4th August the National Assembly, led by a noble, resolved on the *abolition of feudal privileges* and thus swept away at a stroke most of the peasants' irksome disabilities which had been among the root causes of pre-revolutionary discontent.

These political events had, however, done nothing to relieve the starvation in Paris, and on 5th and 6th October there took place the *March of the Women* of the city to Versailles to bring back the King and Queen in the pathetically confident belief that if the King knew of the people's sufferings something would be done for their relief. The women were joined by a mob, and, having broken into the palace, they compelled the King, the Queen and the Dauphin to return to Paris where for the short remainder of their lives they continued virtually prisoners.

That this was their position was shown conclusively when, in June, 1791, the royal family fled by night and made for the eastern frontier but was caught at *Varennes* and brought back to Paris. The real object of the ill-fated flight had been that the King should join the French nobles who, at the outbreak of the Revolution, had fled into Germany where they carried on negotiations with the European Powers with the object of securing intervention on behalf of the monarchy. The attempted flight of the King to these nobles—known as the *émigrés*—thus stamped him in the eyes of the people as the enemy of France and was one of the chief causes of the execution of Louis (January, 1793).

2. ATTITUDE OF BRITAIN

Whigs.

It is now time to consider the attitude of the British people and Government towards events across the Channel.

The first reaction was one of almost entire sympathy towards the movement as being a struggle for freedom. The Whigs especially, led by Fox, were quick to see a parallel with their own "Glorious Revolution" of a century earlier, and they looked for the evolution in France of a constitution similar to that then achieved in England. Even Pitt, though a Tory, was at least mildly favourable to the Revolution, not, it must be confessed, for the same reason as that of the Whigs but because he believed that the Revolution would weaken Britain's traditional enemy.

Burke.

The most famous of the Whigs, however, differed entirely from this attitude. From the outset of the Revolution Burke had opposed the movement, and in October, 1791, he set out his views as a reasoned statement in *Reflections on the French Revolution*. He showed that the English and the French Revolutions were fundamentally different from each other, for whereas the former was but the carrying one stage further of political principles which were traditional among her people, the Revolution of the French involved a complete break from every political tendency of their history. He therefore concluded that the only ultimate result must be chaos, both political and economic, and that from this anarchy France would be saved by a military despot—a prophecy curiously fulfilled by Napoleon Bonaparte. Burke's book produced a profound impression upon even the bulk of the Whig party.

Moreover, his diagnosis of the true condition of France seemed to be confirmed by the events of the months following the publication of the *Reflections*. In August, 1792, the mob captured the Tuileries—the palace which had been the royal residence since October, 1789—and the King and Queen were henceforward confined to prison; in September, 1792, following the first reverses of French arms against the Austrians and Prussians, a systematic

massacre began of the "suspects" already confined in Paris prisons; on 21st September France was proclaimed a republic; and on 21st January, 1793, King Louis XVI was sent to the guillotine. France was evidently subject to a reign of violence against which all parties in Britain revolted, save a very small section of extremists who were themselves infected by revolutionary tenets.

That Britain disapproved of events within France did not itself justify interference unless the Revolution proved a menace to British interests. Actually, the French went out of their way to fan British disapproval into open hostility.

Outbreak of War.

As early as April, 1792, war had broken out between France and Austria. For this, both sides could adduce reasons or, at least, excuses. The French certainly had a grievance in the activities of the *émigrés* who had begun to flee from France as soon as the Revolution broke out and who, from the security of the German towns along the Rhine, intrigued to persuade the Powers of Europe to intervene. Their hopes were centred chiefly on Austria, for the French Queen Marie Antoinette was the daughter of the famous Maria Theresa and was thus the sister of the Emperor Joseph II (died 1790) and also of his successor Leopold II (died 1792). Thus, in addition to the antipathy which all the European rulers felt towards the Revolution because of the danger of the spread of revolutionary doctrines and practices beyond the frontiers of France, Austria was moved by something like a sense of personal responsibility for the welfare of an Austrian princess. The danger in which the French royal family stood was clearly demonstrated to the world by the failure of the flight to Varennes in June, 1791. Almost immediately after that event Austria and Prussia began to draw together in readiness for common action. Negotiations between these states and the Revolutionary Government led only

to greater bitterness. Then in March, 1792, the Emperor Leopold II died. His son Francis II, who succeeded him, was young and rash, and his succession at such a critical juncture so intensified the friction that in April, 1792, France took the initiative and declared war against Austria. So vigorously did the revolutionaries pursue the campaign that by the end of 1792 they had overrun the Austrian Netherlands and had occupied Brussels.

British Intervention.

From this point the logic of events and the rash challenge of France drew Britain inevitably into the conflict. The French occupation of the Netherlands was itself a breach of the Treaty of Utrecht and, almost more important still, was contrary to the policy which England had consistently followed for centuries, namely, that the Netherlands should not be in the hands of any Power actually or potentially hostile to Britain, especially not in those of France. As if to add to British uneasiness, the French further declared the River Scheldt open for commerce, which was a violation of another Treaty, the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). In November, 1792, the French issued the *Edict of Fraternity* which declared that the French nation would grant help and fraternity to all peoples desiring to recover their liberty! This, in effect, was an encouragement to every people to revolt and an open challenge to every government. Finally, the execution of Louis XVI in January, 1793, produced such a revulsion of feeling that the French minister in London was dismissed. The French reply was, on 1st February, to declare war against Britain and also against Holland.

3. FIRST COALITION, 1793-1797

Character of Coalition.

The challenge by France was evidently not directed exclusively against any one State but was a menace to

all the European States alike : it was, in short, the revival of the challenge of Louis XIV. Consequently Europe replied as she had done nearly a century earlier, that is, by a coalition which once more was headed by Britain. The members of the First Coalition—so called to distinguish it from the Second and Third which followed—were Austria, Prussia, Holland, Sardinia, Spain and Britain.

Unfortunately for the Coalition, it lacked the one factor which had guaranteed the success of the earlier alliance against Louis XIV, namely, a William III or a Marlborough who stood out supremely as the acknowledged representative of the European Powers and as leader of their united forces. From the outset the Allies, torn by jealousies, failed to co-operate effectively : each was intent rather upon what he hoped to gain from the war than upon defeating the common enemy. The French, on the contrary, though their early armies consisted chiefly of raw, ill-trained levies, were fired by the double purpose of vindicating the people's government and of defending their fatherland. The most stringent discipline was enforced upon private soldiers and generals alike—failure by the latter usually involved guillotining—and, most important of all, by the middle of 1793 France had discovered in Carnot a man of genius whom she henceforward allowed to control her military operations and who deservedly won the title of "organizer of victory". The story of the First Coalition is thus, briefly, that Europe failed to avail herself of the initial advantage of trained armies and large numbers, the result being that France had time to organize her own resources which she was then able to use to defeat her enemies one at a time until the Coalition ceased to exist. This process we now follow in a little more detail.

European Campaigns, 1793–1797.

The opening events of 1793 went badly for the French, who were expelled from the Austrian Netherlands. The

Allies followed up this expulsion by invading France. The latter was also torn by civil strife: in La Vendée the peasants rose against the Revolution; several of the great towns—notably Marseilles, Lyons and Bordeaux—jealous of the autocratic part Paris was playing, also rose in arms; while Toulon actually received a British fleet under Admiral Hood into its harbour. Yet such was the stimulating effect of Carnot and such the spirit of response by the nation, that by the end of 1793 the internal revolts had ceased to be dangerous and the territory of France had been cleared of invading armies.

During the following year the French resumed the offensive. They again overran the Netherlands and also extended their military occupation to the Rhine.

In 1795 definite results of French success were soon forthcoming. Holland was conquered, was reorganized as the Batavian Republic directly dependent upon France, and thus ceased to be a member of the Coalition. Prussia, whose co-operation with Austria had never been more than half-hearted, made peace, as also did Spain later in the year. Thus, before the end of 1795, three out of the six members had broken from the alliance.

1796 was the critical year of the Coalition. Carnot's plan was a triple attack into Germany: two armies were to march direct, and the third was to execute a flanking movement against Austria by way of north Italy. Actually the two main attacks failed, but were more than retrieved by the astonishing success of the third, led by Napoleon Bonaparte. The latter, by brilliant manœuvring, separated the Sardinians from the Austrians, defeated the former and compelled them not only to make peace but also to cede Savoy and Nice to France. Then he turned to deliver a series of smashing blows against the Austrians in north Italy. This occupied him until February, 1797.

All that remained in order to complete the success thus begun was the invasion of Austria. This was achieved early in 1797 by crossing the Alps. By April, Bonaparte

reached a point within eighty miles of Vienna and induced Austria to offer peace, the final terms being arranged at *Campo-Formio* in October. By the end of 1797, therefore, the First Coalition had collapsed and Britain alone of its original members remained unconquered.

Pitt and the War. ✓

The immunity of Britain from invasion and conquest was, however, due rather to her geographical position than to her military superiority. Indeed, for the general failure of the First Coalition Britain was largely responsible: she had control of the sea yet at no point in the war prior to the Treaty of Campo-Formio did she make any effective use of her navy. This neglect was due mainly to Pitt who, though gifted in finance with statesmanship amounting to genius, lacked the qualities necessary for conducting a great war.

First, during the decade preceding 1793 Pitt had been so intent upon financial economy and so confident of his ability to keep Britain out of war that both the navy and the army had been kept either below their proper numbers or inefficiently equipped and trained. Hence at the outbreak of war Britain was unprepared to play effectively the decisive part on the sea which should have been her peculiar contribution to the Coalition.

Second, when the war had begun, Pitt's judgment concerning its course was seriously at fault. He believed that the chaotic condition of France would prevent her from continuing the struggle for any length of time against nearly all Europe. He did not realize either that France was fighting as a nation with a new dauntless spirit or that her opponents were governments who were dragging their unwilling peoples into the war and were divided among themselves. Nor did he realize that French armies would reach foreign soil and hence would be supported not by France, but by the countries they were invading. It is true that Pitt's misconceptions were shared by his fellow-

ministers and by the bulk of his fellow-countrymen ; but it is also true that the essential quality of statesmanship is to see further than the average person and to plan accordingly. The result of Pitt's shortsightedness was that his financial provisions for the maintenance of the fighting services were of a piecemeal kind : always expecting that the war was about to end, he made no long-distance or comprehensive scheme for financing it. Consequently his monetary policy was wasteful and ineffective, so that during his régime the National Debt was trebled.

Third, and most serious of all, Pitt's conduct of the operations of the war itself formed as sharp a contrast to his father's conduct of the Seven Years' War as could well be imagined. Whereas Chatham, thinking in terms of the world, conceived a great comprehensive plan of campaign for the whole struggle, towards which his schemes for any particular area were made to contribute, Pitt the Younger seems never to have formed a clear idea of what should be the main objective of Britain or of her Allies, and hence the strength of the British army and navy was frittered away upon small, unrelated expeditions most of which ended in failure. In 1793, as we have seen, there were anti-revolutionary revolts throughout France, and if these had been encouraged and supported by large numbers of troops well equipped and ably led, more would have been done to crush the Revolution than all the subsidies voted to the Allies. Instead of this, a small force was sent to *Belgium* under the incompetent Duke of York who managed to take Dunkirk but was compelled to retire first to Holland in 1794 and then to England in 1795. Also in 1793 an attempt was begun to capture the French and Spanish *West Indies* because of their valuable sugar plantations : the islands were occupied, but the troops caught yellow fever and died in heaps—by 1796 the number of dead was forty thousand. Yet the conquest of these islands did not in the least affect the

war as a whole. All that was done to take advantage of the disturbances in France was to send in December, 1793, a force to *Quiberon Bay* in support of the royalists of Brittany and another to help those at *Toulon*. The former did not arrive in time to be of any use, the French royalists having left the coast a few days previously. At *Toulon*, Hood's fleet was allowed to enter the harbour, but his request for more men was ignored and the Revolutionary Government was able to reduce the town, which the British were compelled to evacuate, also in December, 1793.

The following year, 1794, saw the famous action of the *Glorious First of June*. As a result of the British fleet's activity and of bad harvests, the French were beginning to suffer from a shortage of food, and therefore, when they had news of the arrival of corn-ships from America, they sent out a strong fleet from Brest to convoy the precious provisions safely to harbour. Lord Howe, who was in command of the British Channel Fleet, brought on an action with the French fleet in mid-Atlantic. After much manœuvring on both sides, the battle took place on 1st June. The French fleet was defeated with much loss, but the corn-ships managed to elude attention during the manœuvres and the battle and to reach France, so that, as the French achieved their object they had a fair claim to winning the battle even though they lost the action.

Position of Britain, 1797.

Having thus reviewed the general features of the British conduct of the war during the First Coalition, we have now to return to the position in which Britain found herself when that Coalition collapsed. The year 1797 was to prove one of the black years of British history—perhaps comparable only to 1584, when the murder of William of Orange seemed to leave Holland (and hence England) defenceless against Spain, and to 1914. When

in 1795 France compelled Holland and Spain to withdraw from the Coalition she obtained control of the fleets of both those maritime Powers and added them to her own: the consequent threat to the security of Britain was obvious. At the same time as her integrity was jeopardized abroad, Britain found herself embarrassed at home by threatened rebellion in Ireland.¹ The sense of foreboding and uncertainty prevailing in Britain is sufficiently indicated by the price of Consols—hitherto regarded as the finest security in the world—dropping to 50 and by a run on the Bank of England, those persons who had money in its coffers being anxious to recover it before either the Government or the French seized it. In short, in 1797 Britain was isolated, and her only remaining hope was in the navy.

The Navy, 1797.

One of the objects of the Admiralty was to prevent a junction between the Spanish and the French fleets, and for that purpose a squadron was kept at Lisbon. Early in 1797 a fleet of twenty-eight Spanish ships made its appearance, and the British, led by Jervis, though only fifteen ships strong, promptly gave battle off *Cape St. Vincent*. Several of the Spanish ships were captured, and the rest were blockaded in Cadiz. Jervis—who was ably seconded by Nelson and was created Lord St. Vincent—had thus done much to counteract the practical effect of the Franco-Spanish alliance.

At this critical moment the navy seemed about to throw away more than all the security it had thus won: in April a serious mutiny broke out in the fleet. From one point of view there was nothing surprising in this action, for the conditions in which the men served were indescribably abominable. No real effort was made to obtain suitable recruits for the navy, and the two sources from which men were obtained were the prisons and the

¹ Chapter IX, section 3.

press-gang ; the food supplied was insufficient, unpalatable and not regulated with any regard to the health of the crews ; discipline was enforced by unimaginable brutalities ; the living-quarters of the men were disgustingly cramped and filthy ; and pay was never forthcoming except in a lump sum when men were discharged at the end of a campaign. The only marvel is that disturbances had not broken out long before. The mutiny of 1797 had two distinct phases : the earlier one, in the Spithead fleet, was for the redress of such genuine grievances as those indicated above ; the later one at the Nore was flagrantly revolutionary. At Spithead the signal for the mutiny was the refusal of the flagship's crew on 15th April to weigh anchor. The men's demands were formulated by a committee composed of representatives of the crews of the various ships. After a month's negotiations the Admiralty, through Lord Howe whom the men both trusted and adored, promised redress of almost every grievance. Just as peace seemed to be restored, the fleet at the Nore mutinied under the leadership of Parker, a political propagandist whose quality is sufficiently indicated by his demand that the men should elect their own officers. With this mutiny the Admiralty used a firm hand : one by one the disorderly ships were disciplined, Parker and a number of other mutineers being hanged from the yard-arm.

While the mutinies were being dealt with, Admiral Duncan was blockading the Dutch fleet in the Texel. During part of the Nore mutiny he had only two loyal ships, but knowledge of the true situation was kept from the Dutch by Duncan's continuous signals—which could be seen from the enemy's ships—to the rest of the fleet as though the latter were under his command as usual. This " bluff " succeeded so well that the Dutch fleet did not move out until the mutiny had been crushed. In October, 1797, the clash came in the *Battle of Camperdown* : the British not merely won a momentary victory but

hammered their enemies so severely that from that point the Dutch navy went out of existence.

In this way the critical year 1797 was passed: though Britain remained alone, her fleet was undefeated and she was thereby saved for the moment from the dread of invasion.

4. EGYPT AND THE SECOND COALITION

Reasons for Egyptian Expedition.

The astonishing campaign of 1796-1797 culminating in the Treaty of Campo-Formio had made Bonaparte the central military figure in France. His next move was in an unexpected direction, namely, an invasion of Egypt. For this there were several causes. Chief of all, the events of 1793-1797 had shown that though France might reduce the continent to her sway, Britain was impregnable while her fleet remained mistress of the sea; and from 1797 the supreme purpose of Bonaparte's life was to conquer Britain. Direct attack was for the moment impossible, and he therefore decided to threaten British communications with India. This move would hamper British trade—which was one of the main sources of the wealth which had been at the disposal of the Coalition—and might ultimately lead to the French occupation of the British possessions in India itself. Towards this object the occupation of Egypt was obviously a strategic move of the highest consequence. Such a campaign had for Bonaparte the added inducement of giving him a good excuse for clearing out of France whose government at the moment—the Directorate, established in October, 1795—he disliked; and the Directors were nothing loath to allow the departure of one whose genius they had begun to fear. Bonaparte's own cherished hope seems to have been that when France found herself again in danger, he would be able to return at a well-judged moment as the saviour of his country and therefore as its virtual dictator.

Events in Egypt.

Setting sail from Toulon in May, 1798, Bonaparte, with thirty-five thousand troops and a galaxy of the best officers of the day, made for Malta, of which he took possession and where he remained a week. Thence he proceeded to Egypt. He disembarked his troops at Aboukir Bay, seized Alexandria and marched towards Cairo. Egypt, though theoretically a Turkish province, was actually ruled by a warrior-race called the Mamelukes. These Bonaparte met and smashed at the *Battle of the Pyramids*, thereby becoming the master of Egypt.

Meanwhile, Nelson at the head of the British fleet had been pursuing his enemy in the Mediterranean. At first thrown off the trail by the French stay at Malta, he finally sighted their ships in *Aboukir Bay* late in the afternoon of 1st August, and immediately gave fight. The French ships were anchored in line along the coast; but Nelson, regardless of the great risk he was running on account of the sandy shoals along the Bay, took some of his ships between the French and the land, and before the action was over eleven out of the seventeen French ships had been either sunk or captured. This *Battle of the Nile* (or Aboukir Bay) shattered at a stroke Bonaparte's hopes of attaching a great eastern Empire to France and it left him stranded in Egypt and unable to carry out his intention of returning dramatically to Europe as the idol of his countrymen. The British fleet improved the situation by taking possession of Malta and Minorca, thus establishing its control of the Mediterranean.

Second Coalition, 1799-1800.

A more immediately important result was that Bonaparte's imprisonment in Egypt encouraged the European enemies of France to form another alliance against the common foe. The rashness of the Directory had intensified Europe's antipathy against France, and in 1799 Pitt

managed to form the Second Coalition, the chief members of which were Britain, Russia, Austria and Turkey (the last-named on account of the French occupation of Egypt). As usual, Britain was to pay subsidies to enable the other allies to pay their armies. From the very outset this Coalition seemed even more ill-fated than most: almost before it was formed its members began to break away.

Meanwhile, Bonaparte had been making strenuous efforts to retrieve, indirectly, the disaster of Aboukir Bay. With this object he had marched into Syria, hoping thus to maintain communications with France. The crux of the campaign was *Acre* which, though far from being a formidable fort, might if untaken be a serious menace to his communications. Bonaparte therefore laid siege to the town, but found that the Turkish defenders had been reinforced by British seamen and that the guns of the British ships, commanded by Sir Sidney Smith, were further supporting the defences of the town. Assault after assault by the French failed to carry the town, and at last Bonaparte was compelled to withdraw to Egypt apparently more utterly doomed to defeat than ever. His only hope was, somehow, to return to France, and to this the recent news—which Sir Sidney Smith had purposely allowed to reach him—of affairs in Europe became an added incentive: not only had a Second Coalition been formed, but French arms were meeting with almost universal defeat. Believing that the awaited moment had arrived, Bonaparte decided to risk a return to Europe. He deserted his army, boarded a French frigate, ran the gauntlet of British ships in the Mediterranean, had his usual luck, and landed near Toulon in October, 1799. Before the end of the year his ascendancy within France was complete, his official position being that of First Consul.

Even before his influence could be effective in the war, the tide had begun to turn. From the outset the Allies' efforts had been so disorganized that their initial successes

were little more than superficial flashes. In August, 1799, British troops were sent to the Netherlands to co-operate with a Russian contingent and with the Dutch; but, as the Dutch did nothing and the Russians arrived too late, the Duke of York—who was in command of the supposed allied expedition—did nothing and was compelled to withdraw. Also the Russians, complaining that they were not supported by the Austrians, withdrew from the war. Thus, as Turkey had never been more than a nominal ally, the only remaining members of the Coalition were Britain and Austria.

To deal with the latter was Bonaparte's immediate object. In May, 1800, he led an army by the Great St. Bernard Pass into Italy and in June met the Austrians at *Marengo* where, after a closely-fought battle, he managed to achieve a notable victory, thus gaining control of north Italy. Meanwhile, Moreau, one of the most illustrious of French generals, was advancing into the heart of Germany and in December at *Hohenlinden* he smashed another great Austrian army. His advance upon Vienna led to the *Treaty of Lunéville* of February, 1801, whereby Austria sought and obtained peace with France. The Second Coalition was thus at an end, and once again Britain stood alone against France.

5. END OF THE WAR

Armed Neutrality, 1800.

Nor was this by any means the worst of the situation so far as Britain was concerned. It will be remembered that in the crisis of the War of American Independence Britain had exerted her power on the sea so energetically that in 1780 the Armed Neutrality of the North had been formed to protect the rights of neutrals. Once more, in the crisis of the Revolutionary War, a similar cause produced a similar result. Neutrals complained that Britain included not only munitions and debatable materials such

as hemp but also foodstuffs under the definition of "contraband of war". Also, one of the customs of warfare universally recognized was the right of a belligerent to blockade its enemy's ports so as to keep out all shipping; but Britain was going further by declaring French ports to be blockaded and by holding up on the high seas and punishing neutral ships going to or from those ports even though no actual British blockade had been established. These "paper blockades" also were felt keenly as a grievance by the neutral maritime Powers. Very soon after Russia broke from the Second Coalition, Czar Paul I began to negotiate for the renewal of the 1780 League, and in December, 1800, the Armed Neutrality was again in existence, its members being Russia, Denmark and Sweden. Thus when in 1801 Bonaparte had again mastered the Continent, Britain found herself not only isolated but also faced with a hostile maritime alliance. To make matters worse, in February, 1801, Pitt resigned office owing to his difference with George III over the granting of Roman Catholic Emancipation following the Irish Act of Union¹ and was succeeded by the inept Addington.

Fortunately for Britain, by a combination of good judgment and good fortune the whole situation underwent a sudden and dramatic transformation. To this process three events especially contributed. First, an army under Abercromby had been sent to deal with the French army that Bonaparte had left in Egypt. Early in March the British forces successfully landed at Aboukir Bay. At the *Battle of Alexandria*, though Abercromby was mortally wounded, the British won a decisive victory and, during the following months, the French were steadily repulsed. Finally the French garrisons were allowed to leave Egypt and to embark for France. This removed the threat to India and so allowed the British to concentrate their energies upon the European aspects of the war.

Second, on 24th March—three days after the Battle of

¹ Chapter VII, section 3; Chapter IX, section 4.

Alexandria—*Czar Paul was assassinated.* Alexander I, who succeeded him, did not share his father's infatuation for Bonaparte and therefore came to terms with Britain. This defection of Russia, the originator of the Armed Neutrality, broke the back of that League.

The third event completed its disruption. Pitt's government, before its resignation, had arranged for vigorous naval action, and in January, 1801, had dispatched to the Baltic a fleet under Parker and Nelson. An ultimatum to Denmark, demanding her withdrawal from the Armed Neutrality, was refused, and on 1st April Nelson bombarded the Danish fleet at *Copenhagen* and, in defiance of Parker's orders to retire, continued the cannonade until the Danes capitulated. This action completed the collapse of the Armed Neutrality, and Britain showed its appreciation of Nelson's contribution to that end by appointing him to chief command and by creating him a viscount.

Treaty of Amiens, 1802.

As soon as British supremacy at sea had been thus vindicated, Addington's ministry began to negotiate for peace. Both sides had, indeed, been fought to a standstill and both were ready for the end of the war. Bonaparte, though his ambitions remained far from satiated, needed a period in which to reorganize the government of France and the territories which, adjoining France, he had virtually annexed. On 27th March, 1802, the Treaty of Amiens was finally signed. Its chief terms were that Britain should restore all her conquests except Ceylon and Trinidad (the former had been captured from Holland and the latter from Spain); that France should withdraw from Naples; and that after twelve months Britain should restore Malta to the Knights of St. John, whose Order had been disbanded by Bonaparte when he seized the island on his way to Egypt and was to be reconstituted during the intervening year.

These terms were remarkable chiefly for their omissions. France was tacitly allowed to retain her European conquests—of northern Italy, of Belgium and of the territory west of the Rhine. Thus within ten years the young Revolutionary Government of France had achieved all, and more than all, that Louis XIV had vainly striven for a lifetime to achieve—the Rhine frontier and thereby the dominance over Europe and the power from the Belgian coast to menace England. The one thing that could be safely predicted was that Europe in general, and Britain in particular, would not permanently acquiesce in this situation. Sooner or later circumstances would occur which would bind Europe together once more against the common foe, and so the struggle against the ambitions of France would be renewed. Little more than a year had elapsed before the inevitable had happened: in May, 1803, Britain was again at war with France.

CHAPTER XIII

THE NAPOLEONIC WAR, 1803-1815

I. TRAFALGAR CAMPAIGN

Reasons for Renewal of War.

THAT the Treaty of Amiens failed to secure a settled European peace was due, as the previous chapter has shown, to its neglect of the root cause of the war. In 1792 and 1793 Europe had been provoked to an anti-French alliance because of the challenge flung by the Revolutionaries to all existing governments. Yet in 1802 the possession of a Rhine frontier and of north Italy made France more dominating on the Continent than she had ever been before. Moreover, that the driving force of French politics was a military genius with insatiable ambitions meant that France would sooner or later use her newly acquired influence not peaceably but as a means to still greater aggression. The Treaty of Amiens was hardly signed before evidence of that fact began to appear.

In September, 1802, Bonaparte annexed Piedmont to France; before the end of the year he had taken advantage of political dissension in Switzerland in order to invade that country and to establish there the Helvetic Republic which, while nominally independent, was in practice under French control. Similarly, Holland, under the name of the Batavian Republic, became virtually a French Province—a position which was at least as menacing to British security as it has been ten years earlier.

The squabble immediately provoking a recurrence of war concerned Malta. In January, 1803, a French official

TRAFALGAR CAMPAIGN.



journal, the *Moniteur*, published a review of the condition of Egypt and declared that six thousand French troops would be sufficient to recover the country. The evidently implied contempt of the British troops was itself galling to British pride, but more significant still was the unavoidable conclusion that France was meditating a renewed attack upon Egypt. Hence, at the end of the twelve months stipulated in the Treaty of Amiens, Britain refused to relinquish her hold upon Malta. This step, which was a clear violation of Treaty rights, led to bitter controversy between the two governments, the upshot being that on 18th May, 1803, Britain declared war against France.

Invasion Plan.

Long before this, Bonaparte had recognized Britain as his real enemy, and immediately after hostilities were resumed he began to bend all his energies and all the resources of France towards the project of the direct invasion of these shores. At Boulogne he gathered the grand "Army of Invasion" numbering nominally one hundred thousand men for whose transport across the Channel he hoped to devise a plan. The French navy also was being improved in both its ships and its personnel. Unfortunately for Bonaparte's schemes, his fleet was divided and was confined in several harbours by British squadrons. Nelson was blockading the French Admiral Villeneuve at Toulon; Cornwallis at Brest maintained against the French Admiral Gantheaume a blockade which was unbroken between May, 1803, and the Battle of Trafalgar in October, 1805. At Rochefort was a third fleet; and at Cadiz and Ferrol were Spanish fleets which soon were to be at Bonaparte's disposal and which also were watched by British ships. The root problem of the invasion of England therefore was how the various French fleets could simultaneously break out of their harbours and then unite so as to give to Bonaparte control of the

Channel long enough to enable his army to be conveyed across.

For the solution of this problem Bonaparte evolved scheme after scheme, but they were all impracticable in various ways. The truth was that he had neither knowledge of naval strategy and conditions nor the capacity for learning from men who had. For the transport of his troops he had collected a flotilla of more than two thousand flat-bottomed rowing-boats, and during many months the men were continuously drilled in embarking and disembarking operations in which every soldier had his own appointed place and work. Yet however perfectly these manœuvres might be carried out, their object might be frustrated by high seas which would make such craft untenable, or by a single small enemy-vessel whose shots would do terrible havoc among the crowds of unprotected men and would sink boat after boat. These contingencies were the more difficult to guard against with certainty because, even with the most exact discipline, it is computed that so large an army could not all have been embarked in the boats in less than six tides, during which time a change of weather or the appearance of the enemy's men-o'-war would have wrecked the whole project. The object of all Bonaparte's plans was to secure control of the Channel long enough to avoid or overcome these contingencies.

Operations, 1805.

His final plan was that Villeneuve and Gantheaume should simultaneously break out of Toulon and Brest, should release if possible the smaller fleets, should all sail for and unite in the West Indies, and then should return to Europe strong enough to give to Bonaparte the desired supremacy in the Channel. Only part of that plan ever had a chance to mature; for Cornwallis kept so close a blockade of Brest that Gantheaume was never able to break out. However, on 30th March, 1805, Villeneuve

managed to give Nelson the slip from Toulon ; thence he sailed to Cadiz where he released the Spanish fleet—Spain having joined France in the war during the previous December—and together they made for the rendezvous in the West Indies which he reached on 14th May. Meanwhile, Nelson was picking up information as to the direction his quarry had taken : after sailing towards Egypt in search of him, he finally struck the trail and sped across the Atlantic so rapidly that he was in the West Indies only a few days later than the French. False information as to the latter's whereabouts prevented Nelson from bringing on a decisive engagement. Villeneuve had no desire for such an engagement. Moreover, if he could return to Europe in time to join Ganteaume, and so to defeat Cornwallis, they might even yet hold the Channel long enough for the invasion scheme to take effect. Hence Villeneuve set sail eastwards, with Nelson in hot pursuit. The latter had no difficulty in guessing the Frenchman's intention, and he therefore dispatched his fastest frigate which, outsailing the French fleet, gave warning to the British Admiralty of the threatened danger. A fleet was gathered under Calder who, on 22nd July, fought an indecisive action against Villeneuve, after which the French put into Corunna. Nelson had first made for Cadiz and then, not finding the French in the south, sailed north, where he joined Cornwallis and afterwards went to England and took leave for a month.

As soon as Napoleon received the news of Villeneuve's ineffective return to Europe, he recognized that the whole project of the invasion of England had collapsed. This news reached him on 20th July—though the British Admiralty, thanks to the vessel dispatched by Nelson, had known as early as 8th—and he began immediately to re-cast his plans. Though his navy had failed to defeat that of Britain, he still had an army with which he could overrun Europe. On 1st September the camp at Boulogne began definitely to be broken up and the "Army of

England " became the " Grand Army ". Before we follow its career we have to complete the story of events at sea.

Battle of Trafalgar, October, 1805.

On 15th September Nelson took ship again and sailed southwards. Villeneuve had left Corunna and had entered Cadiz, where he lay with a powerful Franco-Spanish fleet. The only British force in the neighbourhood was a squadron of four ships under Collingwood. Nelson, therefore, hoping to bring on an engagement, made for Cadiz, where he took over the command from Collingwood. Villeneuve was induced to leave the harbour by the knowledge that Napoleon, bitterly angry at the failure to secure command of the Channel, was about to appoint another admiral in his place: in such circumstances a defeat at sea could hardly make things worse, and a success might be in time to save his reputation. Accordingly, on 21st October Villeneuve sailed out of Cadiz, and the ensuing engagement took place near by off Cape Trafalgar.


The French and Spanish ships numbered thirty-three, against which Nelson could muster twenty-seven. His plan of attack, which had long been in his mind, was an elaboration of that adopted by Rodney at " The Saints ". Instead, however, of breaking the enemy's line at one point he broke it at two, Collingwood, in the *Royal Sovereign*, leading one column of British ships and Nelson, in the *Victory*, leading the other. At midday Collingwood broke into the rear, and half an hour later Nelson attacked the centre; thus the van of Villeneuve's fleet—consisting of about five ships—was isolated and unable to strike a blow while the centre and rear were being raked and sunk by British gunfire. At three o'clock in the afternoon, nineteen out of the thirty-three French and Spanish ships had been captured; but part of the price paid for this result was the death of Nelson, who was picked out by a sharp shooter in the rigging of a French ship and lingered just long enough to hear of the victory.

Third Coalition.

Though the full significance of Trafalgar became apparent only in the years that followed, its immediate effect was unmistakable: French sea-power had for the moment ceased to exist and Napoleon must find a new way of attacking his only undefeated enemy. Meanwhile, the incompetence of Addington as an organizer for war had become clear to everyone, and in May, 1804, Pitt returned to office. From that moment Pitt devoted every ounce of his energy and every instant of his time to the conduct of the war. Within little more than eighteen months the strain to mind and body had become so intense that his constitution gave way completely. Upon assuming office his first step had been to negotiate for the formation of yet another Coalition--the Third--of European states against Napoleon: its members were Russia, Austria, Sweden, and Britain. This was the Coalition which, after September, 1805 Napoleon set himself to smash, his object being to conquer Europe in order to use his supremacy on the Continent for the reduction of Britain. In formulating his plans he had the advantage of being the master not only of the French army but also of the State: in the same month as Pitt returned to office, Napoleon had accepted the title of Emperor and henceforward he was able to use the resources of the nation for the furtherance of his plans.

Napoleon's campaign in Europe during the twelve months following Trafalgar is one of the most amazing in modern history. After leaving Boulogne he struck straight into the heart of Germany, to which move the Austrians replied by sending an army westwards; but their general was slow and unimaginative and awoke to find himself surrounded at *Ulm* on the Danube. There without striking a blow, he was compelled to surrender with all his army on 20th October, 1805, that is, the day before Trafalgar and less than two months after Napoleon had left Boulogne. Thence Napoleon moved eastwards,

occupied Vienna, and then turned northwards to meet a combined force of Russians and Austrians. The decisive action took place on 2nd December at *Austerlitz*: the Allies were routed and scattered; the Russians retreated homewards and the Austrians were forced to make peace. This was the end of the Third Coalition. Its collapse hastened the death of its founder, Pitt, who passed in January, 1806. We have seen reason to criticize Pitt's conduct of the war; but the fact remained that no one could fill the gap which he had left or could keep together a European alliance against the common enemy. Pitt's dying words were: "My country! How I leave my country." The gloom which these words expressed was shared by the whole nation. But there was worse to come. Since 1795 Prussia had remained consistently neutral, and hence after *Austerlitz* she was the only European state of any consequence not in the power of Napoleon. The latter therefore played with her until her King, Frederick William III, was so incensed that on 1st October, 1806, he declared war against France, ordered Napoleon to retire west of the Rhine and sent an army to compel obedience to this injunction. At *Jena* (14th October, 1806) that army was caught by Napoleon and smashed. The French followed up their victory so vigorously that within a fortnight they had not only overrun Prussia but had entered Berlin itself as conquerors. Once again Britain remained alone unsubdued, and Napoleon therefore determined to use his mastery of the Continent in yet another attempt to bring about her downfall. This attempt is appropriately known as "The Continental System".



THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM

Berlin Decrees.

The foundation of the Continental System was the "Berlin Decrees" of November, 1806, so called because

the first of the Decrees was issued by Napoleon after his entry into the Prussian capital. All trade was forbidden between British ports and the ports of France or of states dependent upon France; any ship violating this order was to be liable to confiscation; and British goods wherever found were to be seized. The meaning of these edicts was unmistakable: on the one hand, Great Britain was blockaded and, on the other, the Continent was sealed up against British goods. If these arrangements could be enforced, Britain would be starved and her trade would be crippled; this would mean that the wealth whereby Britain was enabled to continue the war and to subsidize her Allies would be sapped at its source. In this way Napoleon hoped to do indirectly what hitherto he had been unable to do directly, namely to compel Britain into submission.

The British reply was not long in appearing. *Orders in Council*, issued in January, 1807, announced that all ships trading with French ports or with any other port from which British ships were excluded would be liable to seizure. Thus the stage was set for the final acts of the struggle. The questions that would decide the issue of that struggle were, first, whether the Continent needed British goods more or less than Britain needed Continental goods; and, second, which of the two could make its blockade of the other the more effective. The sequel will show that in both respects the advantage was with Britain: the Industrial Revolution had made the Continent dependent upon British manufactured goods and the British navy assured to her the supremacy of the sea.

From the outset it was clear that Napoleon's Continental System must be either a complete success or an equally complete failure. Napoleon's aim was to seal up the Continent so as to create a vacuum there of British goods, and the slightest break in that vacuum would mean its destruction; for if, anywhere on the Continent, there was even one loophole for trade with Britain, goods from the

latter could thereby be distributed in all directions. In two ways especially Napoleon set about making his control of Europe more rigorous and more comprehensive. First, wherever he could he enthroned relatives or other reliable individuals as the rulers of states which thus became dependent upon France: already his brother Joseph had been made King of Naples, while for a second brother, Louis, the Kingdom of Holland had been evolved from the Batavian Republic, and in 1807 another brother, Jerome, was given the Kingdom of Westphalia which consisted of several north German states and parts of others. Similarly, several of his marshals were rewarded with various states, mostly in Germany. Second, he turned his attention to those areas over which hitherto he had no effective control: of these there were three, namely, Russia, the Scandinavian states of Denmark and Sweden, and Spain and Portugal.

Peace of Tilsit, July, 1807.

It was to Russia that Napoleon first looked. After Austerlitz the Russian contingents retired homewards, but Russia had never formally submitted. After the issue of the Berlin Decrees the adhesion of Russia to the Continental System became imperative, and early in 1807 Napoleon advanced eastwards across the Vistula. In February he met the Russians at *Eylau* where, however, he failed to secure any definite result. But at *Friedland*, in June, he won a complete victory and then proceeded to put his mastery of Russia into tangible form.

The Czar, Alexander I, with whom Napoleon had to deal, was a man of unstable mind whose action in any given circumstance could never be predicted with certainty. He had conceived a boundless admiration for the genius of Napoleon and, though the latter had soundly beaten the Russian army, Alexander readily accepted the idea of an alliance with him. Napoleon, to suit his own purposes, was perfectly willing to humour the Czar by flattery and,

in June, 1807, the two Emperors met in isolated and secret conclave on a raft moored in the middle of the Niemen. As a result of the agreement then reached, the *Treaty of Tilsit* was framed. By its terms, Alexander recognized the new European states created and controlled by Napoleon, and he undertook not only to adhere to the Continental System but also to persuade Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal to conform to it also.


Copenhagen, September, 1807.

The last clause was intended to be a secret between the two signatories, but it nevertheless became known almost immediately. In the Portland Ministry which came into power in Britain in March, 1807, Castlereagh held the office of Minister for War and Canning that of Minister for Foreign Affairs. Canning's agents soon conveyed the news of the "secret" article of the Peace of Tilsit, and he determined upon swift action to forestall its operation. A large fleet carrying twenty thousand men was dispatched to demand that Denmark should hand over its fleet to Britain until the conclusion of the war, when it was to be restored intact. Accession to such a request was, of course, impossible for an independent nation, and Denmark had no option but to refuse. The British therefore bombarded Copenhagen and seized the whole Danish fleet. This high-handed action produced an outburst of indignation in many European countries and among not a few people in Britain; but undoubtedly it saved large and costly military and naval operations, and, by securing British control of the sea, certainly shortened the war.

3. THE PENINSULAR WAR, 1808-1814

Napoleon and Spain.

The other possible loophole in the European blockade was, we said, Spain and Portugal, and it was to these



THE PENINSULAR WAR 1808 ~ 1814.

countries that Napoleon next turned. Towards the close of 1807 French armies crossed Spain, by agreement with the Spanish Government, invaded Portugal—whose royal family had previously been transported to Brazil in British vessels—and took possession of Lisbon. In June, 1808, the Spanish royal family was induced to renounce its throne in favour of Napoleon's brother Joseph who was crowned King of Spain. Meanwhile a British army under Sir Arthur Wellesley had been sent to Portugal. In August it met the French at *Vimiero* and won a victory so decisive that, by the terms of the *Convention of Cintra* the French were compelled to withdraw from Portugal. Lisbon, therefore, fell into the hands of the British, who henceforward used it as a base of operations for the whole Peninsula. This Convention had been the work of a general who arrived after *Vimiero* and was senior to Wellesley. The British Government, not satisfied that the most had been made of the battle, recalled those concerned for an inquiry which entirely acquitted Wellesley. But the immediate effect of the inquiry had been that, during Wellesley's temporary withdrawal, the command in the Peninsula was taken over by Sir John Moore, one of the most capable officers in the service.

At this point two new factors began to modify the situation. First, the Spanish people, incensed at the indignity forced upon them by the overthrow of their monarchy, everywhere rose in revolt against Napoleon, who had thus to face what for him was a new kind of enemy, namely, a nation in arms as distinct from mere government forces. This new phenomenon, gradually rising everywhere in Europe, was indeed to prove Napoleon's undoing. Second, Napoleon, though not understanding the full significance of the Spanish risings, used them as an excuse for overrunning the country: by the autumn of 1808 there were two hundred thousand French in the Peninsula, with Napoleon in command.

Moore at Corunna.

Moore, realizing that to attack the superior forces of the enemy directly was to invite annihilation, decided to try to advance along the north of Spain, in co-operation with the Spanish nationalists, and so to cut off Napoleon's communications from France. But the Spaniards proved not to be dependable and the mountainous roads made progress so slow that, before Moore could get beyond Salamanca, Napoleon had set out to counter the threat by sending out troops to cut off Moore's retreat to the sea. Moore therefore made for Corunna with all speed. Napoleon followed, and soon the movement became a race between the two armies. The French pursued the British so hotly that the latter, owing to the arduous nature of the campaign in such difficult country, lost large numbers of their men. Nevertheless, the British forces kept together as an army, and long before they reached Corunna—where the British transports lay and which was Moore's objective—Napoleon personally gave up the chase and handed over the command to Marshal Soult. At Corunna Moore fought a rearguard action to secure the embarkation of the main body of his troops: this difficult operation was carried through so successfully that the French were held off long enough for the British army to escape, but Moore himself was mortally wounded.

Though Moore's design had not been carried out in the particular form that he originally intended, his main purpose had been amply achieved: the French subjugation of the whole Peninsula during 1808 had been effectively frustrated, and the British had been given time to organize a more comprehensive campaign. In April, 1809, Sir Arthur Wellesley was again sent to command the British and Portuguese forces.

Geographical Conditions.

Familiarity with the main physical features of the Peninsula is essential to any understanding of the ensuing

campaign. The country is crossed by mountain-ranges running, generally, east and west and giving rise to considerable rivers. These ranges are so high as to make campaigning extremely difficult: the lack of modern scientific knowledge as applied to warfare meant, in Wellesley's day, that the movements of an army in one valley might be unknown to those of an army in the next. Moreover, the nature of the country was such that an army had to keep to the main roads which necessarily followed the main valleys. Thus an army moving from France towards Portugal would be compelled to follow one of two roads: either the northern one running through Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, or the southern one through Badajoz. The latter crossed the Portuguese frontier at the nearer point to Lisbon, but the former entered Portugal at such an angle that the Tagus had not to be crossed in approaching the capital. Such was the country from which Wellesley had to expel the French.

Lines of Torres-Vedras.

His first move was to advance from Lisbon and clear the enemy from northern Portugal. This was accomplished during May. He then turned directly towards Madrid. At *Talavera*, in July, he met the French and, after a hard-fought battle characterized by terrible bloodshed, beat them off the field. In recognition of the victory Wellesley was created Viscount Wellington. But in spite of this success, to pursue the campaign farther towards Madrid proved impossible. Moreover, the French were massing troops in numbers capable of overwhelming any army that Wellington could muster against them. He therefore determined upon a plan which, though modest in itself, promised more solid ultimate success: this was the defence of Portugal and the training of a Portuguese army capable of co-operating reliably with the British. The crux of this strategy was Lisbon, for the defence of which he organized an elaborate and, as events proved, an impregnable defence.

Across the peninsula on which Lisbon stands, that is, between the sea and the estuary of the Tagus, Wellington had constructed three parallel defensive lines. Utilizing what natural features the country afforded—such as felling woods and damming rivers—and building high walls and ramparts where necessary, he made possible the withdrawal of his troops from one line to the next interior one if the French attacks could no longer be resisted. The country immediately beyond the exterior line was thoroughly laid waste, both crops and houses being destroyed so that within it an army could not find either sustenance or shelter. The inhabitants of the devastated area were given the choice between moving right away or finding refuge within the "Lines". The latter were constructed in such secrecy—thanks to the loyal co-operation of the Portuguese peasants and to the geographical difficulties of communication—that the French had no idea even of the existence of the defences.

In 1810 the French advanced in large numbers to drive the British from Portugal. Marshal Masséna seized Ciudad Rodrigo in July and Almeida in August. At *Busaco*, in September, Wellington, with the assistance of a strong Portuguese contingent, successfully faced the French but was then compelled to retreat before superior numbers. Steadily he moved southwards and finally withdrew within his prepared Lines. Only then did Masséna become aware of the trap that had been laid for him: by a strange reversal of the usual positions, the besiegers soon began to starve because the surrounding country yielded nothing for their support, whereas the besieged, having access to the sea which they commanded had unlimited resources both of munitions and of food. Hunger and disease began to tell their tale and, after weeks of fruitless waiting, in March, 1811, Masséna was compelled to give the order to retreat.

Then it was that Wellington moved out of his position and began steadily to advance across the Peninsula taking

fortress after fortress as he went. Masséna had fallen back upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Wellington accordingly moved in the direction of this stronghold. In May the French were beaten off at Fuentes d' Onoro, and a few days later Wellington entered *Almeida*. In January, 1812, after heavy campaigning in the meantime, he seized *Ciudad Rodrigo* itself and, at the end of March, *Badajoz*. Thus Wellington controlled the roads leading into the centre of Spain.

Napoleon and Russia.

At that juncture there took place a momentous event which, though it occurred in the east of Europe, reacted so profoundly upon the Peninsula as to be most appropriately related at this point. We saw that Napoleon's real object in carrying his campaign into Portugal and Spain had been his determination at all costs to safeguard the Continental System, and while, during 1810-1812, his armies there were being steadily repulsed, he was exerting himself to the utmost to maintain his supremacy over the rest of the Continent. The adverse effects of the System were seriously felt in Britain: her trade was completely disorganized and corn was increasingly scarce; unemployment and hunger were widespread, and the wrecking of the new machines by idle men became common. Yet, in spite of appearances, economic necessity was working inevitably against Napoleon. That British manufactures were being brought to a standstill was a proof that the Continent was not obtaining from Britain the manufactured goods upon which it depended, and Napoleon found himself obliged to grant permits for the import of various classes of manufactured articles by particular authorities. (At one stage even Napoleon's own soldiers were wearing overcoats made from British cloth!). Also, the scarcity of corn in Britain meant that large quantities of corn, which normally would be sent to her, must somewhere be wasted or sold at low prices. In both these

respects, no country was harder hit than Russia, which formerly had sent large quantities of corn and timber to Britain and from this country had obtained the woollen goods so essential as a protection against the cold. Gradually the blockade roused deep resentment among the Russians, who saw no reason why they should freeze or starve for the convenience of Napoleon. As early as December, 1810, Alexander, breaking away from the Treaty of Tilsit, allowed British goods into his ports. Such a breach in the blockade threatened the collapse of the whole System and at all costs must be stopped. Napoleon tried every means to induce Alexander to keep the Treaty, but all was in vain, and open war was the only alternative.

Moscow, 1812.

So desperate was the situation that Napoleon at last determined upon nothing less than a gigantic invasion of Russia. Having no army that he could spare, his only resource was to gather contingents from all his armies, for example those in Italy, Germany and the Peninsula. By this means he collected six hundred thousand troops which, in June, 1812, he led across the River Niemen into Russia. His objective was Moscow, whence he hoped to dictate terms to the Czar and the Russian Government. The Russians, unable to face the enemy in a pitched battle, fell back and, as they went, laid waste the country. Thus, as Napoleon advanced he found himself in an endless desert. In spite of all obstacles he reached Moscow in September. Hardly had he entered the city when fires began mysteriously to burst out, and at the end of several days the ancient capital was little more than a burnt-out shell hardly sufficient to shelter the French army. Unintentionally the Russians had re-enacted on a vast scale the principle of Wellington's strategy before Torres-Vedras: the French were in a great desert where they could neither obtain support nor induce the enemy to fight them. The

Russians refused even to discuss terms, and in mid-October Napoleon had to retreat. The difficulties of the advance could hardly be compared to the horror of the retreat. Intense cold, snow, starvation and the attacks of the Russians all contributed to turn the disaster into a complete and terrible rout. Napoleon pressed on ahead, leaving his men to struggle on as best they might, and so severe were their privations that nine-tenths of the invaders perished in Russia, only sixty thousand re-crossing the Niemen. At last Napoleon had been defeated, and though he managed for the moment to raise new armies, the nations began to take fresh courage, and the ultimate overthrow of their enemy was due in no small measure to that fact.

The French Expelled.

Here we may return to the main thread of our story of the War in the Peninsula where the immediate effect of the Russian campaign had been that the contingents demanded by Napoleon for Russia had seriously weakened the French resistance to Wellington. Of this Wellington took advantage as, early in the summer, he began to move north-east from Badajoz. In July, 1812, he won a great victory at *Salamanca*, whence he pressed on to Madrid which, however, he had later to evacuate on account of the concentration of French relieving forces.

At that point the growing threat to Napoleon's supremacy in Europe generally began to react seriously upon the French position in Spain. After the retreat from Moscow, Prussia reorganized her resources and her armies: in January, 1813, she signed a Treaty of alliance with Russia, and in May, 1813, declared war against France. In August Austria also declared war. Thus once more the forces of Europe were closing around Napoleon; but this time the spell of his invincibility had been broken by the Russian disaster, while Britain held undisputed and indisputable command of the sea and was surely expelling the French from Spain. To meet the new menace in central Europe,

Napoleon had again to draw off contingents from his armies throughout the Continent, not least from that in Spain. The result was that for the first time in the war Wellington, who now commanded the combined forces of Britain, Portugal and Spain, had numbers superior to those of the enemy.

The consequence was soon apparent. While Wellington advanced with the main army, he sent Graham along the northern coast of Spain to outflank the French. The latter, out-numbered and out-maneuvred, were compelled to evacuate Madrid and to retire to hold the line of the Ebro. At *Vittoria* (June, 1813) Wellington brought on the critical engagement. There the French were routed, losing their baggage and artillery. Hence, unable to offer further resistance, they fled across the frontier with Wellington behind them. After twenty years the enemies of France, formerly expelled in the north-east, were returning in the south-west. In January, 1814, Wellington seized *Bayonne*. Marshal Soult, who had been sent by Napoleon to take over command after *Vittoria*, moved eastwards after leaving *Bayonne* in the hope of luring Wellington away from the sea. Wellington followed, but managed to meet and beat Soult at *Toulouse* on 10th April. Actually, had Wellington known it, this battle need not have been fought, for on 6th April Napoleon had abdicated.

Napoleon Defeated.

To this act he had been forced by affairs in central Europe where we have watched already the formation of a new coalition against him. During August and September, 1813, Napoleon had displayed great courage and consummate generalship in the use of his inferior numbers to keep his enemies at bay. Yet there could be no doubt about the ultimate issue: slowly and surely he was being worn down, for every engagement he fought cost him men which, at that stage in the struggle, he could never replace. In October, 1813, the great *Battle of Leipzig*

(often known as the Battle of the Nations because of the numerous nationals taking part) decided the issue: after a magnificent resistance the French were broken and driven beyond the Rhine.

Even then Napoleon refused very generous peace-terms offered to him by the Allies. The Allies therefore signed the *Treaty of Chaumont* of March, 1814, whereby Prussia, Russia, Austria and Britain undertook to supply one hundred and fifty thousand men each (to which Britain added subsidies of £5,000,000) towards a common army and promised not to negotiate separately with Napoleon. The latter continued to struggle but, as we have seen, on 6th April abdicated. The Bourbon dynasty was restored in France, in the person of Louis XVIII (brother of Louis XVI, the latter's young son Louis having perished during the Revolution); Napoleon was banished to Elba, but was allowed to keep his title; and a conference of the Powers was to meet at Vienna in order to settle the issues raised by the war.

The Congress met on 1st November, 1814. Its discussions revealed almost at once deep-seated jealousies between the European states, and, so acute were these differences, that war between the former Allies seemed imminent when the whole scene was dramatically changed by the escape of Napoleon from Elba and his landing in France on 1st March, 1815.

Britain and U.S.A., 1812-1814.

Before we continue the story of the final overthrow of Napoleon, there is one element of the war which, though a side-issue so far as the main struggle was concerned, calls for notice because it affected Britain directly, namely war between Britain and the United States of America. This was the outcome of Britain's rigorous use of her navy to enforce the Orders in Council of 1807. In particular the numerous desertions of British seamen to American mercantile ships caused both anxiety and resentment in

Britain, and the latter consequently held up American ships in search of such deserters. These "hold-ups", in addition to the vexations endured by neutrals in general, produced serious friction which was intensified by such an action as that of a British warship in challenging the American frigate, the *Chesapeake* (1807). During the years that followed, the relations between the two countries became increasingly embittered. So acute did the situation become that when Lord Liverpool became Prime Minister in May, 1812, he withdrew the application to the United States of the Orders in Council. But things had gone too far, and in June the United States of America declared war against Britain.

For both sides the war had sharp surprises in store, each side losing on the element where it might have been expected to win. At sea the superior armaments of the American ships gave them a definite advantage over British ships of nominally a similar class (though Britain generally conveniently remembers only the action during June, 1813, in which Captain Broke of the *Shannon* sank the *Chesapeake* after only fifteen minutes' gunfire!). On the other hand, the United States' invasion of Canada was resisted so stoutly by the colonists, of both English and French origin, that the campaign was a complete failure, especially when, after the close of the Peninsular War in 1814, fourteen thousand British veterans were sent to America. Finally, with the end of the war in Europe in April, 1814, the reasons for the Anglo-American struggle ended also: Britain no longer needed its naval deserters and the blockade automatically ceased. The only remaining question concerned the precise terms of peace.

The *Peace of Ghent* of December, 1814, purposely omitted mention of the immediate causes of the war and established the *status quo ante bellum*. Outstanding questions of boundaries between Canada and the United States of America became the subject of subsequent negotiations in

which the chief credit is due to Castlereagh the British Foreign Secretary. The most notable event was the agreement reached in 1817 that the navies which both countries kept on the Great Lakes should be abolished. Since that time the long frontier has been entirely free from military defences on both sides—a striking object-lesson of what can be achieved by sincere good-will.


4. THE HUNDRED DAYS

The Campaign.

As soon as Napoleon's landing became known, Louis XVIII, not awaiting the issue of war, fled from Paris and within a fortnight Napoleon was back in his capital. There he issued a manifesto declaring that he would rule as a constitutional King and would maintain a policy of peace in Europe. But the Allies were wary. The re-appearance of their common enemy convinced them of their danger and of the need for united action. They immediately re-affirmed the terms of the Treaty of Chaumont and placed their combined forces under the command of Wellington who had been raised to the rank of Duke in recognition of his services in the Peninsula. Napoleon found no difficulty in raising an army: his former veterans, now released from prison in nearly every country of Europe, flocked to his standard, and within six weeks he had a magnificent force of two hundred thousand men.

The actual course of events was the natural result of conditions on both sides. Napoleon's position, both political and military, was extremely precarious and his chance of success depended upon his taking immediate advantage of the enthusiasm which his return had aroused. Moreover, the Allies' forces were divided: Wellington with a mixed army of one hundred thousand men was operating in the Netherlands with Brussels as a base, and Blücher with a hundred and fifty thousand Prussians was moving from the east. To gain the fullest advantage of

this, Napoleon had to strike quickly and, if possible, to meet and defeat each of them separately. In short, if Napoleon was to win he must win quickly by assuming the offensive. The Allies were more than willing that he should take the offensive, for Wellington's troops were



mostly raw recruits—the veterans had been sent to America—and were so mixed that he dared not trust them in a large-scale offensive against Napoleon and the hardened French troops.

Battle of Waterloo.

The decisive action began on 16th June. Napoleon's main army was at Charleroi, Wellington's round about

Brussels and at Quatre Bras, and Blücher's at Ligny. Napoleon determined to attack Blücher, drive him off the field and so leave himself free to deal with Wellington alone. Accordingly on Friday, 16th June, Marshal Ney was sent to seize the position at Quatre Bras and there to prevent the British forces from reaching the Prussians. Napoleon himself moved against Blücher at Ligny. For some reason that never has been satisfactorily explained, there was some confusion of orders between Ney and Napoleon so that a body of picked French troops, marching and counter-marching between the two commanders, did not strike a blow throughout the day. By nightfall the British who arrived at Quatre Bras in increasing numbers, had repulsed Ney, but Napoleon had succeeded in driving Blücher out of Ligny, though the Prussian army, far from being routed, retired in perfect order.

During Saturday, 17th June, though there was a lull in the actual fighting, events critical in the final stage of the battle were taking place. First, Napoleon, completely miscalculating the objective of Blücher and believing that the latter was making for Namur, which had been the Prussian base, sent off in that direction a considerable pursuing force under Grouchy: but Blücher was acting in accordance with a previous understanding with Wellington and was moving northwards and westwards. The result was that Grouchy, who had not been sent off until after midday—by which time the French had lost contact with Blücher—pursued a wild-goose chase and did not discover his mistake until too late. By the close of the Saturday Blücher had reached Wavre whence, during the night, he sent word to Wellington. Second, the repulse of the Prussians had left the British unsupported at Quatre Bras, and Wellington therefore retired northwards until he reached a good defensive position on rising ground at Waterloo where he was able to cover Brussels. Such was the alignment of the opposing forces when the final stage of the battle began on 18th June.

Napoleon, reckoning that Blücher was miles away to the east and was being watched by Grouchy, concentrated the whole of his army against Wellington. The business of the latter clearly was to hold out until the Prussians arrived in overwhelming numbers to enable him to order a general advance. During the night there had been drenching rain and Napoleon accordingly delayed his attack until nearly midday so that the ground might have a chance to dry. This delay was fatal to his success, for during the morning Blücher was moving westwards towards the scene of the battle, though, on account of the soaked ground, his progress was much slower than he had calculated. Wellington's forces withstood attack after attack, and stronghold after stronghold was seized and lost and sometimes seized again by both sides. Wellington himself moved from point to point, ever in the thickest of the fight encouraging his men and promptly giving orders to deal with each crisis as it arose. By about four o'clock the French attack seemed to be spending itself and Wellington had given the order for a general advance when the Prussians began to arrive on the field. This decided the issue. The French retreat quickly became a disorderly rout: the Prussian cavalry pursued the enemy so rapidly that a mere rabble escaped towards France.

Napoleon fled to Paris where he found opinion turned against him. On 22nd June he abdicated and made for Rochefort in the hope of finding a ship for America. But he was foiled, and on 15th July he surrendered to Admiral Hotham, the commander of the British man-o'-war, the *Bellerophon*. Napoleon was sent as a prisoner to St. Helena, a mid-Atlantic island some twelve hundred miles off the west coast of Africa, where he remained a prisoner until his death in 1821. Meanwhile the Allies had entered Paris and Louis XVIII had been restored to his throne. Thus was brought to an end the period of Napoleon's final bid for supremacy in Europe, a period known as "The Hundred Days".

5. THE PEACE

Treaty of Paris, November, 1815.

The immediate issues were settled by the terms of the Peace which the Allies imposed. France was to pay an indemnity of seven hundred million francs ; was to maintain for five years one hundred and fifty thousand Allied troops who were to be distributed in eighteen of her northern fortresses ; and her frontiers were to be the same as in 1789.

Congress of Vienna.

The broader problems of the peace were meanwhile being threshed out by the Congress of Vienna whose final decisions may be summarized as follows. Belgium was joined to Holland ; Prussia received half of Saxony and some territory on the Rhine ; Austria received Lombardy and Venetia ; Russia received a large part of Poland ; and Britain kept Malta and the Cape of Good Hope. The results of these provisions became increasingly evident as the nineteenth century proceeded. Indeed, it is true to say that much, if not most, of the friction arising in Europe during the middle years of that century was due to the territorial decisions of the Congress, and detailed discussion of those decisions must accordingly be postponed until later in the history.

Effects on Britain.

We may well conclude, however, with a brief review of the effects which the War and the Peace had upon Britain.

First, by the Congress of Vienna certain additions were made to the Empire, Britain being allowed to retain territories she had seized during the war, namely, Mauritius, St. Lucia and Tobago (valuable for sugar-plantations and as military outposts), Heligoland (which was to be of great strategic value in the North Sea), and, most valuable of all, the *Cape of Good Hope*. The Cape had originally

been a possession of Holland, its first white population being Dutch farmers, that is, Boers. After the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, Britain was afraid that the French would seize the Cape in order to interfere with British communications to India. Accordingly in 1795 Britain herself, with the authority of the Stadtholder of Holland, occupied Cape Town and then continued to govern the Colony as a military station until 1802 when, by the Treaty of Amiens, it was restored to Holland. But in 1806, war having once more broken out, Britain again seized the Cape for which, when it was definitely ceded to her in 1815, she paid £6,000,000 to the Dutch Government as compensation.

Second, though the outbreak of the Revolution in France produced here, as on the Continent, a widespread demand for political reforms, the violent excesses of the revolutionaries produced a reaction and caused a determined resistance to all concessions by those classes already possessing the monopoly of political rights. Thus the ultimate result of the Revolution was to delay Parliamentary reform for a generation, nothing being done until the First Reform Act of 1832.

Third, at a time when industrial and economic change was at its height in Britain, the attention of her statesmen was necessarily directed almost exclusively to affairs abroad, so that many of the evils caused by the Industrial Revolution were allowed to develop unheeded and to produce a heavy crop of problems for succeeding generations to solve.

Fourth, large masses of the population were seriously impoverished by the high war-taxation and by the interference with British industry and commerce owing to the Continental System. This effect was intensified when, at the conclusion of the war, the demobilized soldiers and sailors were thrown upon the labour-market and so added considerably to the already large number of unemployed.

Last, and most important in the broad view of history,

the long struggle between England and France, beginning under Louis XIV and William III, was ended, and France was no longer able to challenge either Europe on the land or Britain on the sea. During the struggle lasting from 1793 till 1815, Britain alone had fought unceasingly against the French; the British navies, maintaining, though sometimes precariously, control of the sea, had always been the deciding factor in the war; and Britain had produced the general who was to lead Europe to victory. Thus, by the close of the war, Britain was definitely established as the leading Power of the world. British history during the nineteenth century is mainly the story of the use she made of that pre-eminence abroad and of her attempts to adjust the effects of the Industrial Revolution and of the war at home.

CHAPTER XIV

REVIEW OF PERIOD, 1688-1815

THIS concluding chapter is an outline of English History during the eighteenth century so arranged as to show the general characteristics of the period as a whole both at home and abroad.

I. ENGLAND AND FRANCE

French and English Enmity.

The most striking feature of England's relations with Europe during the eighteenth century was the series of seven large-scale wars. Their details were as follows:

War of English Succession . . .	1689-1697
War of Spanish Succession . . .	1702-1713
War of Austrian Succession . . .	1740-1748
Seven Years' War	1756-1763
War of American Independence . .	1775-1783
French Revolutionary War . . .	1793-1802
Napoleonic War	1803-1815

Thus, of the hundred and twenty-six years between 1689 and 1815, exactly one-half were for England years of war.

Those wars all had one remarkable characteristic: in every one of them, France and England were enemies. For example, in the War of Austrian Succession Britain and Austria were allied against France¹ and Prussia. Within eight years of the end of that war, Europe was embroiled in a still greater conflict—the Seven Years' War—in which Britain and Prussia were fighting France and Austria, so that, though between those two wars the system of alliances had changed, Britain and France were

¹ Strictly, France did not declare war on Britain until 1744.

on opposite sides in both. That is true throughout the whole series: no matter what might be the immediate cause of any particular war and no matter how the other combatants might change, France and England were invariably opposed. This can hardly have been due solely to chance coincidences. On the contrary, examination of the facts shows that between the two countries there were deep causes of enmity which became more, rather than less, intense as the century wore on.

French Menace to Europe.

The first cause was the menace of French power to western Europe, including England, during the greater part of the period. Of this menace there were three phases, namely, under Louis XIV, the Revolutionary Government and Napoleon Bonaparte respectively.

No very profound knowledge of eighteenth-century history is needed to show that Louis XIV's threat to the peace of Europe in his struggle for a Rhine frontier was but repeated on a grander scale by the challenge to Europe of the French Revolutionaries, when they offered help to any nation that rose against its tyrannical government, and by the challenge of Napoleon Bonaparte seeking to overpower every Continental state. Against all three of these threats alike the defence was a European alliance, and the centre of all the alliances was England.

Colonial Struggles.

As the century wore on, a second influence began to play an ever-increasing part, especially in English antagonism to France. Whereas the first two wars in the series, namely those of English and of Spanish Succession, were European only, all the others were fought also outside Europe. The War of Austrian Succession had its repercussions in India (where Clive distinguished himself). The Seven Years' War was fought in all four of the then known continents. From that date, every war was a *world-war*

and was, in effect, a struggle for colonies. Thus the Seven Years' War, again, decided that Canada and India should be British and not French. In such struggles the crucial factor was sea-power, and it was British supremacy—with rare exceptions—on the sea which ultimately secured for her and for her allies the complete victory over the French culminating in the Battle of Waterloo of 1815.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

While the great events, outlined above, were taking place overseas, developments of the most far-reaching kind were shaping themselves at home, developments which were to determine the character of the Constitution under which we live in this twentieth century.

Stages of Development.

In this process there were two main stages. The first was under William III and the second under George I and George II. The essential fact to notice is that both the periods of constitutional growth corresponded with a change in the English dynasty.

Though William III was in the Stuart succession, his coming to the throne marked a break in the direct line and hence made him more dependent than his Stuart predecessors upon one particular party, thus giving an impetus to the party-system of government.

Similarly, George I and George II were the first of the Hanoverian dynasty, and many of their new subjects favoured their rivals, the Stuart Pretenders, who were British and around whom hung the glamour of royalty in distress. The early Georges were therefore disposed to rely upon the opponents of the Pretenders—that is, the Whigs—led by the great minister Walpole. Walpole's power rested upon another factor also, namely that both he and his royal masters favoured a policy of peace, and his exceptionally long period of power (1721–1742) coin-

cided with the only lengthy break in the series of wars, namely that from 1713 to 1740 between the Spanish and the Austrian Succession Wars.¹ During that interval of comparative peace a larger and larger share of the actual responsibilities of government fell into the capable hands of Walpole, who became more and more the master in his own Cabinet, thus giving a marked impetus to what was to become known as "Cabinet Government". Though the privilege of a Parliamentary vote remained almost exclusively in the hands of landowners for more than a century after Walpole's régime began, his system of Cabinet Government provided an instrument ready to the hands of the classes which became enfranchised during the nineteenth century, beginning with the first Reform Act of 1832, the necessity for which was due mainly to the Industrial Revolution.

¹ Strictly, the peace was broken in 1739 with the outbreak of the War of Captain Jenkins' Ear.



SUMMARY OF COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT, 1688-1815

(References are to the relevant Chapters and Sections in the Text)

English Possessions, 1688

1. The Thirteen North American Colonies (except Georgia, founded 1732)
2. In the West Indies :
 - The Bermudas, first settled 1609
 - Barbados, 1624
 - Jamaica, conquered from Spaniards during Commonwealth, 1655.
3. India (East India Company founded, 1600) :
 - Surat—factory, 1609
 - Madras—factory, 1639
 - Bombay—ceded by Portugal to Charles II, 1661 ; granted by Charles II to E.I.C., 1668.

Treaty of Utrecht, 1713 III, 5

Following the War of Spanish Succession :

- Britain gained 1. From Spain, Gibraltar (captured 1704) III, 3
2. „ Spain, Minorca (captured 1708) III, 4
3. „ France, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Hudson's Bay (which became the property of the British Hudson's Bay Co.)

<i>Treaty of Paris, 1763</i>	VI, 6
Following the Seven Years' War:	
Britain gained Canada	VI, 2-5
(Quebec Act, 1774)	VI, 6
(Canada Act, 1791)	VIII, 4
<i>Treaty of Versailles, 1783</i>	VIII, 4
Following the War of American Independence:	
Britain 1. Acknowledged Independence of United States of America.	
2. Restored Minorca to Spain.	VIII, 3
<i>Treaty of Amiens, 1802</i>	XII, 5
Following the Revolutionary War:	
Britain gained 1. Ceylon (captured from Hol- land, 1795)	
2. Trinidad (captured from Spain, 1797)	
3. Malta (captured from France, 1800)	
<i>Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815</i>	XIII, 5
Following the Napoleonic War:	
Britain gained 1. St. Lucia (captured from France, 1803)	XIII, 5
2. Tobago (captured from France, 1803)	XIII, 5
3. Cape of Good Hope (captured from Holland, 1806)	XIII, 5
4. Heligoland (captured from Denmark, 1807)	XIII, 5
5. Mauritius (captured from France, 1810)	XIII, 5
<i>India</i>	X
1. Clive obtained for the E.I.C. administrative powers in Bengal, Behar and Orissa, 1765	X, 2
2. Regulating Act, 1773.	X, 3
3. Pitt's India Act, 1784	X, 5

- 4 Lord Wellesley (a) Conquered Mysore, 1799 . X, 6
 (b) Annexed the Carnatic and
 Oudh, 1801 . . . X, 6

Australia VIII, 4

1. Capt. Cook proclaimed New South Wales a
 British possession, 1770.
 2. First convict settlement at Sydney, 1788.

172

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COALITIONS.

SOVEREIGN	MINISTRIES	DATES	DOMESTIC EVENTS.		EVENTS ABROAD.	DATES
WILLIAM III & MARY II		1689	Siege of Londonderry. Battle of Killiecrankie.	WAR OF THE LEAGUE OF AUGSBURG		
		1690	Battle of Beachy Head. Battle of the Boyne.			
		1691	Siege of Limerick			
WILLIAM III					Battle of La Hogue.	1692
		1694	Bank of England.		Namur.	1695
		1697	Treaty of Ryswick.		Treaty of Ryswick.	1697
					First Partition Treaty.	1698
					Second Partition Treaty.	1699
		1701	Act of Settlement.		Louis XIV acknowledges James III.	1701
		1702				1702
				WAR OF SPANISH SUCCESSION.	Battle of Blenheim. Gibraltar captured.	1704
					Battle of Ramillies.	1706
		1707	Union with Scotland		Battle of Oudenarde. Minorca captured.	1708
ANNE.					Battle of Malplaquet.	1709
		1710	Dr Sacheverell Fall of Marlborough		Fall of Marlborough	1710
		1711	South Sea Company.			
		1713	Treaty of Utrecht.		Treaty of Utrecht.	1713
		1714				
		1715	Jacobite Rebellion		Louis XV King of France.	1715
		1716	Septennial Act.			
					Cape Passaro.	1718
		1720	South Sea Bubble.			
GEO. I		1721				
	WALPOLE.					

GEO. I	WALPOLE	1721			
		1724	"Drapier's Letters."		
GEO. II		1726			Cardl: Fleury, Fr Minister. 1726
		1727			
		1733	Excise Bill Kay's Flying Shuttle		
	WILMING- -TON.	1739		War of Capt. Jenkins' Ear. 1739	
		1742			
	PELHAM	1743		Battle of Dettingen 1743	
		1745	Jacobite Rebellion	Battle of Fontenoy. 1745	
1746					
1748			Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. 1748		
NEW- -CASTLE.	1751	Calendar Revision	Clive at Arcot. 1751		
	1754		Washington attacks Fort Duquesne. 1754		
	1755		Braddock's Expedition. 1755		
	1756		Black Hole of Calcutta. 1756		
DVNSHRE.	1757		Battle of Rossbach. 1757		
NEW- -CASTLE.			Battle of Leuthen. 1757		
	1760		Wolfe at Quebec. 1759		
- PITT.	1761	Bridgewater Canal.	Battle of Wandewash. 1760		
BUTE.	1762				
GEO. III	GRENVILLE	1763	Treaty of Paris. 1763		

GEORGE III	NEW -	1760		SEVEN YEARS' WAR	Battle of Wandewash. Montreal captured	1760
	- CASTLE	1761	Bridgewater Canal.			
		1762				
	BUTE	1763			Treaty of Paris.	1763
	GRENVILLE	1764	Hargreave's Spinning Jenny.			
		1765	Stamp Act.			
	ROCKINGHAM	1766	Stamp Act Repealed			
	CHATHAM	1767	Townshend's Customs Duties.			
		1768				
	GRAFTON	1769	Letters of "Junius." Arkwright's Water Frame			
		1770			Boston "Massacre."	1770
		1773	Regulating Act.		Boston "Tea Party."	1773
	NORTH	1775	Crompton's "Mule."	WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE.	Lexington. Bunker's Hill.	1775
		1776	"Wealth of Nations."		Declaration of Independence.	1776
					Saratoga.	1777
		1778	Death of Chatham.		France declares war.	1778
		1779	First Iron Bridge.			
		1780	Gordon Riots.		Armed Neutrality of the North.	1780
					Yorktown.	1781
	ROCKINGHAM	1782	Irish Parliament Independent.		Battle of the Saints.	1782
	SHELBOURNE	1783			Treaty of Versailles.	1783
	FOX & NORTH	1784	Pitt's India Act. Cartwright's Power Loom			
	PITT.	1788	Warren Hastings' Trial begins.		French Revolution begins.	1789
		1790	Burke's "Reflections."			
		1791	Canada Act.			
					Execution of Louis XVI	
					Revolutionary War.	1793

G E O R G E I I I	P I T T.	1790	Burke's "Reflections".	R E V O L U T I O N A R Y W A R	French Revolution begins	1789
		1791	Canada Act.			
					Execution - Louis XVI	1793
					First Coalition	
					"Glorious First of June"	1794
		1797	Naval Mutinies.		Treaty of Campo-Formio	1797
		1798	Irish Rebellion.		Battle of C. St. Vincent.	1798
					Egyptian Expedition	1798
	A D D I N G T O N	1800	Union with Ireland.	N A P O L E O N I C W A R	Second Coalition.	1799
		1801			Armed Neutrality.	1800
	P I T T.				Treaty of Lunéville.	1801
					Treaty of Amiens.	1802
	G R E N V I L L E	1804				1803
					Third Coalition.	1805
	P O R T L A N D	1806	Death of Pitt.		Battle of Trafalgar.	1805
		1807			Berlin Decrees.	1806
	P E R C E V A L				Treaty of Tilsit.	1807
					Peninsular War begins.	1808
	L I V E R P O O L	1809				
					Lines of Torres Vedras	1810
		1812			Russian Campaign.	1812
					War with U.S.A.	1813
					Battles of Vittoria and Leipzig	1814
					Napoleon's 1 st abdica ⁿ	1814
					Battle of Waterloo.	1815

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INDEX

Names of Battles, Statutes, Treaties and Wars are arranged under those headings respectively.

A

ABERCROMBY, General Sir Ralph,
at Battle of Alexandria, 267
Abercromby, Lord, commander
in North America, 115, 116
Acadia, French Colony, 103
Acre, besieged by Bonaparte,
265
Acts of Parliament (*see under*
Statutes)
Addington, Prime Minister, 146 ;
and Revolutionary War,
267, 268 ; and Napoleonic
War, 276
Addison, editor of *Spectator*, 16
Alberoni, Cardinal, adviser of
Philip V of Spain, 66
Alexander I, Czar of Russia,
left Armed Neutrality, 268 ;
signed Peace of Tilsit, 279,
280 ; broke from Conti-
nental System, 286, 287
Alsace, Lower, becomes French,
22
Alsace, Upper, seized by Louis
XIV, 23
America, North, English Col-
onies, 100-3, 159-62 ; French
Colonies, 103, 104
Amherst, General, chosen by
Pitt, 114 ; in Seven Years'
War, 115-8
Anne, Queen of England, 1 ;
and Bill of Rights, 3 ; Act
of Settlement, 12 ; acces-
sion, 14 ; character, 14 ;
death, 57
Arcot, seized by Clive, 198,
200

Argyll, Earl of, and Massacre
of Glencoe, 26 ; 1715 Rebel-
lion, 80
Arkwright, Richard, invented
Water-frame, 225
Armed Neutrality (1780) 173
174 ; (1800) 266, 268
Aurungzebe, death, 195
Australia, discovery and coloni-
zation, 179, 180

B

BABER, invaded India, 195
Bakewell, Robert, sheep-rearer,
235
Baltimore, Lord, founded Mary-
land, 101
Bank of England, founded, 9 ;
"run" 1745, 80 ; "run"
1797, 261
Barrier Fortresses, 34 ; seized
by Louis XIV, 39 ; restored
to Dutch, 55
Bastille, captured, 251
BATTLES :
Aboukir Bay (Nile), 204
Alexandria, 267
Almanza, 49
Austerlitz, 277
Beachy Head, 31
Blenheim, 44-47
Boyne, 29
Brandywine, 172
Bunker's Hill, 169, 170
Busaco, 285
Buxar, 204
Camperdown, 262
Cape Passaro, 67

BATTLES (*continued*)—

- Copenhagen, (1801) 268 ;
 (1807) 280.
 Corunna, 283
 Culloden Moor, 82
 Dettingen, 94, 95
 Eylau, 279
 Fontenoy, 80, 95
 Friedland, 279
 Hastenbeck, 113
 Hohenlinden, 266
 Jena, 277
 June, Glorious First of, 260
 Killiecrankie, 25
 Kolin, 113
 Kunersdorf, 113
 La Hogue, 31-3
 Leipzig, 289
 Leuthen, 113
 Lexington, 169, 170
 Malplaquet, 51
 Marengo, 266
 Minden, 113, 114
 Newtown Butler, 29
 Nile (Aboukir Bay), 264
 Oudenarde, 50
 Plassey, 113, 201
 Porto Novo, 214
 Prestonpans, 81
 Pyramids, 264
 Quiberon Bay, 119
 Ramillies, 49
 Rossbach, 113
 St. Vincent, 261
 Salamanca, 288
 Saratoga, 171, 172 ; effect,
 173
 Sheriffmuir, 80
 Talavera, 284
 The Saints, 177
 Toulouse, 289
 Trafalgar, 272-7
 Ulm, 276
 Vimiero, 282
 Vinegar Hill, 190
 Vittoria, 289
 Wandewash, 203
 Waterloo, 293-5, 301
 Bavaria, Pragmatic Sanction, 88 ;
 War of Austrian Succession,
 92
- Begums of Oudh, 212
Bellerophon, The, 295
 Berlin Decrees, 277, 278
 Black Hole of Calcutta, 200,
 201
 Blücher, in Waterloo campaign,
 292-5
 Bolingbroke, Viscount (Henry
 St. John), Tory leader, 15,
 16 ; Secretary of State, 16 ;
 exile, 71 ; author of the
Patriot King, 126, 127
 Bombay, became English, 194
 Bonaparte, Napoleon (*see*
 Napoleon)
 Boscawen, Admiral, at Toulon
 and Lagos, 119
 Boston, founded, 101 ; Mas-
 sacre, 166 ; Tea Party,
 167 ; Port Act, 167
 Boswell, 150
 Boulton, Matthew, partner of
 James Watt, 227
 Boys, The, joined by Pitt, 108
 Braddock, General, expedition
 against Fort Duquesne,
 105
 Brandenburg, becomes a King-
 dom, 90
 Bridgewater, Duke of, built
 canal, 231
 Brindley, James, canal-builder,
 231
 Burgoyne, General, at Saratoga,
 171, 172
 Burke, Edmund, Whig leader,
 133 ; association with
 Johnson, 150 ; attitude
 to American Indepen-
 dence, 164 ; Warren Has-
 tings' impeachment, 215 ;
Reflections on the French
Revolution, 253
 Bute, Earl of, Tutor to George
 III, 126 ; Secretary of
 State, 120 ; Prime Minister,
 121 ; resigned, 130
 Byng, Sir George, Admiral,
 at Cape Passaro, 67
 Byng, Admiral John, failed at
 Minorca, 106 ; shot, 107

C

- CABINET, development, 70-3, 302
- Calcutta, English factory, 194 ; Black Hole, 200, 201
- Calendar, revised, 82, 83
- Calonne, French finance minister, 250
- Canada, French settlements, 104 ; became British, 118 ; Quebec Act, 122, 123 ; Canada Act, 145, 179 ; and revolting Colonies, 178
- Canals, Bridgewater's and Brindley's, 231
- Canning, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 280
- Cape of Good Hope, became British, 296, 297
- Carnot, French war-minister, 256
- Carolina, founded, 102
- Carteret, Secretary of State, 94 ; policy in War of Austrian Succession, 94, 95
- Cartwright, Edmund, inventor of Power-loom, 226
- Castlereagh, Minister for War, 280 ; negotiations with U.S.A., 291, 292
- Champlain, Lake, in Seven Years' War, 104
- Charles, Archduke of Austria, (*see also*, Charles VI, Emperor) ; claimant for Spanish throne, 37 ; became Emperor, 53
- Chandanagore, French station, 195
- Charles II and Goldsmiths, 8, 9
- Charles II, of Spain, impending death, 34, 35 ; will of, 38 ; death, 38
- Charles VI, Emperor (*see also*, Charles, Archduke of Austria), accession, 53 ; death, 86
- Charles, Young Pretender, birth, 80 ; and 1745 Rebellion, 10, 80-2
- Chatham, Earl of (William Pitt, the Elder), Secretary of State, 107 ; early career, 107, 108 ; character, 108-11 ; policy in Seven Years' War, 111, 112 ; combined with Newcastle, 64, 110, 111 ; resignation, 120, 121 ; Whig leader under George III, 129 ; takes title, 134 ; last administration, 134 ; death, 135 ; attitude to American Independence, 173
- Chesterfield, Lord, 73
- Churchill, John, (*see* Marlborough, Duke of)
- Cintra, Convention of, 282
- Civil List, 4, 5, 7, 8
- Clinton, General, in War of American Independence, 172, 174
- Clive, Robert, career in India, 198-207
- Coalitions, against France, First (1793) 255-61 ; Second (1799) 264-6 ; Third (1805), 276, 277
- Coinage, debased under Stuarts, 10 ; restored under William III, 11
- Condé, French General, 22
- Conduct of the Allies*, 17
- Connecticut, 101
- Continental System, 277
- Cook, Captain, at capture of Quebec, 119 ; Australian voyages, 179
- Coote, Eyre, won Wandewash, 203 ; and Porto Novo, 214
- Cope, General, at Prestonpans, 81
- Cornwallis, in War of American Independence, 174, 175 ; Governor-General of India, 217-19 ; second term and death, 220
- Cornwallis, Admiral, at Brest, 272-4
- Corvée*, 247
- Crompton, Samuel, inventor of "Mule," 226

Crown Point, Fort, built, 104 ; evacuated by French, 116
 Cumberland, Duke of, at Culloden Moor, 82 ; at Fontenoy, 95 ; at Hastenbeck, 113 ; signed Convention of Kloster-Seven, 113

D

DARBY, Abraham, inventor of smelting by coke, 228
 Darien Scheme, 9, 18
 Debt, National, under Walpole, 74 ; under Younger Pitt, 143, 144-5, 259 ; after Seven Years' War, 162
 Declaration of Rights (*see* Rights under *Statutes*)
 Defoe, 16
 Devonshire, Duke of, Prime Minister, 107 ; dismissed, 111
 Diplomatic Revolution, 1748-1756, 98-100, 105
 Directorate, French government, 263
 Dissenters, under William III, 5 ; and Whigs, 61, 63 ; Indemnity Act, 77
Drapier's Letters, 75
 Duncan, Admiral, at Camperdown, 262
 Dundee, Viscount, Highland leader, 25
 Duplex, French Governor of Pondicherry, 196, 197 ; recalled, 200
 Duquesne, Fort, built, 104, 105 ; Braddock's attack, 105 ; burned by French, 115 ; rebuilt as Pittsburg, 115
 Duquesne, Marquis, Governor of Canada, 105

E

EAST INDIA Company, founded, 193 ; condition 1773, 166, 206, 207
 Economistes, 249

Egypt, Bonaparte's Expedition, 263-5 ; French Army defeated at Alexandria, 267
 Elba, 290
 Elliott, General, defence of Gibraltar, 176, 177
Émigrés, 252, 254
 Enclosures, reasons and Acts, 236, 237 ; results, 237-9
 Enniskillen, siege of, 27-9
 Eugene, Prince, leader of Imperial Armies, 42 ; Blenheim campaign, 46
 Excise Bill, Walpole's, 64, 75-7

F

FAMILY Compact (*see* under *Treaties*)
 Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick, at Minden, 113
 Fitzgerald, Lord Edward, leader of United Irishmen, 190
 Fitzwilliam, Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, 188
 Fleury, Cardinal, minister of Louis XV, 74 ; peace policy, 84
 Flying shuttle, invented, 225
 Forbes, General, at Fort Duquesne, 115
 Fort William, erected, 194
 Fox, Charles James, Coalition with North, 138, 139 ; India Bill, 139, 216 ; Secretary of State, 146 ; abolition of Slave Trade, 146-8 ; death, 146 ; attitude to French Revolution, 253
 Fox, Henry, 108
 Francis, Philip, and *Letters of Junius*, 132, 133, 210 ; opposition to Warren Hastings, 210, 211, 215
 Franklin, Benjamin, envoy to France, 172
 Fraternity, Edict of, 189, 255
 Frederick I, of Prussia, acquired title, 90

Frederick II, of Prussia (the Great), accession, 90; invaded Silesia, 92; signed Convention of Westminster, 105; subsidized by Pitt, 112; defeated at Kolin, 113
 Frederick III, Elector of Brandenburg, became King, 90
 Frederick William I, of Prussia, 90
 Frederick William III, of Prussia, army defeated at Jena, 277
 Free Trade, under Younger Pitt, 144
 French Revolution, effects of American Revolution, 180; effects on Ireland, 187; causes, 245-51; events, 251-55

G

Gabelle, 246
 Galway, Lord, war in Spain, 48, 49
 Ganteaume, 272
Gaspée, H.M.S., 166
 George I, 58; and English parties, 59-62; Cabinet, 72, 73
 George II, 58; and English parties, 59-62; Cabinet, 72, 73; at Battle of Dettingen, 94, 95
 George III, 59; political aims, 62, 126, 127; Departmental System, 136; attitude to American Colonies, 166
 George, Prince of Denmark, husband of Queen Anne, 12, 14
 Georgia, founded, 102
 Germaine, Lord George (*see also* Sackville) and War of American Independence, 168, 171, 172
 Gibbon, 150
 Gibraltar, seized by English, 47; defended by Elliott, 176, 177
 Glencoe, massacre of, 17, 25-7

Gloucester, Duke of, son of Queen Anne, 12
 Godolphin, Whig leader, 15
 Goldsmith, Oliver, 150, 151
 Goldsmiths, 8, 9
 Gordon, Lord George, headed riots, 136, 137
 Grafton, Duke of, Prime Minister, 135
 Graham, John, of Claverhouse (*see* Dundee, Viscount)
 Grattan, Henry, 185-7; opposition to Union, 191
 Grenville, George, Whig leader, 129; Prime Minister, 130; John Wilkes' case, 130, 131; resigned, 133; Stamp Act, 162-4
 Grenville (William), Lord, Prime Minister, 146
 Gresham's "law," 10
Gulliver's Travels, 16

H

HALIFAX, Lord, First Lord of the Treasury, 65
 Hargreaves, inventor of spinning-jenny, 225, 226
 Harley, Robert (*see* Oxford, Earl of)
 Hastings, Lord, Governor-General of India, 220
 Hastings, Warren, Governor of Bengal, 207; Governor-General of India, 208; career, 209-16
 Hawke, Admiral, at Brest and Quiberon Bay, 119
 Hohenzollerns, 90
 Holkar, Mahratta chief, 220
 Holy Club, Methodists at Oxford, 152
Horse-Hoeing Husbandry, 234
 Howard, John, prison reformer, 156
 Howe, Admiral (Lord), Glorious First of June, 260; settles mutiny, 262
 Howe, General, in War of American Independence, 170-2

Howe, Lord, killed in North America, 115
 Huskisson, killed on railway, 232
 Hyder Ali, ruler of Mysore, 213, 214

I

Idea of a Patriot King, effect on George III, 126, 127
 Impey, chief justice in India, 212
 Income Tax, under Younger Pitt, 145
 India, Fox's India Bill, 139; Pitt's India Act, 145; history, 1600-1750, 193-220
 Industrial Revolution, Chapter XI, 221-44; effect on Napoleonic War, 278
 Ireland, War of English Succession, 27-30; Penal Laws, 30, 181, 185, 186; Act of Union, 30, 145, 190-2; history, 1689-1815, 181-92; rebellion (1798), 189

J

JACOBITES, 24; and Tories, 62, Rebellion (1715), 65, 71, 78, 80
 James, Old Pretender, recognized as James III, 39; Rebellion (1715), 78, 80
 Jefferson, Thomas, 170
 Jennings, Sarah (*see* Marlborough, Duchess of)
 Jervis (*see* St. Vincent, Lord)
 Johnson, Samuel, career and writings, 149, 150
Junius, Letters of, 132, 133

K

KAUNITZ, at Versailles, 99
 Kay, John, inventor of Flying Shuttle, 225
 King's Friends, under George III, formed by Bute, 129; support Younger Pitt, 141
 Kloster-Seven (*see under* Treaties)

L

LABOURDONNAIS, 197
Laissez-faire, 143, 240
 Lally, Count de, French Governor of Pondicherry, 202, 203
 La Vendée, revolt in, 257
 Le Bœuf, Fort, built, 104
 Leopold I, Emperor, 90
 Liverpool, Lord, Prime Minister, 146
 Londonderry, siege of, 27-9
 Loom, Power-, invented, 226
 Louis XIV, of France, 11; menace to Europe and England, 22-4, 34; death, 80
 Louis XV, of France, accession, 66, 84
 Louis XVI, of France, character, 250; prisoner, 252; flight to Varennes, 252, 254; executed, 254, 255
 Louis XVIII, of France, accession, 290; left Paris, 292; restored, 295
 Louisburg, captured by British, 96; restored at Aix-la-Chapelle, 97; captured by Amherst and Wolfe, 115
 Louisiana, French settlement, 103
 Louvois, War-Minister of Louis XIV, 22
 Luttrell, Colonel, M.P. for Middlesex, 131, 132
 Luxembourg, General of Louis XIV, 23

M

MACADAM, road-builder, 230
 Macdonald, Flora, 82
 Mackay, English General, 25
 Madras, became English, 194; captured by French, 96, 197; restored at Aix-la-Chapelle, 96, 197
 Mahrattas, established a state, 195; subdued by Wellesley, 220
 Malta, seized by Bonaparte, 264; seized by British,

264; restored by Treaty of Amiens, 268; retained by Britain, 270, 272
 Mar, Earl of, Rebellion (1715), 80
 Maria Theresa, daughter of Charles VI, 88; enters War of Austrian Succession, 92
 Marlborough, Duchess of, and Queen Anne, 15; loses Anne's favour, 52
 Marlborough, Duke of, in Ireland, 29; intrigued with James II, 32, 40; early career, 40; character, 42; in War of Spanish Succession, 43-54
 Mary II, accession, 1, 3; character, 7; death, 7, 12
 Maryland, founded, 101, 102
 Massachusetts founded, 101; Assembly suspended, 167
Mayflower, 101
 Mazarin, Cardinal, chief Minister of France, 22
 Methodism, 124; and slavery, 147; development and effects of, 151-7
 Middlesex Election Petition, 131, 132, 135
 Ministers of State, responsibility to Parliament, 13
 Minorca, seized by British, 50; confirmed to Britain, 55; seized by French, 106; restored to Britain, 121; lost in War of American Independence, 176, 177; in Revolutionary War, 264
 Mir Cossim, Nabob of Bengal, 204
 Mir Jaffir, at Battle of Plassey, 302; made Nabob of Bengal, 202; deposed and reinstated, 204
 Mogul, 193; Empire collapsed, 195
 Montcalm, French commander at Quebec, 117
 Montesquieu, 249
 Montreal, French settlement, 103, capitulated to English, 118

Moore, Sir John, at Corunna, 282, 283
 Moscow, occupied by Napoleon, 286-8
 Murray, General, in North America, 118

N

NAMUR, siege of, 33
 Napoleon, Italian campaign, 257; Egyptian campaign, 263-5; Syrian campaign, 265; First Consul, 265; broke Second Coalition, 266; planned invasion of Britain, 272-4; Emperor, 276; Russian campaign, 286-8; exiled to Elba, escaped, 290; Waterloo, 292-5
 Navy, British, in Seven Years' War, 118-20; in War of American Independence, 169, 174-7; in Revolutionary War, 260-3, 266-8; in Napoleonic War, 272-5, 280, 298
 Necker, French finance minister, 250
 Nelson, at Battle of Cape St. Vincent, 261; at Aboukir Bay, 264; at Copenhagen (1801), 268; Trafalgar Campaign, 272-5; death, 275
 New Amsterdam, became New York, 102
 Newcastle, Duke of (Thomas Pelham), Secretary of State, 94, 95; Prime Minister, 106; resigned (1756), 107; Prime Minister (1757), 111; resigned, 121
 Newcomen, pumping-engine, 227
 New England, founded, 101
 New Haven, 101
 New Jersey, 102
 New Plymouth, founded, 101
 New South Wales, proclaimed British, 179

Newton, Sir Isaac, and re-coinage, 11
 New York, established, 102
 North, Lord, Prime Minister, 135; attitude to George III, 136; Acts passed, 136; resignation, 138; coalition with Fox, 138, 139; American policy, 165
 Nova Scotia, became British, 55, 103
 Nuncomar, 211, 212

O

OPEN-FIELD agriculture, 224, 233-6
 Orders in Council (1807), 278; cause war with U.S.A., 290
 Orford, Earl of (*see* Walpole, Sir Robert)
 Orleans, Duke of, Regent of France, 66; policy after Treaty of Utrecht, 84
 Ormonde, Duke of, succeeds Marlborough, 54
 Oswego, Fort, captured by French, 107
 Oxford, Earl of (Robert Harley), Tory leader, 15, 16; Lord Treasurer, 16; imprisoned, 71

P

PARLIAMENT, position under William III, 3-5; representative system, 63, 64; Pitt's Reform Bill, 142; reform necessary after Industrial Revolution, 242; reform delayed by French Revolution, 297
 Parties, political, under William III, 11, 301; under Anne, 15, 16; effects of 1688 Revolution, 20; during War of Spanish Succession, 52-4; under George I and George II, 59-63, 301; under George III, 62, 127, 128, 141

Paterson, William, and Bank of England, 9; Darien Scheme, 9
 Paul I, Czar of Russia, formed Armed Neutrality (1800), 267; assassinated, 268
 Pelham, Henry, 62; Paymaster-General, 94; First Lord of the Treasury and Prime Minister, 95; death, 106
 Penn, William, founded Pennsylvania, 102
 Pennsylvania, founded, 102
 Perceval, Prime Minister, 146
 Peterborough, Earl of, war in Spain, 48, 49
 Philip of Anjou (*see* Philip V of Spain)
 Philip V, of Spain, acknowledged King, 55
 Pilgrim Fathers, 101
 Pitt, William (the Elder) (*see* Chatham, Earl of)
 Pitt, William (the Younger), early career, 139, 140; Parliamentary Reform, 142; finance, 143-5; as war-minister, 145, 258-60, 276, 277; Acts, 145; resignation, 145, 146, 192, 267; Second Ministry, 146; death, 146; attitude to Slave Trade, 147, 148; and Roman Catholic Emancipation, 145, 146, 192, 267; India Act, 216, 217
 Pittsburg, built, 115
 Pompadour, Madame de, 99
 Pondicherri, French station, 195
 Portland, Duke of, Prime Minister, 146, 280
 Porto Bello, and Treaty of Utrecht, 55, 85; captured in War of Captain Jenkins' Ear, 86
 Pragmatic Sanction, framed by Charles VI, 88; broken by Frederick II, 92
 Prussia, rise of, 89, 90
 Pulteney, 73

Q

QUADRUPLE Alliance (1718), 67
 Quebec, French settlement, 103;
 captured by Wolfe, 116-18

R

RAIKES, Robert, and Sunday
 Schools, 156
 Railways, 231, 232
 Raleigh, established Virginia,
 100
 Rebellion (1715), 65, 71, 78, 80
 Rebellion (1745), 10, 80-2
 Reynolds, Sir Joshua, 150
 Richardson, author of *Pamela*,
 151
 Richelieu, Cardinal, chief Min-
 ister of France, 22
 Roads, turnpike, 229, 230;
 improved by Telford and
 Macadam, 230
Robinson Crusoe, 16
 Rockingham, Lord, Whig leader,
 129; Prime Minister (1765),
 133, 164; (1782) 138;
 attitude to Ireland, 186
 Rodney, Admiral, 175; at
 Battle of the Saints, 177
 Rohilla War, 209, 210
 Roman Catholic Emancipation,
 145, 146; supported by
 Grattan, 187; partly
 granted by Pitt, 188; and
 Act of Union, 191, 192
 Roman Catholics, under William
 III, 5
 Rotten Boroughs, Pitt's Re-
 form Bill, 142
 Rousseau, 249
 Russell, English Admiral, 32

S

SACHEVERELL, DR., 16, 53, 64
 Sackville, Lord George, at Min-
 den, 114 (*see also* Germaine)
 St. Helena, 295
 St. John, Henry (*see* Boling-
 broke, Viscount)
 Sandwich, Lord, First Lord of
 the Admiralty, 175

Savery, Thomas, pumping-en-
 gine, 227
 Scotland, Union with England,
 17; War of English Suc-
 cession in, 24-7
 Shaftesbury, founder of Whig
 Party, 3
 Shelburne, Lord, Prime Min-
 ister, 138
 Sheridan, 151
 Shore, Sir John, Governor-Gen-
 eral of India, 219
 Shujah Dowlah, Nabob of Oudh,
 213
 Silesia, invaded by Frederick II,
 92; ceded to Prussia, 96,
 122
 Sinking Fund, Walpole's, 74,
 75; Younger Pitt's, 144,
 145
 Slavery, Trade abolished, 146-9
 Smith, Adam, author of *The*
Wealth of Nations, 142
 Smith, John, organized Vir-
 ginia, 100
 Smith, Sir Sidney, defended
 Acre, 265
 Sophia, Electress of Hanover,
 and Act of Settlement, 12,
 13, 57
 South Sea Company and Bubble,
 67-70, 74
Spectator, 16
 Speenhamland System, 243, 244
 Spinning-jenny, invented, 225
 Stair, Master of, Secretary for
 Scotland, and Massacre of
 Glencoe, 26
 Stanhope, Secretary of State,
 65; formed Triple Alli-
 ance, 66; and Quadruple
 Alliance, 67
 States-General, of France, meet-
 ing 1614, 248; 1789, 251
 STATUTES:
 Army (Annual) Act, 4
 Bank Act, 9
 Boston Port Act, 167
 Canada Act, 145, 179
 Corporation Act, 5
 Enclosure Acts, 237, 238

STATUTES (*continued*)—

- Gilbert's Act, 243
- Indemnity Act, 77
- India Act (Pitt's), 216, 217
- Licensing Act, lapsed, 5
- Mutiny Act, 3-5
- Navigation Acts, and Scotland, 17; and colonies, 160; and Ireland, 183, 185
- Poor Laws, 243, 244
- Poynings' Act, 186
- Quebec Act, 122, 123
- Regulating Act, 136, 206-8; effects on Indian administration, 210-13
- Rights, Bill of, 3, 20
- Security, Act of, 18
- Septennial Act, 65, 66
- Settlement, Act of, 11-13, 20, 21, 57; effect on Scotland, 18
- Stamp Act, 162-5
- Test Act, 5
- Toleration Act, 5
- Triennial Act, 4, 5
- Turnpike Acts, 229, 230
- Union, Act of, (Scotland), 17-19; (Ireland) 30, 145, 190-2
- Steam-power, 226-8, 231-3
- Stephenson, George, railway development, 232
- Sterne, author of *Tristram Shandy*, 151
- Strassburg, seized by Louis XIV, 23
- Surajah Dowlah, Black Hole of Calcutta, 200, 201; deposed, 202
- Surat, became English, 193
- Swift, Dean, 16, 17; the *Drapier's Letters*, 75

T

- Taille*, 246
- Talents, Ministry of All the, 146
- Telford, road-builder, 230
- The Northern Whig*, 187, 188
- Thirty-nine Articles, 5
- Ticonderoga, Fort, built, 104; evacuated by French, 116

- Tippoo, ruler of Mysore, 214; defeated by Cornwallis, 218; killed, 219
- Tone, Wolfe, 187, 188; in France, 189
- Tories, under Anne, 15, 16; members and principles, 61, 71; under George III, 127, 128
- Torres Vedras, Lines of, 284, 285
- Torrington, English Admiral, at Battle of Beachy Head, 31
- Toulon, resists French Revolution, 257, 260
- Tourville, Admiral of Louis XIV, 22; Battle of Beachy Head, 31; Battle of La Hogue, 31-3
- Townshend, Charles, Chancellor of Exchequer, 134; imposes customs duties on America, 165
- Townshend, Lord, Secretary of State, 65, 67, 73; as agriculturist, 235
- TREATIES:
 - Aix-la-Chapelle, 96-8
 - Amiens, 146, 268-70
 - Campo-Formio, 258
 - Chaumont, 290, 292
 - Family Compact (1733), 84
 - Ghent, 291
 - Hubertsburg, 122
 - Kloster-Seven, Convention of, signed, 113; repudiated, 113
 - Limerick, 29, 181
 - London (1720), 67
 - Lunéville, 266
 - Paris (1763), 121, 122; (1815), 296
 - Partition, First (1698), 37; Second (1700), 37
 - Ryswick, 34; broken by Louis XIV, 39
 - Tilsit, 279
 - Utrecht, 55, 56, 67, 84, 103; broken by British traders, 85

TREATIES: (*continued*)

- Versailles (1756), 105 ; (1783), 177
 Westminster, Convention of (1756), 105
 Westphalia, 22 ; broken by French Revolutionaries, 255
 Triple Alliance (1717), 66
 Tull, Jethro, 234
 Turenne, French General, 22
 Turgot, French finance minister, 250

U

UNITARIANS, 5

- United Irishmen, formation, 188 ; became secret society, 189

V

- VARENNES, Louis XVI's flight, 252, 254
 Vasco da Gama, sailed to India, 194
 Vauban, War-Engineer of Louis XIV, 22
 Vaudreuil, French commander at Montreal, 118
 Vernon, Admiral, captures Porto Bello, 86
 Vienna, besieged by French, 44, 45
 Vienna, Congress of, 290, 296, 297
 Villeneuve, French Admiral at Trafalgar, 272-5
 Virginia, founded, 100, 102
 Voltaire, 249

W

- WALPOLE, Sir Robert, 62 ; career, 64-78 ; Prime Minister, 72, 301 ; finance, 73-7 ; foreign policy, 78, 84-6, 92 ; fall, 93 ; came Earl of Orford, 93

WARS :

- American Independence, 159-80, 259 ; effects on France, 180, 250 ; effects on Ireland, 184, 185

WARS : Austrian Succession, 78,

- 86-97 ; in India, 197, 299
 Captain Jenkins' Ear, 78, 84-6
 Dutch (between France and Holland), 23
 English Succession, 22-34, 299
 Napolconic, 270-95, 299
 Peninsular, 280-9
 Revolutionary, 254-69, 299
 Seven Years', in America and Europe, 98-123 ; in India, 200-3 ; effects on American colonies, 161, 162, 299
 Spanish Succession, 35-56, 299
 Thirty Years', 22
 U.S.A. (1812), 290-2
 Washington, George, and Fort Duquesne, 104, 105 ; Colonial leader, 169
 Water-frame, invented, 225
 Watt, James, steam-engines, 227
Wealth of Nations, The, 142-4, 240
 Wellesley, Lord, Governor-General of India, 219, 220
 Wellesley, Arthur (*see* Wellington, Duke of)
 Wellington, Duke of, in India, 220 ; in Peninsular War, 282-9 ; Waterloo campaign, 292
 Wesley, Charles, Hymn-writer, 153, 154
 Wesley, John, founder of Methodism, 151-7
 Whigs, party founded, 2, 3, 60 ; attitude to William III, 1, 11, 60 ; under Anne, 15, 16, 60 ; members and principles, 60, 61 ; under George I, II and III, 61-3, 71, 301 ; under George III, 127-35
 Whitfield, George, and Methodists, 153
 Wilberforce, William, and Slavery, 147-9

Wilkes, John, founded *North Briton*, 130; libel action, 130, 131; Middlesex Election, 131, 132, 135

William III, accession, 1, 3; character, 5-7; death, 14, 40; generalship, 33

Wilmington, Lord, First Lord of Treasury, 94; death, 95

Wolfe, General, chosen by Pitt, 110, 114; captured Quebec, 116, 118

Wolfe Tone, 187, 188

Wood's Halfpence, 75

Y

YORKTOWN, British surrender at, 174, 175

Young, Arthur, comments on English roads, 230; as agriculturist, 236

Z

ZEMINDARS, Indian tax-collectors, 217, 218

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